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ABSTRACT 
The aim of this study is to trace the evolution of the image of Saudi 
Arabia in the British press from the 1970's to the 1990's. During this period, 
the image which the press and its readers had of Saudi Arabia underwent a 
transformation. At the beginning of the 1970's, Saudi Arabia was perceived as 
a distant, rather exotic, part of the Arabian peninsula, much of a muchness with 
the other states in the Gulf, a country about which little was or needed to be 
known by British readers. It appeared to have no particular importance for 
Britain, far less so than Egypt, Syria or Iraq which were seen as the countries 
of importance and influence, for good or ill in the Middle East and within the 
Arab world. By the beginning of the 1990's, Saudi Arabia was by contrast 
seen as a country which was of considerable importance for Britain both in 
particular and in a general, being of critical importance for the West as a whole 
as the holder of both the largest oil reserves and having the largest long-term oil 
production capacity in the world. It came to be presented as economically 
important as a market for British exports both visible and invisible; a country 
in which a substantial number of British citizens worked and thus required the 
maintenance of actively good diplomatic relations; a regional power; and, as 
at least one, if not now the most influential country in the affairs of the Arab 
world, when it chooses to exert its influence. A country therefore, which the 
readers of the quality press, the people with interest and influence in matters of 
foreign and economic matters, need to know about and have the features of her 
particular political, social and cultural system, as well as the nature and 
importance of it as an Islamic country and the force represented within and 
beyond it, explored, explained and discussed for them by their newspapers. 
Thus, a distinct and substantially detailed image of Saudi Arabia cumulatively 
evolved in the British quality press over the period covered by this study. 
There have been very few earlier studies published which are of 
relevance to the image of Saudi Arabia. The existing studies have been carried 
out mainly in the USA and relate principally to the North American media and 
have tended to merge Saudi Arabia in the general stereotypes of `Arabs', or of 
`Islam', mostly deriving the stereotypes in fact from Palestinian Arabs, and 
have paid little attention to exploring the public image of Saudi Arabia as such. 
This is, therefore, a pioneering investigation in terms of the research question 
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addressed. It is also based on a much greater quantity and depth of data than 
has been explored in the previous studies. 
The methodology employed is that of qualitative content analysis applied 
to the `Quality' sector of the British Press, which unlike the `Popular' press in 
Britain provides the systematic coverage of foreign affairs. The Times, The 
Guardian, the Daily Telegraph and the Financial Times were studied 
comprehensively during four, four week sample periods, selected to spread on 
either side of the four main, pivotal, events in Anglo-Saudi relations, and 
which, at each time, thus brought Saudi Arabia into the main focus for the 
British press, between the Oil Crisis of 1973 and the Gulf Crisis in 1990. Each 
of these, it was found, in fact led to a major extension or change in her image. 
The conclusions of the study indicate the following: (a) that the image of 
Saudi Arabia has typically been favourable in the British press as compared 
with other countries of the area; (b) it developed stage by stage from being a 
shadowy entity to being seen as holding a prominent place in the Arab and the 
Islamic communities as well as occupying a significant one on the world stage; 
(c) the principal factors leading to the rise of Saudi Arabia's importance were 
seen by the Press as oil, its special position within and for Islam, a consistent 
foreign policy of moderation and active opposition to communism and other 
extremist political movements, general economic strength and its strategic 
location; (d) Saudi Arabia also came increasingly to be seen as additionally 
important through the influence it derived from using the weight of its oil, 
financial and political resources to support and to promote its Islamic ideals and 
Islamic mission beyond its own borders. 
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INTRODUCTION a 
Individual groups, establishments and countries spend a huge amount of 
money on improving their image. Saudi Arabia is no exception. In fact as 
`Guardian of the holy places' and Islam, Saudi Arabia has an obligation to be 
zealous about the image of Saudi Arabia and its Islamic ideals. 
With the aim of better understanding the factors involved in the external 
perception of Saudi Arabia and its system, this study attempts to describe and 
analyse qualitatively the image of Saudi Arabia in the British press. 
There is relatively little literature about the external image of Saudi Arabia 
and even this is often from a very generalised perspective, often referring to Saudi 
Arabia as simply stereo-typical of `Arabs' and `Islam'. No systematic and specific 
study of the image of Saudi Arabia as such has, as yet, been published. This study 
is an attempt to discover a pattern in the complex picture of its past, and to 
indicate possible tendencies for the future evolution of the perception of Saudi 
Arabia. 
The term `image' is based on the Oxford English Dictionary's definition of 
"... a concept or impression created in the minds of the public, of a particular 
person, institution or product. " For the purposes of the topic of this particular 
piece of research, the definition has been narrowed down to `a concept or 
impression of Saudi Arabia as published in a selection of British newspapers 
during a succession of sample periods over a period of eighteen years. ' 
There are many reasons for researching the image of Saudi Arabia in the 
British press. First and foremost, it is an intellectually interesting subject given the 
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complexity of Saudi Arabia itself and the fact that the connections between Britain 
and the Arabian peninsula stretch back over a century. The nature and character 
of the image of Saudi Arabia and its ideals might also be crucial in the future for 
those who are concerned about Saudi Arabia and what she stands for. 
In 1980, Wilbur Schramm wrote that, 
"... the world consists of individual and national 
actors and since it is axiomatic that action is based 
on the actor's image of reality, international action 
will be based on the image of international reality. 
This image is not shaped by the news media ... 
alone; personal relations abroad, diplomatic 
dispatches, etc., account too - whether less, equally 
much or more, we do not know. But the regularity, 
ubiquity and perseverance of news media will in any 
case make them first-rate competitors for the number 
one position as international image-formers. "' 
Kenneth Boulding also argued that, 
"... we must recognise that the people whose decisions 
determine the policies and actions of nations do not 
respond to the `objective' facts of the situation, whatever 
that may mean, but to their `image' of the situation. It is 
what we think the world is like, not what it is really like, 
that determines our behaviour . "2 
The same point has also been made by most of the leading contemporary scholars 
of media roles and influences such as John Ellis (1989), Jack Shaheen (1979) and 
William Adams (1980). 
1 Schramm, W: "Circulation of News in the Third World: A Study of Asia", in: 
Wihoit, C. and de Bock, H. (eds): Mass Communication Review Book, Sage, Beverly Hills. 
1980. P. 618. 
2 Boulding, K. E: "National Images and International Systems", in Rosenau, J. N. 
(ed): International Politics and Foreign Policy. A Reader in Research and Theory. (Revised 
Edition), The Free Press, Collier MacMillan Publishers, London. 1969. P. 423. 
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To be able to arrive at well-grounded conclusions about the image of 
Saudi Arabia, it has been necessary to study the information which appeared in the 
Press as well as the evolution of the image over a sufficiently long period of time, 
because images are cumulatively formed. However, given the huge quantity of 
column inches which the daily press of a modern society produces, methods of 
sampling have had to be devised and employed. The two principal methods of 
sampling were applied. 
1. Only the `quality' section of the British press was covered : not the 
`popular' section, and only the principal national daily `quality' papers 
were examined. Narrowing the research coverage down to a manageable 
quantity in this way does not, however, affect the validity of the 
conclusions, because matters of foreign policy and of economic relations 
with foreign countries, especially as far away as Saudi Arabia, are typically 
and regularly only the concern of the British newspapers which form the 
`quality' section of the press. The British popular press concentrates more 
on domestic matters and only occasionally covers such matters, and then 
only in an episodic fashion. Both the sustained interest and knowledge 
which such matters require tend to be the preserve of the educated and a 
politically concerned elite in Britain, and it is also these people who tend 
to have an influence in these policy areas. 
2. Rather than take a random sample, such as a particular day, a particular 
page, or some similar statistical method commonly employed for content 
surveys over a long period of time - which at best, give a statistical 
representation of the extent of coverage and a basis for an impressionistic 
assessment of the character of it but cannot deal with the more 
sophisticated question of the `image' of a country - it was decided to apply 
1_ 
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the technique of sample periods, selected not randomly, but around events 
of major importance in the history of the relationship between the two 
countries. These events were the oil crisis of 1973, the Makkah crisis of 
1979, the `Death of a Princess' crisis of 1980 and the Gulf crisis of 1990. 
The advantage of this approach was that during these events, the attention 
of the British press and of the political class were, at least to a significant 
extent, actually focused on this particular country, and therefore, both the 
quantity and quality of the coverage was high. In addition, because the 
attention of the public was heightened in relation to the whole region, what 
was, published during these periods was likely to have an impact on the 
evolution of an image in the minds of the public. 
The British `quality' press is dominated, or at least was dominated during 
the complete period between 1973-1990 by three newspapers, which between 
them covered the political spectrum within the educated elite: namely, The Times, 
The Guardian and the Daily Telegraph. 
The Times traditionally represents the centre and high ground of British 
politics with a party-politically neutral viewpoint, though during the last two 
decades it has been seen to be tending more to the right than before. The Times 
has also traditionally been considered as the most prestigious of newspapers, 
occupying a special position as such, though this paramount position has been 
substantially eroded since the Second World War. By the period covered by this 
research, it had become less of a first amongst equals. Nevertheless, The Times 
remains the single most important newspaper of the British `quality' press, 
particularly at times of major international crises. 
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The Guardian was always on the centre left of British politics, originally 
supporting the Liberal Party but more recently, it least in broad and intellectual 
terms, supporting the Labour Party. It is the principal newspaper of the educated, 
socially and politically aware and concerned sections of the educated elite of 
Britain and of those with a centre left inclination. 
The Daily Telegraph is on the centre right of British politics, principally 
the newspaper taken by those sections of the elite which typically support the 
Conservative Party and it reflects the alternative perspectives to those broadly 
reflected in The Guardian. 
In addition to the above three papers, the Financial Times was also 
selected because it-is the standard reading matter of the business, economic and 
financial elite who might read one or more of the quality newspapers, depending 
on their political inclinations, but who might look to the Financial Times for very 
high quality factual information and an objective analysis without a party-political 
hue, to assist them in making financial and economic judgements. The 
presentation and image of Saudi Arabia in this context is particularly relevant, 
given the extensive economic dimensions of Saudi Arabia as an oil country of 
major financial importance. 
Between them, the readership of these four newspapers substantially 
covers most, and certainly the majority, of the political and economic elite of 
Britain and especially those who might have some influence with regard to 
Britain's relationship with foreign countries in terms of political, diplomatic and 
economic dimensions. 
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During the period covered by this study, another newspaper, namely The 
Independent, emerged as a newspaper also read by members of the elite and was, 
therefore, influential for the same reasons already given for The Times, The 
Guardian and the Daily Telegraph. Unfortunately, it was not in being for the 
whole of the period covered by this research but a future study should certainly 
include The Independent. Similarly, the Sunday newspapers, which were not 
studied during this research project due to time limitations, should also be 
included in future research projects. 
THE STRUCTURE OF THE THESIS 
The thesis consists of an Introduction, five main Chapters, a Conclusion, 
and a Bibliography. 
Chapter One provides a review of related literature which is divided into 
three sections. The first provides a general discussion of the literature relating to 
`image' and perceptions and the factors affecting the processes through which 
newspaper content, and what a newspaper covers or does not cover, comes about. 
The second section discusses the literature relating to the image of Third World 
countries in the Western media. The third section reviews the literature relating to 
the image of `Arabs' or `Islam' and highlights the fact that, in the literature so far, 
the image of Saudi Arabia has usually been immersed in these stereotypes. 
The following four Chapters then represent the main research findings 
which emerged from the study of the four pivotal events chosen as the sample 
periods in the evolution of the image of Saudi Arabia in the British `quality' press. 
Each of these led, in fact, to a significant shift of focus onto different aspects of 
Saudi Arabia and thus elaborated that image. Therefore, each of these Chapters 
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has, at least to some extent, focused conceptually on different issues relating to 
Saudi Arabia. 
Chapter Three surveys the rather sketchy image of Saudi Arabia as it had 
evolved by 1973, before the Oil Crisis focused attention onto Saudi Arabia in a 
major way and led to it being seen as emerging into a regional power and of 
special importance amongst `oil countries'. 
Chapter Four starts by reviewing the further evolution of that image in the 
context of the so-called `oil shock' of 1979, but then, with the sudden occurrence 
of the completely unexpected seizure of the Grand Mosque by a group of religious 
extremists, which led to the press seeking to understand and present the Islamic 
and social structure of Saudi Arabia and the tensions within Saudi society arising 
from them, the focus of the concluding part of the Chapter switches to those 
issues. 
Chapter Five considers what could be described as the first and, so far, 
only crisis in the typically placid and harmonious Anglo-Saudian diplomatic 
relationship. This was the result of the making, and then the showing of the film 
`Death of a Princess' in 1980 by British television, despite Saudi Arabian protests. 
Diplomatic relations were soon patched up and, as a diplomatic event, it had little 
lasting importance but it resulted in the most extensive exploration and discussion 
in the `quality' press and outside it of the socio-cultural structure and character of 
Saudi Arabia in general, and the position of women in particular. In other words, 
those areas where there had always been the least understanding and where the 
gulf between the fundamental social, cultural and political assumptions between 
Saudi Arabians and the British was the widest, were suddenly thrust into the 
forefront of the news. 
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Chapter Six deals with the presentation of Saudi Arabia in the context of 
the outbreak of the Gulf Crisis, the military occupation of Kuwait by Iraq's 
Saddam Hussein and the implied threat of Iraq marching into Saudi Arabia, and 
possibly beyond, into the most oil rich area of the world. It was the first time that 
the Saudi Arabian state and Saudi Arabian society faced the supreme test of the 
threat of war and the capacity to face up to potentially fateful choices and 
decisions as an Islamic and Arabic country: whether or not to ally with, and 
potentially wage war alongside, the West with Western military forces on her soil, 
against another Arabic, and at least formally, Islamic country. Therefore, 
attention focused for the first time on Saudi Arabian military and diplomatic 
capabilities and on the authority and effectiveness of her system of government 
when it came under critical pressure. These were of course, major and important 
elements in the image of Saudi Arabia in the eyes of other countries but which had 
been largely unexplored in the British press until this point. There is a sense, 
therefore, in which the Gulf Crisis provided an occasion for the British `quality' 
press to present the last major piece of the jigsaw concerning the British image of 
what kind of a country, society and culture Saudi Arabia was and still is. 
The final Chapter of the dissertation presents the overall conclusions 
drawn from the study. It seeks to summarise the image of Saudi Arabia as it had 
evolved by the 1990s. It explores implications for the future development of that 
image and it also makes suggestions for further studies which could explore the 
topic in more detail. 
Nearly all the events which I studied, as presented in the British `quality' 
press, took place before my own eyes. I felt many of them very deeply, not only 
as a Saudi Arabian citizen but as a personal witness. Therefore, my dissertation 
xx 
was written with a feeling of respect for the UK. and also a feeling of love for my 
own country and its ideals. At the conclusion of my study, I feel a deep sense of 
hope and a desire for the people of Saudi Arabia and of the UK to share a future 
of understanding, peace and co-operation, despite all the differences between the 
two countries and their cultures. 
CHAPTER ONE 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
2 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
1.1 INTRODUCTION TO THE CHAPTER 
This Chapter will survey the literature which provided the starting 
point, the background and a theoretical context for the research concerning the 
evolution of the image of Saudi Arabia in the British `quality' press. It is 
organised under three headings: 
1. General and theoretical Factors influencing the public's knowledge 
about and image of, the image of `the world outside'. 
2. The image of the Third World countries. 
3. The image of Arabs and Saudi Arabia. 
1.2 GENERAL AND THEORETICAL FACTORS INFLUENCING 
THE PUBLIC'S KNOWLEDGE ABOUT, AND IMAGE OF, 
`THE WORLD OUTSIDE'. 
Today, the public primarily gain their knowledge about, and form their 
image of, events, places, people or countries at a distance beyond the range of 
their own experience, second-hand, from the mass media. The formation of the 
public's knowledge and image of a `far away country' is a complex process 
affected by many factors. Some of these are bound up with the complex, and 
as yet still not substantially understood, psychological and social processes of 
learning and opinion formation which are a subject and indeed a discipline of 
their own and which, within the compass of this study, cannot be entered into. 
The others primarily involved concern the practices of the media itself, the 
ways in which the content of newspapers, television, radio and related media 
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come to be formed, the professional practices through which the `content' of a 
newspaper, what is covered and what is not and when certain aspects or events 
to be covered come to be determined, and the ways in which these factors 
interact with the audience to cumulatively build up a mosaic image. 
One of the first and highly ° seminals works about the relationship 
between the mass media and the public image is by Walter Lipmann in his "The 
World Outside and the Pictures in our Head" , Lippman argued that there 
is an 
influence and effect of the press on the readers. He believed that image is not 
based, "... on direct or certain knowledge, but on pictures made by [one] self 
or given to him. " Further, Lippman presented some factors, which he thought 
contributed to the image creation process: 
"... They are the artificial censorships, the 
limitations of social contact, the comparatively 
meagre time available in each day for paying attention 
to public affairs, the distortion arising because events 
have to be compressed into very short messages, the 
difficulty of making a small vocabulary express a 
complicated world, and finally the fear of facing 
those facts which would seem to threaten the 
established routine of men's lives. "' 
Hirsch, in Strategies for Communication Research (1977), and 
Schoemaker, in "Building Theory of News Content" (1987), added several 
other factors which they believe affect coverage and content in general, 
contribute to the image shaping process, and have an effect on the audience. 
They are the following: - 
t Lippman, W.: "The World Outside and the Pictures in our Heads" in 
Schramm, W. and Roberts, D. F. (eds): The Process and Effects of Mass 
Communication. University of Illinois press. 1977. P. 284-285. 
4 
1. journalists, as a particular social and occupational group; 
2. the newsroom operation; 
3. the media organisation; 
4. the social context and the context of other institutions in which they 
operate; and, 
5. the ideology and culture, in general, of both journalists and their 
readers. 2 
The following section will briefly analyse representative studies of each 
factor that is believed to be responsible for the message content which 
contributes to the different images we hold about the environment and world 
outside. 
There are many studies which concentrate on journalist and the 
operational mode in the newsroom as the main factors which influence the 
content of the media which shape our image. 
In their classic study, Galtung and Rug (1965) concluded that, 
"Events became news to the extent that they 
satisfy the conditions of. frequency, threshold, 
absolute intensity, intensity increase, unambiguity, 
meaningfulness, cultural proximity, relevance, 
consonance, predictability, demand, unexpectedness, 
unpredictability, scarcity, continuity, composition, 
reference to elite nations, reference to elite people 
and something negative. "3 
2 
3 
Lippman, 1977. See also Hirsch, P. L., Miller, P. V. and Kline, F. G. (eds): 
Strategies for Communication Research, Sage, London 1977. See also 
Schoemaker, P. and Myfield, E.: "Building Theory of News Content". 
Journalism Monographs. Vol. 103. June 1987. 
Galtung, J. and Ruge, M.: "The Structure of Foreign News", Journal of Peace 
Research. 1965. Vol. 2, pp. 64.91. 
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Galtung and Rug warned that these factors are not independent in most 
cases although they generally held that the content of the media which 
contributes to image shaping is primarily the result of selection by journalists 
adhering to professional norms about `news-values'. 4 
Abraham Z. Bass (1969) suggested that there are, in fact, two parts to 
this process: the news editing process by the newspaper editors and news 
gathering. However, he believes that the most important part is the latter one 
where significant decisions are made about the reporting of events. 5 
Barbara Phillips (1976), in a study based on 13 months of field 
observation and ' interviews in various media organisations, found that 
conventions about style and structure of media coverage in itself influences the 
nature of the news process. Phillips believes that such influence "... inhibits 
broader insights into changing realities. "6 
In another study, which examined the role of seven news factors 
developed by Galtung and Rug in their classic work of 1965, Sophia Peterson 
analysed the extent of fidelity of the press in shaping our image. The seven 
factors which Peterson focused on were: unambiguity, frequency, threshold, 
personal elitism, national elitism, meaningfulness and negativities. The study of 
these factors examined the published and unpublished international news in 
The Times during two periods: 3-9 January and 4-10 February 1975. A 
comparison was made between the published news and the unpublished news. 
Peterson concluded that there is considerable evidence that the lack of fidelity 
4 
5 
6 
Ibid.. 
Bass, A. Z.: "Refining the Gate Keeper Concept", Journalism Quarterly. 1969. 
Vol. 46, pp. 69-72. 
Phillips, B.: "Novelty Without Change", Journal of Communication. 1976. 
pp87-92. 
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between the "... world outside and the picture in our heads... " exists.? For 
example, the published news covered 47 stories while the unpublished news 
covered 57. Also, the published news related to 71 actors while the 
unpublished news related to 152. Peterson added that these conclusions 
support the Third World's claim about the imbalance and distortion of news 
flow which influences the image of developing countries. 
Peterson's study is to some extent limited in value as it was limited to a 
single newspaper and a short period of time, and the question as to whether 
within that period there were major events which might have caused the 
imbalance of that paper in that period of time, has not been explicitly 
considered. Nevertheless, Peterson's study provides empirical evidence for 
the functioning of mass media coverage of the world. It also specifically 
supports Lippman's 1977 study concerning "The World Outside and the 
Pictures in Our Head". In a broader perspective than these studies, Lewis 
Donohew (1967) studied the factors which related to the decision to choose 
one news item rather than another. Donohew postulated the following factors: 
1. the influence of the owners' views and attitudes, and, 
2. percieved community opinion of the behaviour of news gate-keepers as 
indicated by: 
(a) news coverage of given topics, and 
(b) community conditions as related to coverage. 9 
7 
8 
Peterson, S.: "International News Selection by Elite Press: A Case Study", 
Public Opinion Quarterly. 1981. Vol. 45, pp. 142-166. 
Donohew, L.: "Newspaper Gate Keeper Forces in the News Channel", Public 
Opinion Quarterly. 1967. Vol. 31, No. 1, P. 61-68. 
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Donohew's study concluded that the publisher's attitude is an important 
force in the news channel, but his findings did not support the hypothesis that 
community conditions are related to coverage although some important 
negative correlations were found. 
Studies considering government policies as an influence on news 
process studies have arrived at different conclusions. The shift of the USA's 
policy to pro-West Pakistan during the conflict between India and Pakistan in 
1971 allowed Lee B. Becker (1977) to examine the relationship between the 
USA's foreign policy and press presentation. The aim of Becker's study was 
to analyse the relationship between government policy and press coverage of 
world affairs. The study used the coverage of the New York Times as the 
"experimental" setting and the coverage of The Times (London) as the 
"control" situation. 
Becker found that the New York Times changed its news view or 
position, but in the opposite direction to that of the leaders in Washington. 
However, when the New York Times coverage was compared to that of The 
Times of London, Becker suggested that some minor changes in the 
quantitative analysis appeared. Becker concluded that such changes might 
have resulted from the fact that, "The reporters and editors sensed pressure 
and reacted by shifting away from its thrust. "9 
In his study, "Ideological Perspectives and Political Tendencies in 
News Reporting", George Gerbner found that all editorial and news items in 
the media have an ideological identity. When comparing the party press with 
Becker, L. B.: "Foreign Policy and Press Performance", Journalism Quarterly. 
1977. Vol. 54, No. 2, P. 364-368. 
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the commercial press in their coverage of a local murder event in France, 
Gerbner discovered that, "France's emerging commercial press does not 
escape from politics, its ideological perspectives lie between those of the left 
press and the right, but closer to the latter. "10 The study covered the event in 
nine newspapers; three represented the left press, three represented the right 
press and three represented the commercial press. Gerbner concluded that the 
coverage of the incident in the three groups suggested that apparently non- 
political news still expressed and cultivated an ideological perspective and that 
this applied as much for the commercial press as for the political press. 
Using quantitative tools, Bernard Anderson" carried out a content 
analysis on 88 issues of 18 elite newspapers in the USA and the UK relating to 
the image of the Third World within the papers, and postulated that "... news is 
ideology... ". The study found that Third World countries received only 5% of 
column space coverage, and that was mostly devoted to political and economic 
types of coverage. Anderson presented an interesting comparative hypothesis 
when he related the type of Third World coverage on the one hand to the 
coverage of sub-cultural events inside one Western country. In Anderson's 
words: 
"The third world is minimally and poorly explained 
in Western print news for much the same reason, I 
suggested, as those factors which account for the type 
of print news coverage given to the poor, disenfranchised, 
disadvantaged and marginalized. "12 
10 
11 
12 
Gerbner, G.: "Ideological Perspectives and Political Tendencies in News 
Reporting", Journalism Quarterly. 1964. Vol. 41, P. 495-506. 
Anderson, B.: "A Comparative Structural Analysis of the Context of Images 
of the Third World in American and English News Publications", Unpublished 
Ph. D, London University. 1987. 
Anderson, B. 1987. P. 330. 
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He concluded that it would be "... pointless to lay on specific institutions [or] 
professions" the blame for misrepresenting the third world": rather, "... the 
entire country, society and economic system are as much to blame. "13 
1.3 THE IMAGE OF THIRD WORLD COUNTRIES 
The "image" issue is often at the centre of major debates between the 
Western news media on the one side and Third World countries on the other 
side. The controversy over the imbalance and distortion of the coverage of 
Third World or developing countries by the Western media has been one of the 
factors which has contributed to lots of research and development within 
"image" studies. The debates on this issue prompted UNESCO, at its General 
Conference in 1976 in Nairobi, to undertake a review in a global framework of 
problems of communication in contemporary society. 
Many Voices, One World (1980)14 is the title of the very extensive 
report by sixteen members from different countries who aimed to study the 
communication problems of an increasingly globalised world. The central issue 
raised in this report was the conflict between the Third World countries and the 
Western countries over the imbalances and distortions of the news flow in the 
Western media, concerning the developing countries. The Third World 
countries called for a new world information and communication order 
sponsored and supported by UNESCO. 
13 Ibid. P. 331. 
14 McBride, S., et al: Many Voices, One World, Report by the International 
Commission for the Study of Communication Problems: Paris, UNESCO, Kogan 
Page, London. 1980. P. 175. 
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Among the various extensive subjects which the reporters tackled was 
"the distortion of content". The section of the report devoted to this is 
relevant to the present study, although the report concerns itself with the Third 
World in general, and not with a specific country. 
In Many Voices, One Work, the distortion of news content is said to 
occur "... when inaccuracies or untruths replace authentic facts... ", as well as 
when the media gives prominence to non-important events for presentational 
reasons and presents random data as the whole or partial truth. The authors 
concluded that "... in many instances, a more heightened sense of journalistic 
responsibility might present a fuller, fair(er) and more accurate picture of the 
world to the public it serves. "15 
Several other studies have been conducted relating to particular sub- 
cultures or segments within the Third World countries which support the 
general claims made. The image of Africa in six newspapers was studied by C. 
B. Pratt (1988). 16 The study aimed to answer two main questions by using 
quantitative methods. 
1. What depth of coverage do the selected magazines have on Africa? 
2. What image do they, by implication, present to their readers? 
The study revealed that, the minuscule coverage of the continent, both 
in terms of geographical area, typology and the emphasis on violence, portrays 
Africa negatively. For example, 86% of the news in the New York Times 
during the period of the study was news about conflict. In addition, 84% and 
15 Ibid. 
16 Pratt, C.: "The Reportage and Image of Africa in Six USA News and Opinion 
Magazines: A Comparative Study", Gazette. 1980. Vol. 26, No. 1, P. 87-92. 
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70% of the news in Newsweek and U. S. News and World Report, respectively, 
was about conflict too. 
Pratt argued that while there are true crises and conflicts in many 
countries in Africa which need to be covered, "... it is disheartening to observe 
media staffers' rationalisation of a Pavlovian response to turbulence. "17 
1.4 THE IMAGE OF ARABS AND SAUDI ARABIA 
"The Image of the Arabs in America: Analysis of Polls on American 
Attitudes"18 was a study which was concerned with the image of different Arab 
countries and Islam. Shelley Slade, who analysed the poll which was 
conducted by a private organisation over the telephone with six hundred 
Americans, found that Saudi Arabia enjoyed a balanced perception compared 
to other Arab countries. Further, the study revealed that 6% of the 
respondents have a very high opinion of Saudi Arabia, 38% a fairly high 
opinion, 28% a fairly low opinion and 13% a very low opinion. 
The study also found that 25% thought of Saudi Arabia as a friendly 
country. Slade believed that this was very low in the light of the political and 
economic ties between the two countries. However, within the 25% who 
regarded Saudi Arabia as `friendly', most of them selected `oil', `oil 
production' or `gas' as the term that came to their minds when Saudi Arabia 
was mentioned. Moreover, 70% of them saw Saudi Arabia as rich and 45% 
saw it as a strong country. 
17 Ibid.. P. 87-92. 
18 Slade, S.: "The Image of the Arabs in America: Analysis of Polls on American Attitudes", Middle East Journal. 1980. Vol. 35, P. 143-162. 
12 
Slade found that there was a correlation between the respondents' 
opinions towards Saudi Arabia and the degree of stereotyping of Arabs and any 
other Arab country. In relation to the media, the analysis revealed that only 
18% of the sample who watched the film `Death of a Princess' were likely to 
have a favourable opinion of Saudi Arabia and "Arabs". 
Slade concluded that the poll showed "Arabs" in general as unfriendly 
towards the USA. 19 
"Image Formation and Textbooks"20 is the title of a study by Ayad Al- 
Qazzaz which was undertaken to determine if texts published since 1975 have 
improved in their representation of Islam. Using a qualitative content analysis 
of chapters and pages of high school world history textbooks, the study found 
that, "The image of Islam is misrepresented in some American textbooks as a 
warlike religion in which women occupy a position of servitude. "21 
The author analysed and presented many methods of misrepresenting 
Islam such as inaccuracy, distortion, false information and omission. One 
example of an inaccuracy in one textbook was that, "Ramadan is the month in 
which Mohammed was born, received his revelation from Allah, made the 
Heijira and died. " With the exception of the revelation, the rest of the 
statement is totally false. 22 
19 
20 
21 
22 
Slade, S. 1980. P. 143-162. 
Al-Qazzaz, A.: "Image Formation and Textbooks" in Ghareeb, E. (ed): 
Split Vision: The Portrayal of the Arabs in the American Media, American Arab 
Council, Washington, D. C. 1983. 
Ibid.. P. 379. 
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In his book "Split Vision: The Portrayal of the Arabs in the American 
Media, " 23 Edmund Ghareeb analysed the imbalance and distortion of the 
USA's media coverage of Arabs and the Arab-Israeli conflict. The study found 
that the American media presents Arab people and countries as incompetent, 
backward, scheming, fanatical terrorists, dirty, dishonest, oversexed, corrupt, 
bumbling, cowardly and super-rich. On the other hand, the study found that 
the American media presents the Israeli people and state as threatened (by 
Arabs), tough, energetic, hard working, perseverant, courageous people and 
pioneers. 
The approach adopted in this study was mainly that of selecting clips of 
the American media which were related to and could support the author's 
hypothesis about the distortion and imbalance claim.. However, the author 
classified the methods used to promote the imbalance and distorted image 
about Arabs as the following: 
(1) 
(2) 
(3) 
omission; 
accepting terminology coined by Israelis such as "Palestinian" becomes 
"Arab terrorist", "October War" becomes "Yom Kippur War"; 
inaccurate information, for example, confusion between the location 
and knowledge of countries in some printed material about Arab affairs; 
and, 
(4) misleading headlines, neglect, burial and underpay. 
The book quoted many examples of the above. 
23 Ghareeb, E. et al: Split Vision: The Portrayal of the Arabs In the American 
Media, American Arab Council, Washington, D. C. 1983. 
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The study concluded that the cultural gap between Arabs and 
Americans, the Arab-Israeli conflict, Arab failure to act and the American 
media are responsible for the negative image of Arabs in the American press 24 
In his paper, Lendenmann25 analysed the work of Herblock and others 
in The Washington Post. Ledenmann presented two major themes which he 
believed to pervade Herblock's ideology concerning the events in the Middle 
East. One theme was that of Arab blackmail of the United States, usually in 
order to procure arms, through their oil. The other theme was "... the 
disreputableness of the Palestinians and the PLO, usually personified by Yassir 
Arafat"26 Lendenmann presented and analysed many of Herblock's cartoons 
which he used to justify his hypothesis of the negative image of Arabs and 
Palestinians in the American press. However, Lendenmann did not present any 
other positive or neutral cartoons about the Arabs. It seems that the study 
lacked some of the objectivity which he was supposedly looking for. 
Jack Shaheen's study of "The Arab Image in the American Mass 
Media"27 started by presenting the following four questions. 
(1) Why is the stereotype so attractive? 
(2) Why is it easy to do? 
(3) Why do most people continue to accept it? 
(4) What steps should be taken to change this image? 
24 
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The study concluded that the image of "Arabs" can be summarised by 
the following aspects: 
(1) Arabs are fabulously wealthy; 
(2) Arabs are barbaric and backward; and, 
(3) ' Arabs are sex-oriented with a penchant for Western women. 28 
Shaheen's paper addressed the issue of how the various sections of the 
American media programme the social system. In children's cartoon 
programmes, Shaheen found that Arab characters are usually presented as the 
"bad" guy. One example is a cartoon story which showed Arab people giving 
watches as gifts, but the watches were time bombs. 29 In daily comic strips, 
which Shaheen believed attracted children, one of the favourite cartoon 
characters, Dennis the Menace, ridiculed Arab people. Dennis complained on 
Thanksgiving Day, "Dewey's family's havin' meatloaf. His dad says some 
Arab is eating their turkey. "30 In adult programmes such as wrestling shows, 
which appeal to adults more than to children, Arabs were presented in a 
negative way. For example, one night the television announcer presented Sheik 
Akabar The Great, and Abdullah The Butcher, as Arab wrestlers for the sheer 
pleasure of inflicting pain on others. What the announcer did not say was that 
the two wrestlers were not Arab but American. 
Finally, the study, made several statements about the duties of Arab 
people against such an image. This study, like the previous ones, did not 
28 Ibid. 
29 Ibid.. p. 328. 
30 Ibid.. 
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follow any specific method. It appears that all the examples which Shaheen 
presented were selected instances which supported his ideas. 
Another of the classic studies about the image of "Arabs" is Shaheen's 
book entitled "The TV Arab "31 The purpose of Shaheen's study was to 
emphasise man's need for fair play, not for a single group of misrepresented 
human beings. The data was collected during eight years of American TV 
programme observation, that Arabs' were presented as extremely rich, generally 
barbaric and uncultured, oversexed and sex maniacs. Moreover, the study 
revealed that Arabs tend to be represented by TV writers as the following: 
(1) 
(2) 
(3) 
(4) 
(5) 
(6) 
(7) 
(8) 
Arabs are buying up America; 
OPEC is synonymous with Arab; 
Iranians are Arabs; 
all Arabs are Muslims; 
Arabs are white slavers and uncivilised rulers of kingdoms; 
all Palestinians are terrorists; 
there is inter-Arab strife; and, 
Arabs are the world's enemies. 
Shaheen reached these general conclusions by observing and 
documenting more than one hundred television programmes which he divided 
into three kinds: dramas; docudramas documentaries; and, news. Also, these 
types of programmes were further divided into cultural programmes such as 
children's programmes, children and adult's programmes and adult 
programmes. 
31 Shaheen, J. G.: The TVArab, Popular Press, Bowling Green State University, 
Shaheen found Ohio. 1984 
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Shaheen believed that Arabs, like any race, have many positive features, 
that Arab misrepresentation on the American TV is due to a lack of knowledge 
of the culture and the background about Arabs, and that misrepresenting Arabs 
is easy and saves producers time. As one producer said, 
"Everybody (e. g. TV producers) tends to think 
in terms of quick solutions. I think the tendency 
to target Arabs for fun and anger is very easy 
and is often done. "32 
NBC's vice president believes that the press is one of the most 
important factors in the process of shaping images. Jerome Stanley, NBC's 
vice president, said, 
"Television entertainment producers, like news 
reporters, sometimes take their information from 
newspaper headlines, editorial cartoons and 
articles in magazines. "33 
Finally, Shaheen ended his study by assuming that the future of the TV 
Arab was unclear and that media representatives in Arab countries and the 
USA should co-operate to improve that image. Shaheen's book, "The TV 
Arab" , is an expanded work of a previous paper (Shaheen, 1983). The 
hypotheses of the two studies of Shaheen are the same and the two conclusions 
are the same, namely that there are more negative images than positive ones. 
One criticism is that Shaheen did not present any fair or positive side of the TV 
Arab. Moreover, Shaheen himself seemed confused about the keyword of his 
study (Arab). He referred to some of the Islamic scholars as Arabwhile they 
belong to non-Arab, Muslim peoples. Despite this, "The TV Arab" can be 
32 Shaheen, J. 1984. P. S. 
33 Ibid. p. 6. 
is 
considered as one of the best qualitative studies about the Arab image on the 
American television in general. 34 
The Image of the Arabs in the Leading Articles of Three USA Daily 
Newspapers3S was the title of a study by Gary Audian. The study's hypothesis 
was that there was an interchangeable relationship between the image of the 
Arabs and Israelis on the one side, and, the political relationship between the 
Arab countries and the USA on the other. Using a quantitative content analysis 
of 206 random leading articles from the New York Times, the Los Angeles 
Times and the Christian Science Monitor between 1960-1982, the study found 
that the American papers presented the Arabs as terrorists and unfriendly. 
However, the study detected some changes in the overall image of the Arabs 
after 1973. 
Like the previous study about the image of Arabs in the media, this 
study was very general. Also, the study did not treat one or two countries, 
instead, in very broad terms, it applied its findings in general to all Arab 
countries. 
"Canadian Mass Media and the Middle East"36 is a study about the 
image of Arabs, Islam and Palestinians on CTV (Canada's largest network) and 
CBC (Canadian Broadcasting Corporation). The study argued that, "The 
image of Islam has three aspects: the image of Muslims, particularly the Shia, 
as religious fanatics; the association of Islam with violence; the link between 
34 
35 
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The study did not add any new insights, except that it collected and 
organised the existing data from various studies, but the major point which this 
study made supported Shaheen (1984) and Ghareeb's (1983) findings which 
concluded that the Western media presents Islam and Arabs in an unfavourable 
light. However, the writer presented his own recommendations for solving this 
phenomenon in that Arab and Muslim people should change their "weak" 
position because people always respect the strong. 
Robert Hershman and Henry L Griggs, Jr, 39 as American foreign 
reporters, described the Arab countries or governments as angry, self-centred, 
distrustful, unco-operative, inaccessible, difficult to interact with and dull. In 
fact, they devoted most of their paper to Saudi Arabia which they saw as: 
(1) particularly frustrating; 
(2) "hell", as one news man described it; 
(3) worse than the communist states - it's easier to go to Libya than Saudi 
Arabia; 
(4) a crucial American ally; 
(5) racist on a religious basis; what made this crew different was that five 
of them were Muslim; and, 
(6) unable to understand what's good for it. 40 
The above article concluded that journalists' access to the Arab 
countries and Saudi Arabia was the most important factor behind the 
imbalanced and distorted image of the countries and their people. I did not 
39 
40 
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locate any positive incident which the writers encountered in any Arab country 
or in Saudi Arabia. 
Studying the quality, quantity and the bias in reporting Israel's invasion 
into Lebanon in 1982, Paraschos and Rutherford did a quantitative analysis of 
147 evening newscast transcripts from ABC, NBC and CBS during the period 
between June 1982 - August 1982. The study concluded that ABC had the 
most favourable assertions towards the PLO while CBS had those most 
unfavourable to Israel. Further, the study showed NBC as the most balanced 
network towards the PLO. 41 
A study was conducted by Dougherty and Warden42 of the `quality' 
press editorial articles about the Middle East during the 11 crisis years. 
Unsigned articles underwent content analysis from four prestige American 
newspapers; The New York Times, The Washington Post, The Christian 
Science Monitor and The Wall Street Journal. Dougherty and Warden 
concluded that the overall attitude of those articles were "... rather monolithic 
nor invariable over 11 years of Arab-Israeli crisis from 1967-1977.43 
Analysing the content of eleven elite newspapers between 1966 - 1974, 
Robert H Trice found that editorials in these newspapers tended to be critical 
of the policy and actions of-the Palestinians. Further, criticism of Arabs and 
support of Israel was weaker than expected. However, he found the American 
41 
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editor in the selected papers to be more supportive of Israel than of the Arab 
countries. 
Coding a total of 2,924 editorial items about the Arab-Israeli conflict 
issue, Trice added that his data supported the hypothesis which is based on the 
imbalance and distortion of reporting from Third World countries. He found 
that during a non-crisis period, the area received less attention, "... even the 
most significant issues will be at a disadvantage. "" 
However, Trice suggested that if the period of his study was extended 
to cover 1987, he would assume that more support for Israeli and Arab 
governments such as Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Jordan would emerge. Like the 
other reviewed studies, Trice examined the Arab image in relation to the Israeli 
conflict on the one hand, and in relation to American policy on the other. Even 
though the study suggested the importance of the cultural factor, the study is 
based on the American mainstream behavioural tradition. 
The above studies indicate that the Western media, as represented by 
the USA and Canada, often presented a negative and unfavourable image of the 
Arab countries, especially the USA. Saudi Arabia, which has been implied 
within the term "Arab", is not an exceptional case as it is sometimes attached 
to the most unfavourable or negative images. This is clear in relation to 
cultural images such as that of women and social life. For instance, when 
considering the image of the "Arab" in the Western media in relation to the 
treatment of women as a variable, Saudi Arabia is considered one of the worst 
Arab countries. 
44 Trice, RH.: "The American Elite Press and the Arab-Israeli Conflict", Middle 
East Journal. 1979. Vol. 33, P. 304-325. 
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There are, however, several methodological weaknesses in the 
American studies which make them not very useful as a comparative yardstick 
for studying the interrelated image of "Arabs" and Saudi Arabia in the British 
press. 
These studies have tried to analyse a single stereo-typical image of the 
"Arab" because the researchers believe in the sameness of "Arabs", 
disregarding political, cultural and economic differences. I believe this cannot 
be achieved, especially when considering the broad terms the studies used such 
as "Arab" and "Islam". For example, "Arab" is a term which is used for 
people in different countries with different backgrounds. All the studies 
substantially equated the image of the "Arab", as specifically emerging in the 
context of the Palestinians in relationship to the Israelis, to "Arabs" in general. 
This has led to over-generalisations. In media terms, the studies adopted a 
simplified `gate-keeper' theory in terms of news' organisation and journalists' 
attitudes, and assumed that specifically American professional practices and 
cultural assumptions amongst their news-media were generally true of all the 
"Western" media. This is clearly a major over-simplification. Nevertheless, 
these studies have been an important step in our understanding of the image of 
Saudi Arabia. More studies covering the media of other social and cultural 
systems, such as that of Britain and of Continental Europe, are needed before 
broader generalisations can be validly drawn. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
THE OIL CRISIS 
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THE `OIL CRISIS' 
2.1 PRELUDE: 19 SEPTEMBER 1973 -16 OCTOBER 1973 
The sample period for the `oil crisis' stage in the development of the 
image of Saudi Arabia in the British press covers the eight weeks between 13 
September to 13 November 1973. The `Oil Crisis' itself can be defined as 
having broken out on 17 October when the official announcement was made at 
the Kuwait conference that oil was to be used as a weapon in the war with 
Israel. The first section of this chapter will, therefore, analyse the image of 
Saudi Arabia as it existed before the crisis, as shown in thecoverage of the 
British press during the four weeks leading up to the announcement. 
This period is intersected by one main event, namely, the sudden 
outbreak of the war between the Arabs and Israel on 6 October 1973. During 
the two weeks prior to it, no major events occurred, and this allows the 
examination of the image of Saudi Arabia in the British Press from different 
perspectives. Prior to the oil crisis, which resulted in a major extension, and 
indeed changes, in some aspects of the image of Saudi Arabia, there were the 
following three central and settled images. 
a) Saudi Arabia as belonging to the `conservative', `moderate' and 
`developing' categories; 
b) Saudi Arabia as a supporter of the Arab countries (Egypt and 
Syria); and, 
c) Saudi Arabia as an oil power country. 
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a) Saudi Arabia as belonging to the `conservative', `moderate' and 
'developing' categories 
Dividing the world inito categories and sub-categories might be a 
universal phenomenon but "such divisions - always come about when one 
society or culture thinks about another one, as different from it"as 
According to the British papers, Saudi Arabia is regarded as belonging 
to the "... developing, under populated Middle Eastern .. "46 culture of the 
world. Economically, the Saudi Arabians were seen to be among those who 
have, against `... those who have not ... ', 
47 financial resources. 
Based on oil resources, Saudi Arabia's oil wealth was portrayed as one 
of the '... twentieth century Arabian nights... '48 However, with an income of 
£55,600 million per year, the British journalists saw Saudi Arabia as "... one of 
the richest and most powerful ... "49 countries in the world, or "... the 
head of 
the richest Arab oil states. "30 Thus, according to the British journalists, the 
major problem that faced Saudi Arabia was that of knowing "... what to do 
with snow-balling capital. "517 One journalist formulated the following 
question: 'How can Saudi Arabia spend it? 's2 
45 
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In terms of ideology, the British journalists viewed Saudi Arabia as 
having a "... profession of Arabism and a devotion to Islam. "53 Moreover, 
Saudi Arabia was seen as the "... ultimate traditionalist Monarchy .. "54, 
"... the 
most moderate ... "55 and an "... anti-communist ... 
" country5' compared to 
the "... militant .. "37, "... revolutionary... "58 Arab regimes such as 
Iraq and 
Libya. 
From an Arab-Israeli conflict perspective, the British press placed Saudi 
Arabia within the categories of those Arab countries who are "... farther 
afield... from... Israel compared to Israel's immediate neighbours... "39 such as 
Syria and Jordan. 
b) Saudi Arabia as a Supporter of Arab countries 
The second main image of Saudi Arabia to emerge is its role as a 
supporter of other Arab countries. During the October War, Egypt and Syria 
received a considerable amount of Saudi Arabian support of more than one 
kind. One of them was a political type of support. Most of the British 
journalists went so far as to claim that Egypt and Syria would not have started 
the October war without counting on " ... a long-term policy with Saudi Arabia 
backing to apply economic and political pressure... "60 on the west. Likewise, 
David Bell of the Financial Times, felt that the Egyptian leaders " ... would not 
have pressed ahead without Saudi support. "61 In the same vein, Paul Martin of 
53 
54 
33 
36 
37 
38 
59 
60 
61 
Hirst, David. The Guardian. 16 October 1973. p. 2. 
Silver, David. The Guardian. 20 September 1973. p. 3. 
Hillmore, Peter. The Guardian. 15 October 1973. p. 17. 
Hirst, David. The Guardian. 28 September 1973. p. 2. 
Silver, Eric. The Guardian. 5 October 1973. p. 5. 
Silver, Eric. The Guardian. 20 September 1973. p. 3. 
Lowry, Suzanne. The Guardian. 10 October 1973. p. 15. 
Dullforce, William. Financial Times. 8 October 1973. p. 12. 
Bell, David. Financial Times. 8 October 1973. p. 1. 
28 
The Times, reported the Saudi Arabian's leader, then King Faisal, and his 
ministers as "... voicing their support for President Sadat of Egypt in his 
struggle against Israel. "62 Moreover, when King Faisal promised all his 
country's potential and capabilities to support Egypt, The Times explained such 
promises as "... a hint that he might use the so-called-oil weapon .. "63 as 
political pressure. Saudi Arabia's important role in the war decision was 
highlighted by David Hirst of The Guardian who claimed that Sadat and Assad, 
the Presidents of Egypt and Syria respectively, had "... informed no other Arab 
leaders, with the possible exception of King Faisal , of their plan to go 
to 
war. "64 
However, as far as the British `quality' press suggests, it was just such a 
threat to use the oil as a weapon which allowed Saudi Arabia to play an 
important role, not only within the Arab world, but also in American policy 
towards the Middle East in general, and the Arab-Israeli conflict in particular. 
The Guardian journalist, Peter Hillmore, held that Saudi Arabia's mention of oil 
as a political weapon was aimed at "... modifying the USA's policy towards 
Israel and forcing American foreign policy to be pro-Arab over a long period of 
time. 65 Along the same lines, Anthony Thomas of The Times believed that "... 
evidence of an important shift in United States policy in the Middle East to 
force a new special relationship with Saudi Arabia, a country with almost 
bottomless oil reserves, is becoming overwhelming. "66 This conclusion was 
based on a succession of commercial and diplomatic initiatives between the 
USA and Saudi Arabia to grant oil supplies continually from the latter to the 
former. Moreover, The Guardian leader of 16 October stated that, "American 
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attitudes to the Middle East ... 
had been modified by Saudi Arabia's implicit 
threat of oil embargo"67 
Saudi Arabia's decision to mobilise army reserves and cancel all army 
leave during the first days of the war was highlighted in the British Press. To 
lessen the importance of Saudi Arabia's participation, an unidentified source in 
the Financial Times presumed "... that the Saudi order only cover[ed] Saudi 
forces stationed in Jordan since 1967. "68 John Bulloch of the Daily Telegraph 
believed that, "One of the more remarkable aspects of this fourth round of the 
continuing Middle East war has been the real and practical co-operation among 
all the Arab states. " However, he pointed out that this time was unlike the 
empty promises made but never carried out in 1967. Saudi Arabia had 
"... mobilised reservists and cancelled all army leave. "69 The Financial Times 
correspondent, Ihsan Hijazi, also reported that, `Saudi forces are on full alert 
and all military leave has been cancelled. ' This information was coupled with a 
claim that King Faisal had said that "... if Arab successes continued ... Jordan, 
with Saudi assistance should take the necessary steps for `liberating 
Jerusalem. '7° 
The decision to send Saudi Arabian military forces to support the 
Syrian troops against Israel on the Northern front, provoked many reactions 
from British journalists, which helps to further illuminate the image of Saudi 
Arabia's government and people. For example, David Hirst, of The Guardian, 
believed that such forces carried more of a political warning than a military 
consequence. 7' Furthermore, Hirst emphasised the religious aspect behind 
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Saudi Arabia's move as he referred in his article to the Saudi Arabian royal 
proclamation that, "Saudi Arabian blood must be mixed with other blood for 
the sake of the occupied land and the holy places. "72 He also related the 
Saudi Arabian's decision to send military forces to the news of the destruction 
of 44 aircraft and 150 Israeli tanks by the Egyptian forces, " which might imply 
that the Saudi Arabian forces were not only insignificant, but were also unable 
to engage in an unassured, uneasy battle. 
Besides Saudi Arabia's image as a political and military supporter of 
Arab countries, the majority of the British press highlighted the image of Saudi 
Arabia as an arms supplier or `transfer' point for arms equipment to Egypt and 
Syria in their war against Israel. With regard to this, Henry Stanhope of The 
Times claimed that the special helicopter which Saudi Arabia bought from the 
UK was "... expected to be transferred to Egypt. "74 Likewise, David Hirst of 
The Guardian wrote that " ... not all the arms that King Faisal 
is now acquiring 
is he going to keep to himself ..:. 73 Another role which was played 
by Saudi 
Arabia, in addition to that of `transferring' arms, was that of acting as an "... 
intermediary in fortifying the Arab armies with needed weapons. "76 This image 
of Saudi Arabia, especially that of transferring its arms to other Arab countries, 
was a very sensitive one which could have influenced the decision-making 
process of future arms sales to Saudi Arabia by manufacturing countries. 
The image of Saudi Arabia as a provider of financial support to Egypt 
and Syria was the fourth type of Saudi Arabian support to Arab countries 
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which was highlighted by most of the British press. For instance, to show the 
importance and validity of enlisting Saudi Arabia's financial support, John 
Bulloch of the Daily Telegraph believed that the Egyptian leader " ... 
had to 
ensure that Faisal was willing to put the money ... and to 
increase the amount 
vastly... "77, as he planned to go to war. ' Moreover, The Times believed that the 
Egyptian leader was "... counting on continued financial support from Saudi 
Arabia should the battle develop into a long and gruelling war. "78 David Hirst 
of The Guardian explained the official statement of the Saudi Arabian 
government to put its resources at the service of the battle to mean `money' 
and he believed that Saudi Arabia furnished 300 million pounds to Egypt for 
the war effort? 9 
c) The Image of the Oil Aspect of Saudi Arabia 
Saudi Arabia has proven oil resources of over 170 billion barrels, of 
25% of the world's known oil, and is capable of producing up to 12.2 million 
barrels per day, or more than 40'/0 of the oil production of all the Gulf States 
combined. 80 
Saudi Arabia's policy concerning this "... huge oil reserve... "81, or this 
'... bottomless oil reserve. """82 as commonly described by the British press, 
was seen to be based on not mixing oil with politics. The Daily Telegraph 
wrote that in the Saudi Arabian government, there "... has been a reluctance to 
use oil in the past... "83 for exerting political pressure. In the past, the Saudi 
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Arabians had "... refused to contemplate such a policy at all.. "84 when asked 
by other Arab countries to use oil as a political weapon to advance the "Arab" 
cause. Eric Silver of The Guardian argued along the same lines, as he quoted 
an unidentified Israeli source who underlined that the Saudi Arabian leader, 
King Faisal, "... refused as steadfastly as his predecessor to mix oil and 
politics. "85 According to Adrian Hamilton of the Financial Times "... the 
world's hope for substantial increase in oil supplies... "86 to prevent the 
development of an international supply crisis shortage, rested on the image of 
Saudi Arabia as having both such quantities of oil and such a policy. However, 
in the period between the "Arab" defeat heralded Israel's pre-eruptive air strike 
in 1967 and the outbreak of the October War in 1973, several factors 
influenced Saudi Arabia's oil policy for a limited period of time. 
In the late 1960s and early 1970s, the world's oil conditions, compared 
to previous years, showed an increase in the demand for oil as a source of 
energy compared to other sources. Moreover, oil producers convinced 
themselves that it was not economically beneficial for them to over-produce oil. 
Furthermore,, high dependency on imported oil, particularly by western-leaning 
Japan, and the USA convinced Arab leaders, who had lost territory to Israel 
and faced increasing domestic tension, that, "Oil could supplement military 
force as a weapon in the Arab struggle. "87 This should convince the consumer 
countries to press Israel for a political solution. In addition, Saudi Arabia 
warned both in private and in public of its unwillingness to increase oil 
production just to satisfy the industrialised countries, particularly the USA, the 
main supporter of Israel, unless they used their influence over Israel to 
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withdraw from Arab lands. 88 This combination was undoubtedly in the minds 
of the Egyptian and Syrian leaders when they decided to move their troops 
across the 1967 line and started the fourth Arab-Israeli war on 6 October, 
1973. 
After the war broke out, the image of Saudi Arabia portrayed by the 
British press revolved around the oil issue more than other issues and 
overshadowed the other aspects of Saudi Arabia which were discussed in the 
previous pages. However, even though it was believed that other Arab oil- 
producing countries participated in playing the `oil' card, Saudi Arabia came 
to be seen as having a vital position among the oil producing countries in 
general, and Arab countries in particular, owing to the vast oil reserves and 
selectively much higher technical production capabilities. ° These features 
convinced James Wightman of the Daily Telegraph to propose that without 
Saudi Arabia's backing, any decision to stop western and American oil 
exportation by other Arab states "... would have little effect.. "99 Adrian 
Hamilton of the Financial Times also wrote an article in this vein, stating that, 
"It is the Middle Eastern producers, and particularly the reserve-strong 
countries like Saudi Arabia, who hold most of the cards and that time will only 
strengthen their hand, with all the problems of raising prices, excess revenues 
and political ramifications that this implies. "90 
Saudi Arabia's oil policy image was now portrayed as a ".. sophisticated 
policy based on playing the `oil card' as a long term economic weapon to exert 
political pressure. ""1 To support such a view, the Daily Telegraph journalist, 
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Michael Hilton, reported that Mr. Otto N. Miller, Chairman of Standard Oil 
Company in Saudi Arabia, said in a letter to his shareholders that American 
foreign policy should pay more attention to the Arab state. In addition, Milton 
was convinced that the company "... [had] had advance warning of King 
Faisal's intention of reducing expansion of Saudi Arabian output from 30 per 
cent to 10 per cent a year. ""2 The Times' editor's commentary on the October 
War proposed that Saudi Arabia, "... had found a subtle and not ineffective 
way of using oil as a lever ... which might 
in time have had some effect ... on 
the political situation in the Middle East. "93 Peter Hillmore of The Guardian 
assumed that Saudi Arabian oil policy "... had been a slow acting one with the 
aim of forcing America's foreign policy over a long period (of time). "94 
It is clear that Saudi Arabia had been threatening to use oil as a weapon 
against the Western countries in general and the USA in particular but the 
Saudi Arabians imposed such a threat in a moderate way compared to other 
countries. While other Arab countries pressed for extreme measures in 
applying the oil threat and asked for "... a complete halt in supplies ...... 
93 Saudi 
Arabia stood for a more moderate approach 
Regarding this matter, James Wightman of the Daily Telegraph 
believed that Saudi Arabia, felt "... the threat of a ban may be more beneficial 
to the Arab cause. " Also, he assumed that the Saudi Arabians thought that, 
"... a complete halt in supplies might have the opposite of the desired effect 
and harden American support for Israel. "96 Along the same lines, Ihsan Hijazi, 
of the Financial Times, reported that Saudi Arabian officials were known to be 
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opposed to the ideas of cutting off the oil altogether, but he felt that the 
measures should be applied discriminately so that countries which had been 
taking a favourable stand on the Arab-Israeli conflict should not be punished. 97 
Therefore prior to the Kuwait oil conference, James Wightman of the Daily 
Telegraph, stressed that Saudi Arabia was not " ... expected to take the 
extreme step of cutting off supplies to America. " Nonetheless, it was assumed 
that Saudi Arabia's stand at the conference "... might [be to] carry out an 
earlier threat and freeze supplies. "98 
However, as pressure on Saudi Arabia increased from other Arab 
countries, the Saudi Arabians were seen to take a relatively more hard-line 
policy compared to their initial stand regarding the oil supply. David Hirst of 
The Guardian, proposed that the Saudi Arabians "... were anxious for only a 
token cutback as a warning to the USA and the West. "99 
2.2 REASONS BEHIND THE SUDDEN CHANGE IN OIL POLICY 
According to the view presented by British journalists, the main reasons 
behind Saudi Arabia's threat to use oil as a political weapon against the 
Western countries and the USA were stopping "Arab" humiliation, reaching a 
settlement in the Middle East, the return of Jerusalem and "Arab" lands and 
economic benefits.. Anthony Thomas' article in The Times argued that the 
essential aim of Saudi Arabia in politicising its oil policy, even before the war 
started, was "... to deter Israel from future humiliation of Arab countries. "100 
Similarly, in the same paper, two days after the war began, Paul Martin of The 
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Times interpreted Saudi Arabia's "... full support to Egypt and Syria... ", as 
mentioned in King Faisal's telegram to Dr. Henry Kissinger, as a warning to the 
USA that, "... should the Arabs suffer another defeat then it would scarcely be 
possible for Saudi Arabia to maintain its pro-American policy. "101 Even so, as 
the writer stated, Saudi Arabia "... made no direct threat to cut oil to the 
west.. " in this telegram. 102 Further, Louis Heren of The Times, assumed that 
Saudi Arabia's intention, among others, was to "... wipe out the humiliation of 
1967 on the Arab countries. "103 The Saudi Arabians believed that further 
humiliation would increase the strength of the radical regimes in the region. 
The British press also underlined the importance of the return of Arab 
lands, in general, and Jerusalem in particular, as the price for the Saudi 
Arabians not using the oil weapon. Richard Johns, of the Financial Times, 
believed that Saudi Arabia had "... set implementations of UN resolution 242 ... 
as the price for not using the `oil weapon' against the USA"104 Earlier, in the 
same paper he had indicated that Saudi Arabia would be willing to increase oil 
exports to the USA, if the USA "... created the right political climate" in the 
Middle East "'° 2 Harold Sieve, of the Daily Telegraph, held that King Faisal 
and other Gulf oil countries were "... [planning] to turn the heat on the fuel- 
hungry west, so it [would] insist on Tel-Aviv coming to terms. "106 
Saudi Arabia was seen to hold an unfavourable attitude towards 
communist ideology and the countries which represented such an ideology. 
This attitude stressed the favourable stand of Saudi Arabia towards the 
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Western camp in general, and towards the United States in particular. But, 
when it came to the Arab-Israeli conflict, the Saudi Arabians were seen to hold 
an uncertain position by standing in the same camp as pro-communist countries 
such as Syria and Libya against Israel and the pro-Western and USA allies' 
camps. It would seem, however, that in public and private comments, Saudi 
Arabia "... left no doubt that continu[ed] unquestioning United States' support 
for Israel was unacceptable and indicated [that it] would put a ceiling on on 
output unless the American government pursued a more even-handed policy in 
the area. "107 Likewise, Adrian Hamilton of the Financial Times, pointed out 
Saudi Arabia's warning to the USA that, "... it might be forced to curb the rise 
in its vital oil production unless a settlement is reached in the Middle East. "108 
Thus, when the October War started, Paul Martin of The Times wrote 
that Saudi Arabia had "... made it clear of late that it [was] ready to use its oil 
as an element of pressure against Israel. "109 Louis Heren in the same paper 
commented that, based on its huge oil reserve and in spite of its `moderation' 
compared to other Arab, radical regimes, Saudi Arabia "... want[ed] to retrieve 
occupied Arab lands taken in-1967. "110 In a comprehensive comment, The 
Guardian's Peter Hiillmore underlined the Saudi Arabian's oil policy which 
connected the increase in oil production to satisfy industrial countries to several 
related conditions. According to Hillmore, the Saudi Arabians want ".:. 
America to respond favourably to the legitimate Arab demands, stop its 
support of Israel, and forceit to withdraw from occupied Arab land and to 
repatriate the Palestinian people to their homeland as the price for increasing oil 
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production in Saudi Arabia ... to meet growing American 
demand. "111 The 
Mies highlighted the change in Saudi Arabia's' oil policy. The paper explained 
that Saudi Arabia, the country "... upon whom the United States [would] 
depend in any energy crisis, gave a warning of the consequences of continued 
American support for Israel. " The Saudi Arabian government announced that 
it was unable to "... maintain its friendship with America... " if the USA "... did 
not adopt a stance more favourable to the Arab. " 112 
At the same time that some British journalists were concentrating on 
the return of "Arab" lands and the cessation of "Arab" humiliation by Israel, 
others highlighted the ideological Islamic religion as the aspect of Saudi Arabia 
which was the factor behind the Saudi Arabians decision to use and politicise 
their oil resources. In an article entitled, 'Faisal settles for Arabism', David 
Hirst of The Guardian, discussed the Islamic dimension in Saudi Arabia's 
unexpected decision to use its oil as a political weapon. Although a royal 
proclamation had previously announced that Saudi Arabian blood must be 
mixed with other "Arab" blood for the sake of the occupied lands and the holy 
places113, there was no mention of an oil embargo.. Saudi Arabia's promise to 
Arab countries to put "... all her resources at the service of battle... "114 was 
however, interpreted by Hirst as a threat of an oil embargo. Similarly, The 
Times proposed that Saudi Arabia was "... second to none in [its] determination 
to achieve a settlement favourable to the Arabs and to defend in particular the 
holy places of Islam, including Jerusalem. "' 15 
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From among the British journalists, only Eric Silver of The Guardian 
discussed the economic benefits behind the Saudi Arabian's decision to use 
their oil as a form of political pressure. A ceiling on an increase in oil 
production would not only threaten the industrial countries into pressuring 
Israel, but would also increase demand over supply and thus increase the price. 
Eric Silver supported his argument with a quotation from an unidentified Israeli 
analyst who believed that Saudi Arabia "... need[ed] to apply the squeeze 
anyhow and ... might as well make the most of it. " Furthermore, the 
unidentified Israeli source stated that, "... the recent emphasis - in the statement 
by the king and his advisers - has been much more on the economic, rather than 
the diplomatic, things Washington can do to keep the oil flowing. "' 16 
2.3 CONCLUSION 
Up until the Kuwait conference, the overall image of Saudi Arabia in 
the British press was that of a favoured country compared with other Arab 
countries. It was seen as a moderate and conservative country, amongst what 
was seen to be typically militant and hawkish regimes, with radical tendencies 
and was anti-communist and pro-Western in orientation. Saudi Arabia was 
seen as playing only a supporting role, principally financially, behind Egypt and 
Syria which were seen as the driving forces amongst the Arab countries. Its 
potential for influence in that capacity was well recognised, but was seen more 
as potential than an actuality, which derived from its large oil reserves, output 
and income. 
The Saudi Arabian oil policy was seen as built on "not mixing oil with 
politics". Once the war broke out the Saudi Arabians began to be seen as 
116 ibid 
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considering changing their policy, at least to some' extent, and to be making 
veiled threats to use their oil resources as a political weapon in support of the 
Arab countries involved in the fighting, but this was only in a very moderate 
way compared to what other Arab oil states might have wanted to do. Thus 
the Saudi Arabians were usually reported as speaking of the oil `threat' in the 
context of an `unwillingness' to increase future oil production rather than 
meaning they would reduce or halt the flow of oil altogether. Saudi Arabia was 
seen as probably likely to support the other more hawkish oil states in a 
moderate application of the idea of an `oil weapon' in the belief that without it, 
the USA might increase its support for Israel, when for the first time the Arab 
forces were in the ascendancy. 
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THE `OIL CRISIS' AND ITS AFTERMATH: 17 OCTOBER 1973 - 
14 NOVEMBER 1973 
2.1.1 THE KUWAIT CONFERENCE 
During the second week of the October War, by which time the tide 
had turned against the Arab, representatives of Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, 
Bahrain, Qatar, Abu Dhabi, Iraq, Syria, Egypt, Libya and Algeria met in 
Kuwait on the 17th October, 1973, and agreed to reduce their oil production 
by at least five percent from their average September output. They also 
agreed to make a further cut of five percent every month thereafter until 
Israel withdrew from the occupied territories. 117 
The Kuwait conference of the Arab oil producing countries 
stimulated a large reaction in the British Press. The role of Saudi Arabia in 
the development of the 'oil weapon' and its influence through it in the 
October war, came to alter significantly the perception of both Saudi Arabia 
and King Faisal in the British Press. 
2.1.2 FROM 'MODERATE' TO `HARD LINE' 
Saudi Arabia's role during the Kuwait conference evoked various, 
and sometimes contradictory, images of Saudi Arabia in the British press 
according to the perspective of each journalist. Thus, David Housego of the 
Financial Times, who believed that "... oil was dramatically thrown into the 
Middle East conflict... " as a result of the Kuwait conference, wrote that "... 
117 Strategic Survey 1973. IISS publication. p. 99. 
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the measure is far more draconian than even the gloomiest forecast ... had 
predicted. " He was convinced that "... the desire of the moderate Gulf 
states such as Saudi Arabia ... was evidently swept aside" 118 In contrast, 
Peter Hillmore of the The Guardian, who saw the measure as "... far less 
dramatic than had been feared", believed that "... the more moderate states 
had won the day. "119 Similarly, Paul Martin of The Times, who saw the 
Arab oil-cut plan "... as a subtle use of the oil weapon", believed the 
measure to "... have been inspired by Saudi Arabia", 120 the country which 
sees oil as a long term economic weapon. 
One day after the Kuwait Conference, Saudi Arabia reduced its oil 
production by 10%. The Daily Telegraph, which did not comment on Saudi 
Arabia's role during the Kuwait meeting, described the cut in Saudi Arabia's 
oil production as an "... escalation of the oil-weapon diplomacy. " The 
paper added that it "... was an unexpected move... " because Saudi Arabia 
"... had argued for moderation in the use of the oil weapon... "121 before the 
Arab meeting in Kuwait. Likewise, James Wightman of the Daily Telegraph 
claimed that "... Arab sources were taken aback... " by the Saudi Arabian 
decision because it was the Saudi Arabians who "... had argued for 
moderation" 22 in applying the "oil weapon" before and during the Kuwait 
meeting. 
Adrian Hamilton, of the Financial Times maintained that the 10% cut 
in Saudi Arabian oil production had brought 'uncertainty' to oil supplies 
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because Saudi Arabia was "... the world's largest exporter of oil. "123 In the 
same vein, Roger Vielroye of The Times predicted that the decision had 
"... worsened the oil supply crisis... " because Saudi Arabia was "... the 
biggest oil producer in the Middle East. "lu 
2.1.3 THREATENING AMERICA 
The British journalists who reported the Saudi Arabian decision 
agreed that the reason behind the - move was to modify America's policy 
towards the war. Roger Vielroye of The Times, claimed that Saudi Arabia 
had "... threatened a total halt of Saudi oil shipments to the United States 
unless the government modified its present position in the Middle East 
war". 125 Peter Hillmore of the The Guardian stated that King Faisal had 
said that, "If President Nixon .. (did).. not modify his position towards 
Israel, Saudi Arabia .. (would).. stop the flow of oil to America. "126 Also, 
James Wightman of the Daily Telegraph reported that Saudi Arabia had 
announced that "... all oil exports to the United States would cease if 
American support for Israel did not stop. "127 On the same day, the Daily 
Telegraph suggested that the Saudi Arabian's 10% production cut was "... in 
protest at America's support of Israel in the Middle East. "128 Moreover, 
Adrian Hamilton of the Financial Times argued that the Saudi Arabian "... 
move was accompanied by the threat that Saudi Arabia would stop the flow 
of oil to the U. S. if it did not modify its position on Israel. "129 
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Unlike the other papers, the Daily Telegraph saw the Saudi Arabian 
additional cut in oil production as a response to Egyptian 'pressure' which 
the paper claimed had "... led to Saudi Arabia's harder line. "130 In the 
same paper, James Wightman suggested that, " There was conjecture that 
Saudi Arabia had received demands from Egypt yesterday to take a sterner 
line. "131 
The Saudi Arabian agreement to participate in the Kuwait decision to 
reduce their oil production by 5%, and then the decision to cut it by 10%, 
might reflect what was going on at the battle front between Egypt, Syria and 
Israel. On 16 October, 1973, Golda Meier, Israel's Prime Minister, 
announced that, "Israeli forces were fighting on the west side of the Suez 
Canal. "132 This meant that in response to the change in the war in favour of 
Israel, Saudi Arabia was expected to do something to improve the situation 
through the use of the "oil weapon". 
2.1.4 OIL POLICY AFTER THE CEASE-FIRE 
The United States ignored King Faisal's `threat' to halt oil supplies if 
it would not modify its policy towards the Middle East war and instead 
`insulted' the King, who was known as `America's best friend', by 
approving a $2.2 billion aid package to Israel. King Faisal reacted on 20 
October, 1973, with an order of a "... total ban on oil to the U. S. " This 
decision should be seen as one of the most vital decisions in the history of 
130 Staf. Daily Telegraph. 19 October 1973. p. 1. 
131 Wightman, James. Daily Telegraph. 19 October 1973. p. 1. 132 Nadav, Safran. 1988. p. 158. 
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Saudi-American relations and the oil industry as it had "... a consequence ... 
on Saudi Arabia's position, [and] indeed, on its destiny. "133 
In spite of this, the Saudi Arabian's decision did not receive adequate 
coverage in any of the four papers. This might lead us to suppose that the 
papers acted within the interests of the Western countries who did not want 
to amplify and then encourage the escalation of the use of the "oil weapon". 
Alternatively, the reason might simply have been that when news of the 
Saudi Arabian decision broke out on Saturday, 20 October, it was too late 
for the papers to print the story on the same day and by Monday, 22 
October, the story might have lost its news worthiness to the other media, or 
to other events, such as the cease fire agreement. 134 
2.1.5 SAUDI ARABIA'S OIL POLICY AFTER THE KUWAIT 
MEETING 
On 22 October, 1973, the United Nation's Security Council passed 
Resolution 338 calling for a cease-fire, which was accepted by Egypt and 
Israel and later by Syria. However, in spite of the cease-fire, Saudi Arabia 
neither removed the oil embargo on the USA, nor reversed the general 
cutback in its oil production. The British press reported that in spite of the 
cease-fire agreement, King Faisal had announced that Saudi Arabian troops 
would "... remain on the Syrian front under Syrian command and remain 
bound by its cause. "135 Therefore, Saudi Arabia stood for the following: 
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a) the withdrawal of Israel from Arab lands; 
b) the recovery of East Jerusalem to Arab control; and, 
c) the recognition of Palestinian rights. 
a) Withdrawal of Israel 
David Hirst of The Guardian interpreted . the Saudi Arabian 
announcement to mean that, "... for King Faisal, though there has been a 
cease-fire on the shooting front, there has been none on the economic 
one... ", because Saudi Arabia was " ... still insisting on the withdrawal of 
Israeli forces from all occupied territories. "136 Robert Graham of the 
Financial Times wrote that, "The Saudis insisted that the cutback [in oil] 
would remain in force until Israeli forces had been withdrawn from occupied 
Arab territory. "137 Similarly, Ihsan Hijazi of the Financial Times, who based 
his report on the weekly Lebanese periodical Al D yar, argued that King 
Faisal had said that, "This country will continue the suspension of oil 
exports to the U. S. and cut back production until ... Israel withdraws from 
occupied Arab territory. "138 On the occasion of Dr. Henry Kissinger's visit 
to Saudi Arabia to discuss the end of the oil embargo, Hijazi pointed out that 
sources "... doubt that there would be any weakening in King Faisal's 
determination to maintain the oil pressure until Israeli withdrawal from 
occupied Arab territory has been fulfilled. "139 William Dullforce of the 
Financial Times was assured by sources "... that there [would] be no easing 
of oil restrictions until occupied Arab territory ha[d] been recovered. "140 
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Paul Martin of The limes went so far as to depict Saudi Arabia as, "The 
most militant Arab country in the prosecution of the oil war... ", because 
King Faisal of Saudi Arabia "... ha[d] declared that his embargo on oil and 
the overall oil production cut [would] remain in force until Israel withdraws 
from occupied Arab territory. "141 Peter Gill of the Daily Telegraph held 
that King Faisal "... [was] understood to have made it plain [to the 
Americans] that he [would] settle for nothing less than the return of all 
occupied territories. " 142 Along the same lines, The Guardian reported that 
"... Saudi Arabia [would] maintain its embargo against oil shipments to the 
U. S. until Israel withdraws from all Arab lands ... conquered 
in the 1967 
war. "143 
b) Recovery of East Jerusalem 
Even though the British press highlighted Saudi Arabia's insistence 
on the withdrawal of Israel from all occupied Arab lands as a price for 
changing its oil policy, according to many British journalists, the recovery of 
the city of Jerusalem was portrayed as also occupying an important position 
in the Saudi Arabian's mind. On this issue, David Hirst of The Guardian 
wrote that Saudi Arabia had insisted on the withdrawal of Israel from all 
occupied lands, "... including Jerusalem... ". 144 However, Paul Martin of 
The Times proposed that one of the main problems of Sadat and Assad, the 
Presidents of Egypt and Syria respectively, after the cease-fire agreement, 
was to satisfy King Faisal of Saudi Arabia on the issue of Jerusalem. 
According to Martin, although the Saudi Arabian's had "... little direct 
141 Martin, Paul. The Times 9 November 1973. p. 10. 142 Gill, Peter. Daily Telegraph. 12 November 1973. p. 7. 143 U. P. I. The Guardian. 14 November 1973. 
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connection with [the] fighting ... the question of 
Jerusalem [was] one close 
to King Faisal's heart. "'45 Thus, Ihsan Hijazi of the Financial Times 
concluded, based on unidentified reports from Riyadh, that, "The monarch's 
attitude on the need to re-establish Arab control of East Jerusalem ... was 
especially strong. "146 In the same vein, Peter Gill of the Daily Telegraph 
pointed out that King Faisal was ... understood to have made 
it plain ... that 
he [would] settle for nothing less than the return of all occupied territories 
including East Jerusalem. " 47 
While some journalists portrayed Saudi Arabia as demanding the 
withdrawal of Israel from occupied Arab lands, with withdrawal from 
Jerusalem as a part of the deal, other journalists stressed the special 
importance of Jerusalem for Saudi Arabia, on ideological grounds. This led 
to a new emphasis on seeing Saudi Arabia as an Islamic, religious state. 
John Bulloch of the Daily Telegraph described King Faisal as the 
"... Guardian of the holy shrines of Islam... " which of course, consists of 
Mecca and Medina, but he reminded his readers that "... the third holiest 
[was] in Jerusalem. "148 Further, Bulloch argued that for the sake of 
Jerusalem, the King would not only use his oil as a weapon, but he was also 
"... prepared to enter into formal diplomatic relations with Russia... ", 149 the 
country which Saudi Arabia detested as "... atheistic. -.. ". '5° 
Paul Martin of The Times reported, based on what he called a right 
wing Arab newspaper Al Hayat, that King Faisal had said that, "... the Arab 
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East of Jerusalem should be returned to Arabs because its future is 
fundamental to Islam. " Thus, Martin claimed that unlike other leaders, "... 
who would be ready to consider an international city, or an accommodation 
providing for Arab sovereignty over Islamic holy' places... ", King Faisal 
was " ... understood to have adopted an uncompromising 
line... " over the 
question of the city. '51 
In the same vein, Patrick Kratley of The Guardian explained that the 
issue of the city of Jerusalem was a danger to any peace settlement because 
"... it is one of those emotional issues that does not really yield to logic. " 
He argued that the Saudi Arabians, as "... the Guardians of the holy places 
... ", see themselves as having ".:. a stake in the future of Jerusalem 
because 
they regard the city as the second most holy city in Islam. " Thus, even a 
'conservative' leader like King Faisal of Saudi Arabia, according to Kratley, 
"... would line up with militant left wingers of the Arab world... "152 on the 
dispute over Jerusalem. 
The importance of the status of Jerusalem to the Saudi Arabian 
leaders and their people derives, of course, from the position which it has in 
the history and culture of Islam. There is a special chapter in the holy book 
of all Muslims, the holy Qur'an, which allocates a specific reference to the 
significance of the city of Jerusalem in `Sura' XVII, named Bani Israel or 
`the children of Israel'. The journey of the holy prophet is described as he 
was transported from the sacred mosque (of Mecca) to the furthest mosque 
(of Jerusalem) in the night and shown some of the signs of God. The 
introduction to this reads as follows: 
151 Martin, Paul. The Times. 10 November 1973. p. 6. - 152 Kratley, Patrick. The Guardian. 13 November 1973. p. 4. 
50 
Glory to (God) 
Who did take His servant 
For journey by night 
From the sacred mosque 
To the farthest mosque. 153 
C) Recognition of Palestinian Rights 
In addition to presenting Saudi Arabia as linking the removal of the 
oil embargo and the severe cutback in production to the withdrawal of Israel 
from occupied Arab territory, especially Jerusalem, a few journalists also 
presented Saudi Arabia as employing its oil weapon to restore the legitimate 
rights of the Palestinians. After the acceptance of the cease-fire, David Hirst 
of The Guardian wrote that the Saudi Arabians were still insisting, among 
other things, on the "... restoration of the legitimate rights of the Palestinian 
people. "'54 Ihsan Hijazi of the Financial Times claimed that the settlement 
which the Saudi Arabians were looking for as a condition to remove the 
`threat' of their "oil weapon" "... [did] not only mean Israel's withdrawal 
from Arab territory occupied in the1967 war ... but also the establishment of 
what the monarch regard[ed] as the legitimate right of the Palestinians. "'55 
Along the same lines, Paul Martin of The Times claimed that King Faisal, 
"... ha[d] tied himself to the Egyptian war aim... " which consisted, among 
other aims, of "... the restoration of legitimate Palestinian rights. " 
According to Martin, King Faisal "... regarded any solution that passed over 
the Palestinian issue as doomed to failure. " Therefore, the King was 
reported to have "... insisted on the importance of the Palestinians being part 
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of any peace talk and later of any agreement reached to end the Middle East 
crisis. "136 
2.1.6 SAUDI ARABIA AS AN ANTI-COIF MUNIST STATE 
- Saudi Arabia was consistently presented as an anti-communist state . 
The journalists in the four different papers each referred to the anti- 
communist features of Saudi Arabia from different perspectives. Eric 
Silver, of The Guardian, projected this character of Saudi ý Arabia by arguing 
that Saudi Arabia was more concerned with the danger of the communists 
than with the danger of the Arab-Israeli conflict. To support his argument, 
Silver quoted an unidentified Israeli official who insisted, that prior to the 
1967 Arab-Israeli war, Saudi Arabia was "... more anxious about Soviet 
penetration of the Middle East... " than about Israel and was more worried 
about the threat from "... Egypt and other `revolutionary' Arab 
regimes... "157 than even about that from Israel. 
In order to strengthen his point, Silver quoted in his article Harold 
Wilson's personal account of the Labour government which claimed that 
King Faisal was "... begging the British... " not to remove their forces from 
the Gulf Emirate and Aden "... for fear of leaving him exposed" 58 to the 
communist threat. On the other hand, when Saudi Arabia, the West's ally in 
the region, lined up with other Arab countries against Israel, these countries 
included some which Saudi Arabia considered as "... almost communist... ". 
The Daily Telegraph' journalist, John Bulloch, explained this 'strange' 
position of Saudi Arabia by writing that the Saudi Arabians had "... been 
156 Martin, Paul. The Times. 10 November 1973. p. 6. 
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forced to make a common cause with such states... ", because Saudi Arabia 
not only distrusts the Egyptian form of socialism ... but also detests 
communism... "159, and considers its "... creed ... as atheistic. "160 
The presentation of Saudi Arabia as an anti-communist state was 
underlined in some of the British press through descriptions of the Saudi 
Arabian government as `anxious', `threatened', `distrustful', `detesting 
communists' and `begging others' not to leave it exposed to the communist 
threat. Besides the portrayal of Saudi Arabia as anti-communist, on the 
grounds of emotional expressions, David Hirst of The Guardian projected 
the anti-communist role in the form of more active politics. He argued that 
the "... Sadat-Faisal axis and the implicit anti-communism that goes with 
it... " was the moving factor which led to the rift between Moscow and 
Syria, the main pro-USSR country among the Arab countries. Thus, Hirst 
concluded that, "If Assad does fall foul of the Russians, that will please 
Faisal. "161 
David Hirst only put King Faisal in a position equal to Sadat in his 
reference to the anti-communist `axis' between the two leaders. Paul Martin 
of The Times, however, stressed far more Saudi Arabia's anti-communist 
stance. According to Martin, Saudi Arabia was seen as "... the arch- 
traditionalist in the Arab world... " and was the "... only big Arab country 
without relations with the Eastern block. " Also, it was the only important 
Islamic country that had "... declared communism an enemy of Islam. " 
Finally, combining references to Saudi Arabia's growing importance with its 
anti-communist attitude, Martin told his readers that Saudi Arabia "... was 
159 Bullock, John. Daily Telegraph. 7 November 1973. p. 6. 160 Bullock, John. Daily Telegraph. 12 November 1973. p. 18. 161 Hirst, David. The Guardian. 28 September 1973. p. 2. 
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understood to have been the main driving force behind President Saddat's 
decision to expel the 10,000 Russian military advisers from Egypt. "162 
Even during the October War, when Saudi-American relations were 
at their lowest since the creation of Saudi Arabia as a result of the position 
of the USA towards the Arab-Israeli conflict, Saudi Arabia was shown as not 
changing its attitude towards communists. Paul Martin of The ? Times 
affirmed that the Saudi Arabian leader, King Faisal, had assured the 
Americans that he "... reiterate[d] his opposition to the spread of communist 
influence and [had] state[d] that basically his policy remain[ed] 
unchanged. "163 
Another way of projecting Saudi Arabia as anti-communist in the 
British Press was by emphasising the economic means used by Saudi Arabia 
to discourage some Arab countries from adopting a socialist policy. For 
example, Paul Martin of The limes wrote that the decrease of the socialist 
economic policies of Egypt, and the increase of the open door ones, which 
developed in the early 1970s, was induced by "... grants of financial aid 
from Saudi Arabia ... [and other Gulf states which] ha[d] encouraged the 
Egyptians to trim their socialist policies. "1" Moreover, besides encouraging 
Egypt away from socialist policies and influences, Saudi Arabia was 
understood to have lessened the effect of other rich Arab socialist 
governments, such as Libya, by making their financial contributions to other 
Arab countries ineffective due to King Faisal's "... promise to make good 
Libya's contribution at the very least. "165 
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According to John Bulloch of the Daily Telegraph, prior to the 
October war, Saudi Arabia had agreed to provide President Sadat with "... 
the money which Gadaffi was increasingly reluctant to give. "166 Eric Silver 
of The Guardian, who held the same view, suggested that "... Libya ha[d] 
been losing its allure as a source of funds and sustenance... " because the 
Egyptians "... were turning to ... King Faisal of Saudi Arabia. 
"167 Further, 
as part of Saudi Arabia's effort to contain pro-USSR Arab regimes, Ihsan 
Hijazi of the Financial Times speculated that the large arms deal between 
Syria, the UK and France, in September 1973, which included a supply of 
artillery, tanks and planes, would be financed mainly by Saudi Arabia. 168 
2.1.7 THE IMAGE OF KING FAISAL: 
a) As a "Conservative Leader' 
A "... conservative leader... "169 was one of the common images of 
King Faisal in the British press. So when President Sadat found an ally in 
King Faisal instead of Gadaffi, in the early 1970s, Eric Silver of The 
Guardian commented that the Egyptian leader was turning to "... the 
ultimate traditionalist monarch, King Faisal of Saudi Arabia .. [instead of 
Gadaffi]... for funds and sustenance. "170 Jurek Martin of the Financial 
limes viewed King Faisal as "... the most conservative ruler in the Arab 
world... ", yet Martin quoted David Holden, who wrote that King Faisal 
displayed "... the characteristic knack of the radical conservative for leading 
166 
167 
168 
169 
170 
Bulloch, John. Daily Telegraph. 16 October 1973. p. 18. 
Silver, Eric. The Guardian. 20 September 1973. p. 3. 
Hijazi, Ihsan. Financial Times. 25 September 1973. p. 8. 
Kratley, Patrick. The Guardian. 13 November 1973. p. 4. 
Silver, Eric. The Guardian. 20 October 1973. p. 3. 
55 
his people backwards into the future. "171 Louis Heren of The Times 
contrasted King Faisal's conservative stance with the "... radicalism... " of 
other Arab leaders. Compared to "... the extreme radicalism of Libya's 
President Gadaffi... ", King Faisal was seen as "... a moderate 
counterbalance... " 172, "... the most moderate... [against]... the volatile and 
unpredictable Libyan leader. "173 The Daily Telegraph's journalist, John 
Bulloch, fleshed out the conservative image of King Faisal when he referred 
to the fact that King Faisal was "... a Wahabi Moslem, one of the strictest 
branches of Islam. "174 
b) As the 'Guardian of Islam' 
Another image of the Saudi Arabian leader which was portrayed in 
the British press was that of the `Guardian of Islam'. Jurek Martin of the 
Financial Times referred to King Faisal as the "... The Guardian of the holy 
shrine at Mecca... ", 175 the city which brings thousands of Muslim pilgrims 
to Saudi Arabia. In the same vein, Patrick Kratley of The Guardian claimed 
that the reason why the Saudi Arabians thought they had a stake in the future 
of Jerusalem, which they regard as the second most holy place, was because 
they see themselves as "... the Guardians of the holiest place of Islam, 
Mecca. "176 John Bulloch of the Daily Telegraph also presented King Faisal 
as the `Guardian of Islam' but pointed out that he was the unelected, "... 
self-appointed Guardian of the holy shrines... " of Islam. 177 
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King Faisal was portrayed by The T Imes as being the defender of 
Islamic placesbecause the King, as the paper stated, was "... second to none 
in his determination to defend in particular the holy places of Islam, 
including Jerusalem. "178 In addition, Paul Martin of The ? Times presented 
King Faisal as the spokesman of Islam because it was "... King Faisal 
himself [who] declared communism an enemy of Islam. "179 
c) As 'America's Best Friend' 
The general trend was for most journalists to see King Faisal as a 
pro-USA ruler, a friend of America, or "... the man upon whom the United 
States [would] depend .. ", 180 but they gave different reasons 
for his stance. 
Eric Silver of The Guardian, for example, thought that Saudi Arabia's 
developmental needs accounted for King Faisal's pro-USA attitude. As 
Silver argued, the Saudi Arabian King's "... long-term dream, ... to 
transform Saudi Arabia from an oil reservoir into an industrialised state ... ", 
depended on the USA. In order to support his argument, Silver quoted a 
Wall Street Journal's statement which said that King Faisal's `dream' needed 
"co-operation from America. "'81 
Indeed, when King Faisal threatened to use the 'oil weapon' against 
the USA, Peter Hillmore of The Guardian questioned the Saudi Arabian 
leader's threat because the King was "... America's best friend in the Arab 
world. "182 In the same vein, The Times wrote that it did not expect the King 
to use the 'oil weapon' on the assumption that the King was "... extremely 
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reluctant to damage his friendly' relations with the United States... ", 183 the 
country which Faisal depended on to develop his Kingdom. 
David Hirst of Tice Guardian believed that security was also behind 
King Faisal's pro-USA stance, since King Faisal felt that, "... his long term 
security lie in a close identification with the USA" 184 Yet, the picture of 
King Faisal as America's best friend, of someone whom Washington could 
simply take for granted, changed and the King was now projected as an 
unhappy ý or complaining friend after he used oil as a weapon against the 
USA. On 22 October 1973, The Guardian wrote that the Saudi Arabians, 
who were expected to save the Americans in an energy crisis by increasing 
their future oil production, might "... refuse to do so unless the United 
States contributed to a just settlement of the Arab - Israeli conflict. "185 Peter 
Hillmore of The Times reported that the Saudi Arabians insisted that the oil 
weapon would "... continue to be used until the United Nations Security 
Council's cease-fire resolution had been implemented. "196 Likewise, Ihsan 
Hijazi of The Financial Times affirmed, based on the weekly Lebanese 
periodical Al-Diyar, that King Faisal "... would continue the suspension of 
oil exports to the U. S., and cut back until the cease-fire ... was 
firmly 
established and Israel withdrew. " Hijazi added that the King intended to 
stop oil to any "... country which adopted a hostile stand towards the Arab 
main cause... " and that, there ". ".. could be no tolerance or forgiveness in 
this matter. "187 Further, when Iraq withdrew its support of Syria after the 
cease-fire agreement, Saudi Arabian forces remained in Syria. David Hirst 
of The Guardian claimed that even though the presence of Saudi Arabian 
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troops was "... less important in itself... ", it was "... evidence that King 
Faisal was still behind the strategy... " mapped out before the war. Hirst 
proposed that the strategy's main aim was "... to persist in the use of the oil 
weapon which is now the Arabs' strongest card. "188 When, during the 
cease-fire negotiations, Saudi Arabia further cut back its oil, Ihsan Hijazi of 
the Financial Times wrote, based on unidentified sources, that King Faisal 
was convinced that, "... the oil weapon should be exercised even more 
strongly during the current diplomatic activity and settlement... [so that] ... 
the efforts may not lose their momentum and so the pressure on Washington 
may not ease. "189 Hijazi explained that the "... Saudi escalation arising 
from the cut back ... was aimed at providing Egypt with additional 
support... " in the political process following the cease-fire agreement. 19° 
Therefore, when Kissinger decided to visit Saudi Arabia as part of his 
attempt to "... keep President Nixon's entire foreign policy on track... ", and 
when Saudi Arabia increased its oil production cut back, Peter Hillmore of 
The Guardian suggested that the Saudi Arabian decision was "... a tougher 
attitude by Saudi Arabia [which came] only a few days before Dr Kissinger's 
visit. "191 It was reported that' he would pay "... high priority in his talks 
with Arabs, and particularly King Faisal of Saudi Arabia, to try to persuade 
them to drop their oil production cut back. "192 Thus, Ihsan Hijazi of the 
Financial Times concluded, in an article entitled `Kissinger on mission to 
placate Faisal', that Kissinger's visit to Saudi Arabia was regarded as "... a 
move by the Nixon administration to reassure King Faisal of Washington's 
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v 
intentions in the Middle East and to head off a further escalation by Saudi 
Arabia of its oil pressure on the U. S. "'93 
On 4th November, 1973, the Arab oil producing countries held their 
second meeting in Kuwait to review the process and development of using 
their oil weapon. According to Paul Martin of The Times, it was at Saudi 
Arabia's insistence that Arab oil countries held this second meeting where 
they decided to further increase their oil production cut back from 5 per cent 
to a minimum of 25 per cent. As a result of the new measure, Saudi 
Arabia's oil production was reported to "... fall to 5.8 million barrels per 
day... "194 compared with 9 million barrels per day in previous months. 
The coverage of the second Arab oil ministers' meeting represented 
Saudi Arabia as putting further political pressure on the USA and Western 
European countries to press Israel to accept the Arab countries' definition of 
peace. In fact, one day before the meeting, Egypt, Syria and Saudi Arabia 
held a "... secret talk... "195 to co-ordinate their political manoeuvre after the 
cease-fire agreement. Paul Martin of The Times underlined that the two 
countries and Saudi Arabia had "... agreed on a joint political stand on peace 
efforts. " In the same way, David Housego of the Financial Times argued 
that the second oil meeting was seen as a direct response "... to the USA's 
apparent refusal to put pressure on Israel. "196 
The fact that the Saudi Arabians had adopted an aggressive attitude in 
applying the `oil weapon' as a political weapon, was clear in the Daily 
193 
194 
195 
196 
Hijazi, Ihsan. Financial Times. I November 1973. p. 8. 
Hillmore, Peter. The Guardian. 6 November 1973. p. 1. 
Martin, Paul. The Times. 3 November 1973. p. 1. 
Housego, David. Financial Times. 6 November 1973. p. 8. 
60 
Telegraph's report that the Saudi Arabians had "... asked the conference for 
approval of 50 per cent... "197 instead of the agreed 25 per cent, and had 
even "... spurred the others into developing the machinery to ensure that the 
oil weapon hits the right targets and hurts when it does. "198 David Hirst of 
The Guardian concluded that "In the intense pressure that the Arabs [were] 
exerting on America, it [was] America's friend, King Faisal [who was] the 
lead wolf wielding the stick in the shape of the oil weapon . "199 Thus, Jurek 
Martin of the Financial Times wrote that, "The piquancy... of the matter 
was that the process of using the oil weapon was led by ... the one man 
who, because of the value he placed on his relationship with America.... 
would be considered the last to support such [a] use. "200 However, in spite 
of the King's use of the oil weapon, and even his threat to enter into political 
relations with the USSR, King Faisal was "... certain that the future of his 
country ... should be bound up with America and the West. "201 
d) As 'A New Leader' 
The presentation of King Faisal and his country as emerging into a 
position of leadership and power in the Arab world after the crushing 
military defeats suffered by Egypt and Syria, was clearly signalled by a 
feature article by Jurek Martin of the Financial limes entitled `Man of the 
Week', on 20 October, 1973. Martin wrote an exclusive article about the 
Saudi Arabian King, presenting him as emerging as the leader of the Arab 
cause. Martin held that King Faisal, "... after years in the shadows... ", had 
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emerged in the Arab world "... as one of its undoubted leaders. " 202 He 
continued by saying that, "The two decisions in Kuwait ... have thrust 
Faisal 
irrevocably onto the world stage. " Martin wrote that compared to other Arab 
leaders, Faisal 
"... hardly fitt[ted] the popular image of an oil-rich Arab 
ruler. Ascetic where many of his compatriots ha[d] 
been vulgarly ostentatious, diffident and elliptical in 
his public pronouncements where they ha[d] been outspoken, 
he [was] nevertheless typical of a new and still small breed of 
Arab monarchs. "203 
King Faisal and his country, in their unwanted new role, were an unknown 
quantity because "... neither Saudi Arabia nor Faisal himself ha[d] ever 
sought publicity. "204 It was difficult for journalists to get in and out of the 
country and harder still, though by no means entirely impossible, to gain an 
audience with the king. In addition to presenting King Faisal and Saudi 
Arabia as a secretive society, Martin gave his readers the impression that 
Saudi Arabia was a backward country. Referring to King Faisal's "... main 
task... ", Martin said the King "... ha[d] been seen on the one hand to use 
his new oil wealth for the purposes of developing a backward and still 
inherently tribal kingdom and, on the other, to preserve the traditional values 
of the Muslim way of life. "205 
Similarly, John Bulloch of the Daily Telegraph believed that it was 
not bad news since, "..., King Faisal [was] a man of rooted convictions and 
massive obstinacy, allied to a shrewd appraisal of what was beneficial for his 
202 Martin, Jurek. Financial Times. 20 October 1973. p. 32. 
203 Martin, Jurek. Financial Times. 20 October 1973. p. 32. 204 Ibid.. 
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own country. "206 Thus, Bulloch argued that ".. it [was] becoming 
increasingly obvious that it [was] the brooding, hawk-like figure of King 
Faisal who [was] emerging as the real power. "2m 
Likewise, Louis Heren of The Times stated that King Faisal of Saudi 
Arabia had become a major influence in the Middle East. He claimed that 
the monarch's influence was based on the "... country's oil reserves and 
swelling coffers. "208 In the context of using oil as a weapon in the October 
War, Paul Martin, also of The Times, believed that what had made the oil 
producer's decision very serious to the consumer countries was that King 
Faisal of Saudi Arabia, the " ... leader of the moderate camp, 
ha[d] set the 
pace in continuing the oil war. "209 
Jurek Martin of the Financial Times, argued that King Faisal was 
"... [the] most conservative ruler in the Arab world... ", and suggested that 
oil was what had thrust Faisal and his country irrevocably on the world stage 
... after years in the shadows as one of its undoubted leaders". 
210 John 
Bulloch of the Daily Telegraph concluded that "... what gave King Faisal a 
working majority in the Arab league, as well as a commanding voice in Arab 
affairs ... was that King Hussein of Jordan, King Hassan of Morocco and the 
Gulf rulers all looked to him for leadership. "211 
The most important outcome of the `Oil Crisis' from the point of 
view of the image of Saudi Arabia in British eyes, or at least in the eyes of 
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the journalists and readers of the `quality' press, was the emergence of both 
the country and its King into a position of leadership within the Arab states, 
and the subtle but perceivable shift in the balance of the friendly relationship 
between Saudi Arabia and the United States. 
2.1.8 CONCLUSION 
The perceived emergence of King Faisal of Saudi Arabia into an 
important position on the world stage and into regional leadership came as a 
result of the oil embargo led by Saudi Arabia during, and after, the October 
war. This raises the question of why Saudi Arabia was not already seen 
somewhat more in that light a long time before? Saudi Arabia had already 
participated in at least three oil embargos in the context of the Arab-Israeli 
conflict, in 1948,1956 and 1967. These attempts, however, were wholly 
unsuccessful due to the different circumstances which existed relating to 
energy resources, in general, and to oil in particular. But during the six 
years following the 1967 war, the international oil market witnessed a rapid 
expansion induced by the economic boom in most of the developed Western 
countries. This increased the demand for oil at 'a continuous and even 
accelerating pace until 1973. This unique growth in the demand for oil was 
not only due to a normal growth in demand which accompanied an 
expanding economy but was also the result of "... the switch to oil as the 
predominant source of energy supply compared to other sources such as 
coal. "212 
In addition, world-wide energy conditions started to change, around 
1970, when the energy market was unusually tight due to a high 
212 Adelphi Papers. No. 117.1975. 
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consumption of oil. The buyers' market that used to characterise the oil 
business developed into more of a sellers' market. Further, the OPEC 
organisation began to exercise some restraint over oil production and prices. 
In general, according to the IISS's 1974 report, (International Institute of 
Strategic Studies) the following principal factors were believed to 
characterise the oil situation. 
(a) Demand for oil in world trade would rise from 43 million barrels a day 
in 1972 to some 100 million barrels a day by 1985, if demand for energy in 
Japan, Western Europe and North America continued to increase. These 
countries accounted for 80 per cent of oil trade. 
(b) The USA was expected to be a major oil importer of 15 million barrels 
a day by 1985 and the USSR, for reasons of cost, quality and availability of 
oil, was also assumed to become a customer in the oil market. 
(c) Five hundred and fifty billion barrels, or 62 per cent of the world's 
proven oil reserves, lie in the Middle East and 160 billion barrels, or 29 per 
cent, lie in Saudi Arabia alone. Therefore, the "... reliance of the industrial 
West on the Middle East - and particularly on Saudi Arabia, the producer of 
the last resort - would increase very heavily. "213 
Given Saudi Arabia's oil reserves, its geographical location also came 
to be seen as giving it a position of 'special and long-term strategic 
importance. This created a greater interest in Saudi Arabia by Western 
countries, in general, and the United States, in particular, which "... 
extend[ed] beyond .. short term consideration, as well as 'purely' economic 
213 Strategic Survey 1973 IISS Publication. 1974. p. 31. 
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consideration to include the larger national security needs of the Western 
world, and indeed, the whole non communist world. "214 
The British press came to be conscious of the above considerations as 
a result of the `Oil Crisis'. All four papers came to project the `new' 
importance of Saudi Arabia and implied that the Saudi Arabians were 
emerging into a permanent position on the world stage in the context of the 
energy crisis which ensued, and which the West needed to solve through 
Saudi Arabia. Peter Hillmore of The Guardian believed that the Americans, 
who were ".. counting on a steady increase in Middle East supplies to meet 
growing energy needs... ", had hoped that "... Saudi Arabia would increase 
production from 7 million barrels per day to 20 million barrels per day over 
the next few years. "215 
Likewise, Paul Martin of The Times viewed Saudi Arabia as the 
country "... upon which the United States [was] expected to rely to fill the 
gap created by the energy crisis. "216 When Saudi Arabia escalated the use of 
the `oil weapon' by ordering a 10 per cent cut back in its production during 
the October war, James Wightman of the Daily Telegraph described the 
Saudi Arabian move as "... the biggest single blow yet in the world oil 
crisis... [because] ... Saudi Arabia's oil fields produce more than all the 
other Arab states put together. "217 The Guardian, which had originally 
suggested that the `oil weapon' did not affect the USA's policy towards the 
war, stated that "... the United States badly needs the Saudi Arabians, who 
are sitting on the largest crude oil reserves in the world, to expand their 
214 AI-Marayati, Abid, A. 1984. p. 66. 
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production substantially over the coming years to meet the American energy 
gap, "218 
Anthony Tucker of The Guardian advised the Americans to "... 
accelerate and keep their development of internal energy resources much 
more rapid than [was] done at present... " instead of pressing its demands on 
increasing oil production in the Middle East states, in particular Saudi 
Arabia. 219 
When Saudi Arabia stopped its oil shipments to the USA, and Dr 
Kissinger, the USA Secretary of State, planned to visit Saudi Arabia, Ihsan 
Hijazi of the Financial Times argued, based on unnamed `informed sources', 
that the visit was "... a move by the Nixon administration... to head off 
further escalation by Saudi Arabia of its oil pressure on the U. S. "22° 
In the same vein, Peter Hillmore of The Guardian pointed out that, 
"... Arab Observers... " described the visit as "... evidence of the importance 
of Arab oil to U. S. policy makers. "221 Stephen Barber of the Daily 
Telegraph stressed that the Americans were trying to persuade King Faisal of 
Saudi Arabia "... to drop oil production cut back... "222, and were looking 
"... for a promise of an unrestricted flow of oil to ' the United States. "223 
Ihsan Hijazi of the Financial Times claimed that Dr Kissinger had "... 
impressed on the Saudi Arabian monarch the vital importance the U. S. 
attaches to lifting the oil embargo. " Further, Hijazi added that Kissinger 
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even "... assured King Faisal that Washington was determined, this time, to 
bring about a settlement... "2u, which the Saudi Arabians insisted on as a 
price for ending the `oil weapon'. 
Paul Martin of The ? rimes amplified this by stating that King Faisal 
had made it clear to Dr Henry Kissinger that, "A just settlement would 
ensure uninterrupted flow of oil to the United states and the rest of the 
world. "225 It would also grant "... [an] earlier tentative undertaking, to raise 
Saudi Arabia's pre-September production of more than eight million barrels 
daily by more than two and a half times by 1980 to alleviate the Americans' 
expected energy crisis. "2 
Similarly, to show the vital interests of the European countries in 
Saudi Arabia and its importance for them, some of the British press 
emphasised the increased dependency of some Western countries on Saudi 
Arabian oil based on the latest trade statistics which stated that Britain had 
imported oil, worth 89 million pounds, of which 25 million's worth came 
from Saudi Arabia. Peter Hillmore of The Guardian was alarmed that the 
UK had "... increased its dependence... "227 on Saudi Arabian oil supplies. 
When Saudi Arabia decided to stop oil shipments to Holland, which refused 
to modify its policy towards Israel, Peter Rogers of The Guardian held that 
the Saudi Arabian action would have "... far wider effects on the whole of 
Northern Europe ... [because] ... one quarter of Europe's oil supplies go 
through the Dutch port of Rotterdam ... the Saudi Arabian action could 
effect Scandinavia, Germany, Belgium and Luxembourg. "22U Similarly, 
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Adrian Hamilton of the Financial Times believed that the Saudi Arabian 
move was "... bound to cause severe strain on European oil supplies... ", as 
the Saudi Arabian supply was "... one of the largest single supplies of oil to 
Holland which act[ed] as the central import terminal... "229 for European 
countries. Saudi Arabia's "... oil fields, produce[d] 8 million barrels per 
day. "BO 
The broad trends in the world economy, and especially those of the 
Western economies, had predicated that Saudi Arabia would emerge, and 
would be seen to have emerged, onto the world stage as a country of 
importance, and that if its government played the cards effectively which 
circumstances have given it, it would also come to occupy a position of 
regional leadership sometime in the future. It was now, however, that with 
unexpected determination it emerged onto the world stage as a country 
whose views carried weight, both as a result of the fact that it emerged as 
well as the implications this brought with it. The unexpected renewal of the 
war between the Arab countries, and Israel, in 1973, certainly provided an 
opportunity for Saudi Arabia to strengthen its position, but it was the result 
of the effectiveness and skill with which King Faisal and Saudi Arabia 
responded to that opportunity which was the critical factor. It was the 
contrast between the ultimate failure of Egypt and Syria's military efforts, 
and the at least partial effectiveness of Saudi Arabia's use of the `oil 
weapon' for backing up diplomatic pressure, that led to a sudden and 
considerable enhancement of Saudi Arabia's image in terms of its perceived 
importance, and indeed, it transformed the image of its leader into a figure 
229 Hamilton, Adrian. Financial Times. 29 October 1973. p. 1. 230 Wightman, James. Daily Telegraph. 19 October 1973. p. 1. 
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f 
of world importance, in addition to the position he already occupied in the 
Arab world. 
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THE 'MECCA CRISIS' 
3.1 PRELUDE: 22 OCTOBER 1979-19 NOVEMBER 1979. 
During the years after the October war and the oil embargo of 1973- 
1974, two main developments took place. One was the peace process 
between Egypt and Israel, sponsored by the USA, and the other one was the 
increase in world oil prices as a result of the oil embargo during the October 
war. These two changes, especially the latter, affected Saudi Arabia and 
created the setting for the press coverage of the Mecca crisis. 
a) Saudi Arabia's Position During The Peace Process Between Egypt 
and Israel 
The strong Arab opposition to the Egyptian-Israeli treaty which was 
formed around the Damascus-Baghdad axis, threatened any party, including 
Saudi Arabia, that would not actively penalise and ostracise Egypt. 
(Moreover, the collapse of the Shah's regime in Iran and the war between 
the two Yemens in that time confronted the Saudi Arabians with additional 
critical dangers. ) Thus, Saudi Arabia was forced to choose between two 
strategies: one was tosupport Egypt and confront Arab opposition, and the 
other, was to support the Arab opposition and risk her connections with 
Egypt and the USA. The Saudi Arabian leader came down in favour of the 
latter strategy. This attitude might explain Saudi Arabia's oil policy during 
1979 and especially during the oil crisis of that year. 
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b) The Effect of World Oil Prices on Saudi Arabia's Domestic 
Situation 
High oil prices provided Saudi Arabia with an extraordinarily high 
income: from 1.2 billion dollars in 1971, to 22.6 in 1973,25.7 in 1975, 
30.8 in 1976,36.5 in 1977,32.2 in 1978 and 60 in 1979. Such a high 
income allowed Saudi Arabia to start major development plans, most 
notably, the second five-year plan of 1976-1980, in which she spent 142 
billion dollars. However, development for Saudi Arabia meant and required 
imported foreign technology and foreign technicians, teachers, doctors, 
workers and advisers with their own values and culture which were different 
from that of the Saudi Arabians. This strain and conflict characterised Saudi 
Arabia's domestic life which came to a head in the 1979 Mecca crisis when 
an extremist group attacked and seized the Grand Mosque. Thus, as Richard 
Johns of the Financial limes wrote, "In the wake of the first oil price 
explosion, from 1974 to 1976 especially, the Kingdom suffered similar 
stresses and strains as Iran. The Saudi Arabian government saw the warning 
light and put the brakes on to control development and inflation. "231 
3.2 SAUDI ARABIA'S OIL POLICY 
The four weeks' sample period before the `Mecca crisis' covered the 
period from mid October to mid November, 1979. An examination of the 
British newspapers during this period showed that the image of Saudi Arabia 
revolved around the oil issues. Once again, it was oil issues, this time 
resulting from the fall of Iranian oil production in early 1979 caused by the 
Islamic revolution, which brought Saudi Arabia to the attention of the British 
231 Johns, Richard. Financial Times. 22 November 1979. p. 24. 
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papers. The four -weeks which were studied did not cover the whole of 
the 
Oil Crisis but covered the concluding period of the second Oil Crisis, which 
was dominated by two central issues. The first issue was connected to 
doubts about the likelihood of Saudi Arabia's high production policy 
continuing. The second issue arose from Saudi Arabia's decision to continue 
its high oil production level, but with a higher price. 
The two related issues led to views of Saudi Arabia's oil policy 
which were different from the images that had appeared during the first Oil 
Crisis, namely because the second Oil Crisis took place in a different 
political setting. The Saudi Arabian role during the second Oil Crisis was 
not directly related to the Arab - Israeli conflict. Also, unlike the first case, 
Saudi Arabia's actions, which adversely affected Britain and the West, were 
taken against the desires of Saudi Arabia, which in general sought to ease 
rather than tighten the oil position world-wide. 
In sum, during the four weeks before the Mecca crisis, oil was the 
focal point around which the image of Saudi Arabia revolved. Saudi 
Arabia's oil production policy was believed to have been influenced by a 
lack of technological resources, division `within' the royal family, oil 
conservation aims and Arab pressure. On the other hand, seeking to protect 
the world economy, trying to rationalise the oil price structure and restoring 
the solidarity of OPEC were projected as the main reasons behind Saudi 
Arabia's oil price policy. Due to the continuity of these issues and policies, 
and their perception as such by the press even after the attack on the Grand 
Mosque, the two periods, namely before and after the Mecca crisis, will be 
treated as one section as far as oil is concerned. 
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3.3 SAUDI ARABIA'S OIL PRODUCTION POLICY 
By the beginning of the first, quarter of 1979, Saudi Arabia's oil 
production started to decline from 10 million barrels per day, to about 9.8 
and finally to 8.8 in the early second quarter of that year. This reduction in 
Saudi Arabia's oil production and the collapse of Iranian oil exports, as a 
result of the Iranian Islamic revolution of early 1979, played an important 
role in creating a tight oil supply which was responsible for the creation of 
the second Oil Crisis, or the 1979 `oil shock'. 
In an article which caught both the public and official mood in the 
USA concerning the seriousness and the effect of the 1979 Oil Crisis, 
Andreas Whittam Smith of the Daily Telegraph wrote that, "So unpleasant 
would further reduction in oil supplies be for the consuming nations that war 
like spirits are foolishly urging military intervention. In California you can 
see bumper stickers reading: `We need oil, not scapegoats. Let's go for it'. " 
232 He went on to write how, "In June, a television sponsored poll asked the 
question: Would you favour the use of force to take oil if our heating oil 
supplies are inadequate next winter? The proportion of respondents saying 
"yes" was 62 per cent". He referred to how American admirals had 
explained how simple it would be to invade key Middle East countries. He 
also pointed out that, "Most major American corporations have done a war 
scenario as part of their long-term planning. One company chairman called 
this exercise, `The hidden agenda'. " With reference to Saudi Arabia, 
Andreas stated that, "James Atkins, one time United States Ambassador to 
Saudi Arabia, said that in such an adventure, America would have to 
consider the expulsion of the native population from the areas taken over and 
232 Whittam Smith, Andreas. Daily Telegraph. 6 November 1979. p. 18. 
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the drafting of American workers to man the entire oil fields. Even then, 
sabotage would probably have caused terrible damage. "233 
When in October, 1979, Crown Prince Fahd (later King Fahd) 
informed the American Ambassador that in response to American requests, 
Saudi Arabian oil production would be increased, it was stressed that the 
extra one million barrels a day were authorised only in order to alleviate the 
strain on the world's oil supply market. 
By the beginning of the final quarter of 1979, the British press were 
emphasising the change in the Saudi Arabian oil policy. Compared to the 
more moderate oil policy which had prevailed during most of 1979, Saudi 
Arabia was now presented as being keener on following a policy which 
aimed at less oil production and a higher oil price. British journalists also 
believed that whereas Saudi Arabia was prepared "... [to] show herself 
willing to increase output for a short period above her desired level in order 
to accommodate the need of the consumers... "234 that "... level would not 
be renewed for the next quarter. "233 They saw technical inability, division 
within the royal family, oil conservation aims and Arab pressure as the 
reasons for doubting the continuation of a high output. These led to 
discussions in the British press of aspects of Saudi Arabia which had not 
before formed a part of the evolving image of Saudi Arabia in `quality' 
British newspapers. 
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a) Technical Inability 
The Guardian viewed Saudi Arabia, in particular, as losing its pivotal 
position in the oil market as a result of its technical inability. John Andrews 
of The Guardian wrote that, 
"... the underlying problem for the consumers is the 
demise of Saudi Arabia as the dictating force in OPEC. 
Until the shortfall caused by the Iranian revolution, 
Saudi Arabia could always keep prices in line by 
threatening to flood the market with extra oil ... [however] 
with Iran now limiting its exports to 3.3 million barrels 
per day, this no longer holds true. Saudi Arabia's extra 
million barrels per day in the second half of this year has 
failed to ease the market and there are, in any case, severe 
doubts about Saudi Arabia's technical ability to produce 
indefinitely above the 8.5 million barrel mark. "236 
Along the same lines, Frances Cairncross of The Guardian believed that 
Saudi Arabia was the country which "... could once be relied upon by the 
West to stop OPEC from rocking the economic boat. But it is no longer 
clear if it can control what happens to world oil prices. "237 Hamish Mcrae 
wrote that, "The ability of the Saudi Arabians to boost production much 
above the present 9.5 million barrels per day is technically quite limited. "238 
Thus, the result of the Iranian oil cut back, " ... has been to rob Saudi 
Arabia of its dominating position within OPEC by removing its ability to 
produce an instant supply glut through additional production. "239 
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b) `Division' Within the Royal Family 
On 23 October, 1979, the British press highlighted two reports made 
by two Saudi Arabian senior ministers. One was by the Oil minister, Sheikh 
Yamani who was reported as saying at a news conference in Atlanta that, "A 
young Turk Mafia in the Saudi government was pushing for higher oil prices 
and a substantial reduction in oil production levels. "240 The other report 
was made by the Saudi Arabian Information Minister, Dr. Mohammed Abdu 
Yamani, as a denial to the former report in which he was reported to have 
said that, "Reports of the Oil Minister's statements were a complete 
fabrication in whole and, in part, they were sensationalist and aimed at 
spreading confusion. "241 Roland Gribben of the Daily Telegraph wrote 
that, "Divisions inside Saudi Arabia are coming increasingly into the open... 
Sheikh Yamani, Saudi Arabia's Oil Minister, said a 'young Turk Mafia' was 
pressing for policy changes. " Gribben assumed that it was "... no secret 
that there were splits inside the Saudi ruling family on crucial oil issues... " 
and highlighted Sheikh Yamani's statement that, "Saudi's moderating role 
was being reduced. "242 Richard Johns of the Financial Times asked the 
following question in an article entitled `Saudi Arabian oil , policy presenting 
a solid front to the world', "In the face of the kingdom's traditional and 
impassive facade of total unity, is the leadership of the world's biggest 
exporter of oil divided over the crucial issue of pricing, and more important, 
production of its major resource? "243 He stressed that, 
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"The evidence is, however, that Sheikh Yamani did 
refer to the existence of a 'young Turk Mafia' in Saudi 
Arabia which ... evoked an 
image of ridicule in direct 
contrast to the solemn conservatism of what was - at 
least until the emergence of the Ayatollah Khomeni as 
the supreme power in Iran - the world's only theocratic 
state". 244 
On the other hand, The Guardian simply reported that, 
"The Saudi Arabian Government has denied as total 
fabrication statements attributed to the Saudi Oil Minister, 
Sheikh Ahmad Zaki Yamani, on divisions within the Saudi 
Government over oil pricing and production. "245 
Richard Johns of the Financial Times went beyond the surface of the 
argument as to what Sheikh Yamani might, or might not, have said and 
discussed the Oil Minister's statement and Saudi Arabia's decision making 
process. Johns explained that, 
"Even though in the Saudi system, the advice of Sheikh 
Yamani and other commoners in the cabinet is, to varying 
degrees, taken into account on the most important questions 
in practice, it would be misleading to talk of 'young 
Turks' in the leadership, with one possible exception. In 
the last analysis, important political decisions on production 
and pricing are made by a small group of princes of the royal 
family, outside The Council of Ministers and in an obscure, 
archaic manner. Apart from King Khalid and crown Prince 
Fahad, its most prominent members are known to be Prince 
Sultan, Minister of Defence; Prince Abdullah, Commander 
of the National Guard; and Prince Naif, Minister of the 
Interior. 
On grounds of age and attitude, the only man who might 
justifiably be called a 'young Turk', and has been, is Prince 
Saud al-Feisal , the Foreign Minister. "246 
244 Ibid. 
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c) Oil Conservation 
Reflecting on Saudi Arabia's oil production, Ray Dafter of the 
Financial Times wrote that, 
"Saudi Arabia, which is still producing at a rate of 
9.5 million barrels per day in order to stabilise world 
supplies... would like to reduce its output to what it 
regards as a more acceptable level of 8.5 million barrels 
per day. It may do [so], if it sees little progress being 
achieved, 
in the area of energy conservation. "247 
Commenting on Saudi Arabia's high oil production, The ? Mmes wrote 
that, " It is doubtful how long Saudis can afford to go on irritating its OPEC 
partners while the West shows little real sign of reducing consumption". 248 
Thus, when the USA's Treasury Secretary, Mr G. William Miller visited 
Saudi Arabia to ask Saudi Arabia to continue higher oil production level 
"... in return for a concrete effort by consuming countries to reduce 
consumption"249, John Andrews of The Guardian wrote that, "... hopes that 
Saudi Arabia [was] planning a spectacular leap in oil production to dampen 
down the market and reassert the Saudi's pivotal role in OPEC, were firmly 
quashed. "250 He stated that Sheikh Yamani had "... dismissed such 
plans... " and had said in Los Angeles, "I do not think the question is one of 
increasing supply. "251 Also, in Brussels, Yamani warned of the dangers of 
an over reliance, on oil. He stressed that such a reliance, "... could 
undermine the entire supply system if adequate countervailing methods were 
not applied. "252 Richard Johns of the Financial Times reported that other 
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senior government members, such as Sheikh Hisham Nazer, Minister of 
Planning, 
"... have said publicly in the past that they would 
prefer to ... prevent the exhaustion of the country's 
one great but finite resource and limit oil output to 
what the kingdom needs to provide finance. Others 
like Mr Ghazi Al-Ghossibi, Minister of Industry 
and Electricity, and Mr Mohammed Abu Al-Khali, 
Minister of Economy and Finance, are believed to be of 
the same opinion. "253 
In an article entitled 'Cut In Oil Output Need Not Be Unkindest Of 
AM, Andreas Whittam Smith of the Daily Telegraph stated that, 
"It does not require much imagination to see 
why OPEC is attracted by the ideas. Indeed, it 
should be particularly easy for us. Britain is also 
an oil producer. The government has recently 
announced conservation measures that have the 
effect of reducing North Sea output below what 
it would otherwise have been... The key fact is this, 
since 1979 less oil has been found in the world than 
has been consumed. Before that watershed year, 
the ratio between world output and reserves was 
constantly improving, now the gap line is relentlessly 
downward. "254 
d) Arab Pressure 
It was `assumed' that major demands were, made on Saudi Arabia as 
an oil-power by other Arab states. With regard to this issue, Ray Dafter of 
the Financial Times wrote that, 
"Saudi Arabia ... is still producing at a rate of 9.5 
253 Johns, Richard. Financial Times. 23 November 1979. p. 3. 254 Whittam Smith, Andreas. Daily Telegraph. 6 November 1979. p. 18. 
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million barrels per day in order to stabilise world oil 
supplies. It would like to 'reduce its output to what 
it regards as a more acceptable level of 8.5 million 
barrels per day. It may do if it sees little progress 
being achieved in the area of ... Palestinian self 
determination. "255 
Nicholas Hirst of The Times assumed that Saudi Arabia was under 
pressure at home because "... some other Arab nations [saw] it as being too 
friendly to the USA while the Camp David Accord left the Palestine question 
unresolved. "256 Likewise, Richard Johns of the Financial Times assumed 
that, "The Saudi government ... was also under 
heavy pressure from other 
Arab states and the Palestine Liberation Organisation to reimpose the 8.5 
barrels a days ceiling on its oil production. "257 The Times journalist, 
Nicholas Hirst, concluded that even though the Saudi Arabians might like to 
keep politics out of oil matters, they could not " ... ignore the surge 
in 
Islamic feeling throughout ý the Middle East and the failure of the Camp 
David Accord to make any real progress towards solving the Palestinian 
question. All these have their effect on pricing and supply policies. "258 
Indeed, during the 10th Arab League summit held in Tunis in November, 
1979, some Arab countries, including Saudi Arabia, were just able to block 
a call in the summit by the Iraqi President, Saddam Hussein, who "... called 
on Arabs to use their oil resources in the battle against Israel. "259 
While Saudi Arabia had been under pressure from the Americans, 
who wanted "... the Saudis to continue the higher level of production to 
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restrain prices and keep inflation in check... ", 260 other Arabs saw the 
continuation of the higher Saudi Arabian oil level as "... being too friendly 
to the US..., "261 who they believed had ignored the Palestinian issue. This 
pressure was led by the Syrian and Iraq axis who wanted to challenge "... 
the more moderate oil producers, like Saudi Arabia... "262, to use oil as an 
"... effective economic weapon... "263 "... against countries which 
support[ed] Israel and Egypt. "264 Another pressure stemmed from Iran which 
intended to persuade all OPEC countries to cut back their production. Saudi 
Arabia, which had increased its oil production level in order to ease the oil 
supply position as a result of the revolutionary events in that country during 
1978 - 1979, lowered its production to enable Iran to regain its market 
share. Yet Iran, who wanted to maintain its lower production level and 
higher oil prices, did not increase its output level. 265 Thus, when Saudi 
Arabia once again increased its oil production level to ease the oil supply 
situation and to control prices, Iran was perceived to have exerted heavy 
pressure on Saudi Arabia to drop back from its extra oil production level. 
Iran's pressure, on Saudi Arabia, which was ' presented in the British 
press as a factor behind the possible lowering of Saudi Arabian oil 
production, was originally given less emphasis compared to other factors. 
However, the Iranian influence on Saudi Arabia's oil policy seemed to be 
highlighted more and more in the papers as other events unfolded or erupted. 
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For example, when the Holy Grand Mosque in Mecca was seized, 
The Times ran an article by Nicholas Hirst under the title, "After the Revolt 
at Mecca - Even 
Greater Concern Over Oil Supplies". Hirst, who maintained that the Mecca 
events had added a new dimension asked, 
"Could the Ayatollah stir up the Shi'ite workers in the 
Saudi oil fields? Might Islamic fever break out in Saudi 
Arabia in a more extreme form and endanger either the 
present regime or the level of oil production. "266 
In addition to the vulnerability of Saudi Arabia's oil policy with 
regard to the ideological Iranian influence, the Daily Telegraph pointed out 
how the Iranians could influence Saudi Arabian attitudes indirectly through 
other parties. For instance, in early December, 1979, a meeting of Arab oil 
producing countries broke up in confusion after, Saudi Arabia's "... Oil 
Minister walked out in protest against a resolution in support of the Iranian 
students holding American hostages in Tehran"267, which was proposed by 
Syria and Libya. Sheikh Yamani's walk out angered the Iranian Oil 
Minister, All Akabar Mointar, who later rounded on Saudi Arabia's refusal 
to back the resolution "... supporting Iran in its dispute with the US... " He 
stated that it was "... astonishing, that Ahmad Zaki Yamani [could] claim 
that there [was] no connection between politics and economics. "268 David 
Hirst of The Guardian reported the Saudi Arabians as saying that oil and 
politics could not be separated and that they were - "... not going to be 
266 Hirst, Nicholas. The Times. 27 November. 1979, p. 12. 267 Staff. Daily Telegraph. 5 December 1979. p. 4. 268 Andrews, John. The Guardian, 6 December 1979, p. 6. 
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stampeded into the kind of apocalyptic showdown which Colonel Gadaffi 
apparently want[ed] to foist upon them. "269 
While it was being argued that Iran could disturb Saudi Arabia's 
stability through its Shi'ite minority in the Eastern province of Saudi Arabia, 
and through its allies in the Arab region, it was also being argued that Iran 
could influence Saudi Arabia's oil policy through its strategic and military 
position. The Guardian's unnamed staff member in Jeddah, reflecting on 
the effect of the American - Iranian tension, claimed that, 
"... possible repercussions on the Kingdom's oil industries 
should the US - Iran turmoil lead to a war, are a prime 
cause of anxiety. The risks include an Iranian blockade of 
the 30 mile - wide straits of Hormuz, and even an attack on 
the Kingdom's indefensible oil fields in the Eastern province. 
The oil fields stretch across miles of desert and their 
installations - wells, fractionation plants, pumps, refineries - 
make ready targets for external aerial attacks or for internal 
Islamic militants. "270 
The image of Saudi Arabia which was being presented to the British 
public was becoming more multifaceted, even in terms of the simplicities of 
an 'oil-state', with a greater understanding emerging of Saudi Arabia's 
vulnerability to various inside and outside pressures and the dangers arising, 
not only from the Arab - Israel conflict, but also from the Gulf region 
tensions and the combination of having an internal minority which was the 
majority of a powerful state effectively bordering on Saudi Arabia. 
Awareness of the importance of the Shi'ite minority in Saudi Arabia's 
strategic Eastern province, where they constituted a majority compared to 
other parts of Saudi Arabia, appeared for the first time and so did the 
269 Hirst, David. The Guardian. 10 December 1979. p. 6. 270 Staff. The Guardian. 11 December 1979. p. 7. 
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realisation that given Saudi Arabia's huge size, its underrpopulation and its 
close location, Saudi Arabia was very vulnerable to military options. 
To sum up, the British press now came to view Saudi Arabia as a 
country which would like to practise a moderate oil production policy, but 
which was beset with considerable and complex internal and, external 
circumstances which could dictate this policy to be less moderate. A more 
sophisticated and' sympathetic image was coming into being. 
3.4 - SAUDI ARABIA'S OIL PRICE POLICY 
Oil prices are related to oil supply. The Saudi Arabian oil production 
policy of high output levels, which was discussed earlier, was designed by 
the Saudi Arabians to keep oil prices down -to a moderate level because 
normally, the smaller the oil supply, the higher the oil price. Thus, Saudi 
Arabia's decision to increase its oil production by one million barrels per 
day above its normal level, was not only to compensate the oil supply 
shortage caused by Iran's falling oil production, but was also to restrain oil 
prices, in order to prevent a world-wide economic depression spreading from 
the oil consuming industries of the West. This was perceived and 
appreciated by the British press. Richard Johns of the Financial Times 
explained that, "The leap-frogging escalation of prices since the beginning of 
1979 would have been far worse without Saudi Arabia's role in maintaining 
oil supply stability. " John's quoted John West, the American Ambassador 
to Saudi Arabia, as saying that, "A fall of 50 per cent in Saudi production 
would bring the greatest world-wide depression we have ever seen. "271 
271 Johns, Richard. Financial Times. 23 October 1979. p. 3. See also UPI 
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Moreover Saudi Arabia, which had maintained a higher oil production above 
its normal level in order to ease the oil market supply was "... charging the 
$18 a barrel bottom price for its oil in order to stabilise prices and the 
economic situation in the consumer countries. "272 Meanwhile, other 
producer countries like Iran were charging $5.50 a barrel more than Saudi 
Arabia for the same quality of crude and Algeria, Libya and Nigeria broke 
through the official OPEC ceiling of $23.50. Saudi Arabia was described 
as being "... totally isolated in OPEC... and totally out of line within the 
market, being the only country charging an $18 a barrel bottom price ... set 
by the two tier system which emerged from the OPEC conference of 
1979. "273 
In addition to Saudi Arabia's own moderate oil production policy, 
with the exception of the oil embargo of 1973 - 1974, Saudi Arabia was also 
a strong advocate of a moderate oil price policy, in general, and within 
OPEC, in particular. For example, in October, 1975, at the OPEC meeting 
in Vienna, OPEC members increased prices by 10 per cent as a compromise 
between the 5 per cent proposed by Saudi Arabia and the 15 per cent 
proposed by Iran. At the 1976 OPEC meeting in Doha, only Saudi Arabia 
and the United Arab Emirates agreed to 5 per cent. At the 1977 OPEC 
meeting in Stockholm, which was held to reunify oil prices, Saudi Arabia 
again agreed to increase its prices by only 5 per. cent. Finally, during most 
of 1979, Saudi Arabia was the only country charging the $18 a barrel bottom 
price set by the Geneva OPEC meeting in June of that year. Other OPEC 
members were charging $5 -8 per barrel more than Saudi Arabia. 274 
272 Andrews, John. The Guardian. 27 October 1979. p. 18. 273 Ibid.. 
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However, as early as mid November, 1979, there was speculation 
that this Saudi Arabian policy might change. The British papers which 
reported on events in Saudi Arabia presented several reasons behind Saudi 
Arabia's decision. 
a) Protecting the Consumers 
Even before the Saudi Arabians decided to increase their oil price in 
December 1979, `The Middle East Economic Survey' predicted that Saudi 
Arabia might raise its oil price. Ray Dafter, of the Financial Times, who 
highlighted this prediction stated that, "The Saudis disillusionment stemmed 
in part from the large third quarter profits registered by oil companies. It 
was felt that the benefits of lower Saudi prices had gone to the 
companiesrather than the consumers. "275 Similarly, and based on the same 
source, John Andrews of The Guardian highlighted that, 
"It is now clear the Saudis feel, particularly in 
view of the colossal third quarter profits registered 
by the Aramco parent companies ..., that the benefits 
of lower Saudi prices have gone to the oil companies rather 
than the consumers. In such circumstances it would not be 
surprising if Saudi Arabia took action to raise its prices... ". 276 
Hugh Davies of the Daily Telegraph reported that the Saudi 
Arabians, "... felt they had been "taken advantage or because of the 
relatively low price, $18 a barrel ... when others charged $23.50 a barrel. " 
He suggested that the Saudi Arabians felt that the price they were selling at 
had not gone to the benefit of the consumers and that it had "... been raked 
off by the oil companies. "277 
275 Dafter, Ray. Financial Times. 13 November 1979. p. 36. 276 Andrews, John. The Guardian. 26 November 1979. p. 1. 277 Davies, Hugh. Daily Telegraph. 26 November 1979. p. 1. 
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According to James Buchan of the Financial Times, Mr Miller, the 
American Treasurer who had visited Saudi Arabia to encourage the Saudi 
Arabians to keep their higher oil production level had said that the Saudi 
Arabian officials were "... very upset because they suspected that oil 
companies were selling Saudi oil at higher market prices instead of passing 
on the benefits to consumers. "278 
b) Dispelling Criticism 
Sheikh Ahmad Zaki Yamani, the Kingdom's Oil Minister, confirmed 
that Saudi Arabia would raise its oil price in advance of the OPEC 
conference beginning in Caracas in December 1979. Nevertheless, Richard 
Johns of the Financial T Imes stressed that, "The Kingdom want[ed] to 
restore a rational system at a moderate level, not least to dispel criticism 
from other OPEC members and at home about the profit margins being 
given to US companies. "279 Johns also stated that, "Saudi citizens [were] 
expressing increasing discontent with the differential between the Kingdom's 
low - priced oil and the higher rate of other producers. " In addition, he 
wrote that "Criticism from other producers [was] one main reason why 
Saudi Arabia [was] anxious to realign prices at next week's OPEC 
meeting. "280 A day later he wrote that, "Politically, the objective would be 
to defuse mounting criticism from other Arab producers of the Kingdom's 
moderation in holding down prices. "281 , Nicholas Hirst of The Times 
explained that Islamic feeling against the West during the American Embassy 
278 Buchan, James. Financial Times. 26 November 1979. p. 1. 279 Johns, Richard. Financial limes. 13 December 1979. p. 4- 290 Ibid. 
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crisis in Iran, the Mecca crisis and the failure of the Camp David Accord 
had "... all had their effect on the pricing policy of Saudi Arabia. "282 
C) Stabilising Oil Prices and Protecting OPEC's Solidarity 
Saudi Arabia was presented in the British `quality'press as attempting 
to stabilise oil prices and to protect the pricing structure and solidarity of 
OPEC. Ray Dafter of the Financial Times, reported that, "Saudi Arabia, the 
world's main oil exporter may soon bring its prices more in line with those 
of other crude oil producers. " He explained that, " The Saudis may decide 
to impose their own ' price increase before the next OPEC ministerial 
conference in Caracas, Venezuela ... [because] 
Saudi Arabia may feel that 
such a move would go some way towards rationalising the oil pricing 
structure and towards restoring the solidarity of the organisation. "283 In the 
same vein, and based on The Middle East Economic Survey, Roland 
Gribben of the Daily Telegraph highlighted the fact that "Saudi Arabia was 
likely to raise prices before the conference and disclosed that plans were 
being made for the gathering of key oil states to try and restore some price 
stability. "284 Saudi Arabia and other countries were expected to increase 
their oil prices, and Duncan Campbell-Smith of the Financial Times claimed 
that, "Their planned increase represent[ed] an attempt to strengthen the hand 
of the moderate OPEC states ahead of the Caracas conference. "2115 Some 
increase in the official pricing structure was now certain and according to 
Ray Dafter of the Financial Times, the moderates would be hoping to 
282 Hirst, Nicholas. 7 he Times. 14 December 1979. p. 21. 283 Dafter, Ray. Financial Times. 13 November 1979. p. 36. 284 Gribben, Roland. Daily Telegraph. 13 November 1979. p. 21. 295 Campbell-Smith, Duncan. Financial Times. 10 December 1979. p. 1. 
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restrain the increase "... to bring overall price levels more into balance and 
to help restore the pricing solidarity of OPEC. "286 
Thus, when the Saudi Oil Minister Sheikh Ahmad Zaki Yamani 
announced in Brussels on the 12th December, 1979, that Saudi Arabia would 
raise its oil price from 18 dollars to 24 dollars per barrel before the OPEC 
meeting, which was to be held on 17th of that month, Nicholas Hirst of The 
Times assumed the move was "... to bring unity back to the OPEC pricing 
structure. " Further, Hirst added, "... but having moved closer to the prices 
being charged by the 'hawks' in OPEC, the Saudis will hope that they will 
then be able to have a moderating influence on further price increases being 
demanded at the Caracas meeting. "287 The next day, in an article entitled 
`Will The Hawks Win This Time', Hirst wrote that the importance of the 
change was psychological. 
"By breaking through the upper limit of $23.50 
fixed at the Geneva conference earlier this year, 
Saudi Arabia will be seen to have moved from its 
extreme position of attempting to hold down values 
to a level which ... will be easier for Saudi Arabia to 
agree with if other members insist on a higher price. " 
Hirst concluded that Saudi Arabia was gambling that by moving so 
far, it could "... bring other states into line, reduce selling on the spot market 
and ease the pressure for production cuts which could badly hurt the 
West. "egg 
286 Dafter, Ray. Financial Times. 13 November 1979. p. 36. 287 Hirst, Nicholas The Times, 13 December 1979, p. 17. 288 Hirst, Nicholas The Times, 14 December 1979, p. 21. 
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Meanwhile, David Fairhall of The Guardian argued that the Saudi 
Arabian oil price increase was "... intended to avoid another disruptive clash 
with the organisation's "hawks" such as Iraq, Libya and Algeria when they 
all meet in Caracas. " He supported his argument by quoting Sheikh Ahmad 
Zaki Yamani who had said that, "We managed to agree on this level so we 
[could] tell our partners what our price [was] now, and if you want to join 
us, we will be very happy. "289 
Similarly, Ray Dafter and Margaret Van Hatten of the Financial 
Times explained that the Saudi Arabian decision was "... seen in the oil 
industry as a further attempt by Saudi Arabia - the world's biggest exporter - 
to defuse some of the problems at the annualprice-fixing meeting of OPEC 
countries which begins in Caracas, Venezuela at the end of December 
1979. "290 
3.5 CONCLUSION 
To sum up, Saudi Arabia was presented as a strong supporter of a 
moderate oil price policy compared to some other producer countries. 
When Saudi Arabia increased its prices slightly in favour of the desires of 
the `hawk' members, the Saudi Arabian decision was seen as not having 
stemmed from Saudi Arabia's own desire, but from a combination of 
circumstances which made it not only understandable but to which it was a 
sensible and constructive response, designed to achieve the following aims 
which were shared by the West. 
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a) To protect the oil consumers. 
b) To diffuse Islamic, Arab and local pressure which expressed 
unhappiness 
with the Saudi Arabian's moderate oil policy which they saw as 
"... helping the West... "291 
c) To rationalise the oil price structure and protect OPEC's solidarity. 
Even though, 'division within the royal family' over oil prices was 
seen to some extent as a factor which influenced Saudi Arabia's decision to 
raise its prices, this eventually came to be seen as only a momentary 
disruption in the process towards an increasingly positive and sympathetic 
image which was emerging. 
291 Hirst, Nicholas. The Times. 14 December 1979. p. 21. 
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THE MECCA CRISIS AND ITS AFTERMATH: 20 NOVEMBER 1979 
-18 DECEMBER 1979 
3.1.1 INTRODUCTION 
The main elements of Saudi Arabia's image in the British press at the 
end of the first Oil crisis (1973) were the following: 
a) a Middle Eastern country with an anti-communist attitude; 
b) a moderate country in matters of oil policy; 
c) the seat and `Guardian' of Islam's holy places; and, 
d) a country which, under its present King was, at times, in the process 
of emerging onto the world stage into a position of leadership in the 
Arab World. 
These elements were reinforced during the 2nd Oil Crisis of 1979. 
This was essentially an external image, where Saudi Arabia was seen as if it 
was just as an area on the map, an entity in British foreign policy and trade. 
The Mecca Crisis then came and added to this external image, at least to 
some extent, information about what was inside the borders, images of the 
society, the culture and the political structure which set the external image 
into a domestic and social context. 
On November 20,1979, several hundred armed men attacked and 
seized the Grand Mosque of Mecca, Islam's holiest shrine, barricaded 
themselves inside the huge structure and proclaimed one of their members to 
be the Mahdi. The Times correspondent in Jeddah explained that the Mahdi 
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... [was] not strictly a messiah, but he was prophesised as a 
divinely K 
inspired human who would cleanse Islam. "292 It took the Saudi Arabian 
government more than two weeks to end the uprising which was considered, 
"... by far the worst known internal disruption in the Kingdom since the 
1920s when a rebel Ikhwan force ... was crushed. "293 It was also seen as 
"... the most serious challenge to Saudi Arabia since President Nasser's 
attempts to bring down the dynasty in the early 1960s. "294 
In order to counter the intense speculation which existed, particularly 
in view of the Saudi Arabian government's announcement in the previous 
months of the discovery of an Iranian plot to cause disturbances during the 
annual pilgrimage to Mecca, the government announced that the attack was 
not connected to foreign sources. Prince Naef, the Saudi Arabian Interior 
Minister, declared that the incident was "... a religious deviation... "295 He 
was also reported as saying that, "... by its nature, [it was] a deviation and 
departure from the truth of the Islamic religion within a criminal framework 
and [was] far away from any political content. "296 When asked whether the 
gunmen were of a specific foreign nationality, Prince Naef stated, "There 
[was] no evidence which might lead us to believe that this incident [was] 
connected to any specific nationality. "297 Furthermore, Prince Saud Al- 
Feisal, Saudi Arabia's Foreign Minister, affirmed this point when he "... 
denied that the attack was politically motivated or led by Iranian Shi'ites. " 
He also stated that the gunmen were mostly "... Saudis... "298 'Similarly, in 
his letter to the King of Morocco, which was reported by Reuters, King 
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Khaled of Saudi Arabia implied a similar meaning when he stated that 
"... [the] heretics who profaned the holy places in the month of Muharram 
were deviators from Islam... "299 and he denied any outside connection. 
Thus, the Saudi Arabians declared that the incident was an internal 
matter without any connection to any foreign sources, "... the work of 
Muslim fundamentalists. "300 It was carried out by "... criminal deviation 
from Islam... ", 301 who "... had placed themselves beyond the Islamic 
community. "3026 However, despite these official statements, the British 
papers continued to offer different reasons for the incident and argued about 
the identities of the group and its likely association with outsiders, albeit 
they also sometimes' confirmed the official account. These speculations were 
extremely revealing about British perceptions of Saudi Arabia, its position 
and importance. 
The four papers all argued at the outset that Iran was responsible for 
the attack and the seizure of the Grand Mosque. David Watts of The Times, 
based on reports from the USA, reported that the gunmen were "... Islamic 
militants. " He speculated that, "If so, they could be acting in sympathy 
with the students who have occupied the US Embassy in Tehran. " Watts 
reminded his readers that there was a Shi'ite `minority' in Saudi Arabia 
compared to a `majority' in Iran. 303 In the same paper, Edward Mortimer 
wrote that a few weeks before the attack on the Grand Mosque, Iran was 
accused of attempting to disturb the annual pilgrimage to Mecca in Saudi 
Arabia. Thus, "It was natural, in the circumstances, to jump to such a 
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conclusion about the involvement of Iran. "304 However, a week after the 
attack took place, The Times admitted the innocence of Iran and that 
"... uncertainty... " was to blame for the "... speculation that the seizure of 
the attack on the Grand Mosque had been carried out by partisans of the 
Iranian revolution... or more alarmingly, by Shias from Eastern Saudi 
Arabia itself, where many Shi'ites are employed. " The paper warned that, 
".., such a development would be deeply worrying, not only to Saudi Arabia, 
but to the Gulf area as a whole. "305 
The Daily Telegraph reported that Mecca had "... joined Tehran as 
the scene of Islamic passions boiling over. " It also blamed Iran for the 
accident and argued that it was "... almost certainly overspills from the 
ferment in Iran, though exactly how many, may not be clear for a time. " 
The paper explained that compared to "... the Saudi Arabian dynasty, 
[which] belong[ed] to the Wahhabi sect of the Sunni (orthodox) branch of 
Islam, there [were] many Iranian Shi'ites in Saudi Arabia. "306 
In the same paper, John Bulloch saw the attack as a conflict between 
Sunni and Shi'ite branches of Islam and described the crisis as "... a terrible 
desecration in believers' eyes. " He claimed that the armed men were 
prompted by the age-old split between the Sunni and Shi'ite division of 
Islam, and by "Ayatollah Khomeni ... the acknowledged leader of Shi'ism 
and his actions in Iran which affect his followers everywhere. "307 Bulloch 
also reported that the majority of the attackers were all Saudi Arabians and 
he insisted that they "... had close contacts with the Shia Moslems of 
304 Mortimer, Edward The Times. 23 November 1979. p. 1. 305 Staff. The Times. 29 November 1979. p. 17. 306 Staff. Daily Telegraph. 22 November 1979. p. 18. 307 Bulloch, John. Daily Telegraph. 22 November 1979. p. 5. 
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Iran. 3OS He wrote that they were "... mainly from Eastern Saudi Arabia. 
They were Mahdists, another sub-division of the Shia sect. "309 
The Guardian newspaper also maintained that Iran inspired the attack 
on the Grand Mosque. John Andrews' reaction to the event was that the 
armed men "... must be inspired by the Islamic revolution of Shi'ite Iran, 
thus confirming Saudi fears that the 'Khomeni infection' ... [would] spread 
beyond the borders of Iran to undermine the stability of Sunni rooted 
states. "310 Furthermore, Mohammed Sodky of The Guardian, claimed that, 
based on unidentified sources, the attackers had been identified as Shi'ite 
Muslims from Eastern Saudi Arabia who were serving in the Saudi Arabian 
army. Sodky said that their intention was "... to topple the Saudi monarchy 
and establish an `Islamic republic' on the same line as the one founded in 
Iran by Ayatollah Khomeni, the foremost Shi'ite leader. "311 
The Financial Times, which like the other papers had initially implied 
that Iran was involved in the attack on the Grand Mosque, 312 later 
maintained, based on "... Arab diplomatic sources... ", that "... the 
atmosphere generated by Ayatollah Khomeni and his Islamic fundamentalism 
[was] responsible for the attack. "313 There was no evidence of direct Iranian 
involvement but the paper added that the events would probably "... not 
have occurred but for 'the heady calls going out from Tehran and Ayatollah 
Khomeni in the holy city of Qom. "314 
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Another theory suggested that other Arabs or nationalists were behind 
the attack on the Grand Mosque. John Andrews of The Guardian 
conjectured that, "The seizure was the work of extremists, possibly 
Palestinians, in sympathy with Iran over occupation of the US Embassy in 
Tehran or possibly pressing Saudi Arabia to use the oil weapon against the 
United States. "313 David Watts of The Times, based on an unnamed 
`informant', argued that the gunmen who took over the Mosque "... 
appeared to be South Yemenis. "316 Ihsan Hijazi of the Financial Times 
claimed that, "Many are said to come from Jizan and Najran, the Saudi 
district adjoining North Yemen, or [the] Yemen Arab Republic, and had 
received training at camps across the border... ", districts which "... were 
reunited with Saudi Arabia in the early 1930s. "317 On the other hand, 
according to The Times, "... a group calling itself [The] Union of the People 
of the Arabian Peninsula... " had claimed responsibility for the seizure of the 
Grand Mosque and had claimed that they intended to "... trigger a pan - 
Islamic revolution. "318 The Financial Times reported that another group 
which called itself "... the Moslem Revolutionary Movement in the Arabian 
Peninsula... " had also claimed responsibility and that their intention "... was 
aimed directly against the Saudi royal family. "319 
Finally, it transpired that the gunmen were neither Iranian nor 
Shi'ites, and were neither Arab nationalists nor Yemenis but were from "... 
Bedouin tribes of Central Arabia. "320 John Bulloch of the Daily Telegraph 
pointed out that "The `apostates', as they branded,... were mainly from the 
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Otaiba tribe. "321, Richard Johns, of the Financial 77mes, identified them as 
coming "... from the Saudi heartland of the Najd. "322 Other journalists 
classified them as tribal people with religious motives who "... were exposed 
to the messianic and reformist ideas ... floating around the 
Moslem 
world... "; 323 "... religious traditionalists who [were] seek[ing] a return to 
the fundamentals of Islam... "; 324 and, "Mahdists, a sect within Islam. "323 
The 77mes leader of 29 November, 1979, reflecting on the event in Mecca, 
referred to the attack as "... the religious fervour of the desert tribes in 
Saudi Arabia. "326 
Once it became clear that the attackers were indeed from a tribally 
based religious sect, the questions addressed in the British press focused on 
why such men should attack the Grand Mosque in the holy city of Mecca, in 
a country which was founded on a balance of religious and tribal forces. 
According to the British papers, rapid economic development, corruption, 
and Westernisation were the main causes. 
The Financial Times stated that Saudi Arabia "... had become 
increasingly conscious of the dangers of offending conservative feelings as a 
result of too rapid change and the possible spread of religious extremism. "327 
Richard Johns of the Financial Times stated that, "It [was] not greatly 
appreciated, the extent to which the `progressives' [in Saudi Arabia] ... have 
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had to take account of deep conservative feeling in pursuing development 
policies . "329 In a similar vein, The 
Times leader argued that the Grand 
Mosque incident was "... a rebelling against over rapid social change, 
corruption and Westernisation. "329 Further, Michael Field of the Financial 
Times believed that what inspired the tribes who stormed the Mosque in 
Mecca was "... disillusionment with foreign cultural influence that fast 
development brings. "330 The Guardian correspondent in Jeddah held that the 
group action reflected a "... wider dissatisfaction ... 
(with) ... the 
materialism brought by oil for the Saudi Arabians who feel that they have 
lost their soul. "331 Richard Johns of the Financial Times also passed the 
same opinion but further noted that the seizure of the Grand Mosque "... 
appear[ed] to have been by intensely conservative forces opposed to the 
government's programme of modernisation and development rather than the 
radical - but similarly 'reactionary' - ones unleashed by the Ayatollah 
Khomeni's revolution in Iran. "332 
The Times, concluded that the "... influence of wealth and contact 
with the West... " had caused Saudi Arabia to "... fall away from the values 
that they proclaimed. "333 This was seen as a result of, 
"... undertaking the most ambitious development plan in 
its history. This has entailed the presence in the Kingdom 
of perhaps as many as 3 million foreigners and all the 
dislocation of traditional values inevitably resulting in the 
crude and self-contained town and desert societies of a 
country united by force and religion only 50 years ago. "334 
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Even though the Saudi Arabian government was able to end the 
Mecca Crisis, the British papers argued that Saudi Arabia might experience 
three main consequences as a result of the attack on the Grand Mosque. 
These will be examined below under the headings of a)"The `shattered' 
assumption", b "Putting the brakes on development", and c) "Distancing 
itself from the West". 
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3.1.2 THE MAIN CONSEQUENCES OF THE ATTACK ON THE 
GRAND MOSQUE 
a) "The 'Shattered' Assumption" 
The assumption that the Kingdom was insulated from the religious 
ferment that was troubling the Islamic world by its reformist creed of Islam 
(Wahhabism) was "... an important assumption that the Saudis [had] made 
about themselves... "335, but which the attack on the Mosque had overturned. 
Another assumption, which the events of 1979 had changed, was that, 
"... there was a broad tribal consensus behind the family, whose forebears 
[had] founded the first Saudi domain in alliance with the reformer 
Mohammed bin Abdulwahab in the 18th century. "336 Along the same lines, 
The Times' correspondent in Jeddah believed that the complacent "... belief 
that the tribes [had] been effectively won over in Saudi Arabia [had] now 
been shattered. So too, [had] the hope that Muslim fundamentalism [had] 
been satisfied. "337 In the same paper and on the same day, Edward 
Mortimer added that the event was "... a severe blow to the prestige of the 
Saudi government, which had hitherto appeared to be in total control of its 
country and have the sanction of the religious authority on its side. "338 
John Andrews of The Guardian wrote that the impact of the Grand 
Mosque attack on Saudi Arabians, "... the followers of the puritanical 
Wahhabi interpretation of orthodox Sunni Islam, raise[d] the nightmare of a 
335 Buchan, James. Financial Times. 7 December 1979. p. 7. 336 Ibid. 
337 Staff. The Times. 23 November 1979. p. 6. 338 Mortimer, Edward. The Times. 23 November 1979. p. 1. 
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new brand of radicalism in the Middle East which [would] threaten both the 
government and the unity of Islam itself. "339 
For John Bulloch of the Daily Telegraph, the event challenged Saudi 
Arabia on its own ground and showed the country to be "... incapable of its 
primary duty of protecting the holy places within its own territory... " and, 
with reference to the response in other Muslim countries it "... inflame[d] 
events outside [its] own country. "34° 
Nicholas Hirst of The Times believed that the events in the Grand 
Mosque "... '[had] shown that Saudi Arabia [was] not immune from the 
unrest which [had] . 
been sweeping Islam... " in general, and Iran in 
particular, but he went on to explain that Saudi Arabia did not have "... the 
same seeds for discontent, the same urban poor, .. [was].. less 
industrialised, 
less populated and most of its people .. (were) .. of a 
different sect to the 
Muslims in Iran. "341 When the Saudi Arabian government posted armed 
policemen outside some other large mosques during the Grand Mosque 
seizure, James Buchan and John Close of the Financial Times concluded that 
the action was "... one indication that [Saudi Arabia] ... publicly 
recognise[d] the threat from the pulpit. More important, the attack on 
Mecca show[ed] that ... the government and religious establishment [had] 
been outflanked in their claims to hold the keys of pure and reformed 
Islam. "3424 
339 Andrews, John. The Guardian. 22 November 1979. p. 17. 
340 Bulloch, John. Daily Telegraph. 24 November 1979. p. 1. 
341 Hirst, Nicholas. The Times. 27 November 1979. p. 12. 
342 Buchan, James and Close, John. Financial Times. 7 December 1979. p. 22. 
104 
David Hirst of The Guardian maintained that the events "... must 
have come as a profound shock... " to Saudi Arabia and he claimed that "... 
not only regimes like the Syrian and Iraqi Ba'this are threatened by surgent 
Islam, but traditionalists like themselves who, intheory at least, have never 
sought any legitimacy outside the puritanial teachings of their Wah'habite 
faith, were also vulnerable. "343 
Thus Saudi Arabia was seen as a country in which Islamic and tribal 
forces formed the main components of the social system, and the assumption 
that Saudi Arabia was in control of these two forces, came to be seen as at 
least questionable. 
b) "Putting the Brakes on Development" 
The 1973-74 oil price increase allowed Saudi Arabia to conduct 
extraordinarily extensive development plans which brought about rapid 
change and with it, different values. However, the events of 1979, which 
were a dissatisfied response to such change, influenced the government to 
become "... increasingly conscious of the dangers of offending conservative 
feelings. "344 The Financial Times' unnamed Middle East correspondent 
wrote that one likely outcome of the affair in Mecca would be the "... 
strengthening of the position of the conservatives in the leadership, 
particularly Prince Abdullah, "who argued against fast development. "345 
Likewise, James Buchan and John Close of the Financial limes assumed 
that, "In the longer term, the events ... must give greater weight to the 
conservatives within the royal family and their advisers who favour slower 
343 Hirst, David. The Guardian. 10 December 1979. p. 6. 344 Staff. Financial Tunes. 22 November 1979. p. 1. 345 Ibid. p. 42. 
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growth and reduced oil production. "346 Similarly, The Guardian's 
correspondent in Jeddah proposed that, as a result, "Saudi Arabia .. [would] 
.. begin a slow and thorough re-examination of its development... and take 
the opportunity to attack rampant corruption and hypocrisy in the country ". 
He added that, "There [was] no doubt ... that new 
developments in the next 
five-year plan [would] concentrate more on rural development and less on 
the cities. "347 Michael Field of the Financial Times predicted that "This 
would mean fewer contracts in what has recently been the world's fastest 
growing market. "34s 
Nonetheless, it was perceived that even before the attack on the 
Grand Mosque took place, the Saudi Arabian government had been "... 
fairly successful in controlling sensitive areas of its own making such as 
television and girls' education. "349 The gunmen had merely made the 
government more sensitive and "... keen to control obvious abuses of the 
Wahhabite way to forestall any similar actions. "350 The introduction of 
Saudi Arabian women into the work force to replace non-Saudi Arabian 
females was expected to be "... a likely first casualty in the inevitable swing 
to Islamic orthodoxy which began ... in the wake of Iran and the Grand 
Mosque crisis. " Additionally, according to The Guardian, "The Matawyn 
or religious police from the Society for the Eradication of Vice and 
Encouragement of Virtue, [had] moved back into Jeddah wielding their 
sticks at those not hurrying to the call for prayers. "351 
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c) "Distancing Itself From the West" 
The 7Imes leader of 29 November, 1979, proposed that following the 
Mecca Crisis the Saudi Arabians were "... likely to try to distance 
themselves further from the West in both social and economic policies, while 
pressing harder their advocacy of the Palestinian cause and the Muslim 
claim to Jerusalem. "352 It was also argued that the Mecca Crisis would 
reinforce "... the already strong lobby in favour of conserving oil and not 
satisfying the needs of the industrialised West. "333 James Buchan and John 
Close of the Financial Times claimed that the attack "... signalled trouble to 
the West ... ", and predicted that a cooling, of the "... over- warmth 
in 
relations with the West and the USA - sponsored Egypt-Israel peace treaty 
were bound to be two of the more serious consequences of the [Mecca] 
affair. "354 Consquently, Saudi Arabia was expected to be "... more 
sensitive than ever about evidence of its continuing close, but uneasy, 
relationship with the US. "355 
David Hirst of The Guardian concluded that, "If the house of Saudi 
[was] to remain what American Congressmen like to call a "bastion of 
stability", it [was] going to have to respond to certain environmental 
pressures, and taking its distance from America [might] be one of them. "356 
The Saudi Arabians' "... unwillingness to make promises about future oil 
production levels to William Miller, US Secretary of the Treasury, was 
conceived by The Times newspaper as "... a foretaste of what [was] to 
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come. "337 Michael Field of the Financial Times suggested that the Mecca 
affair would induce "... a reduction in oil output to take account of lower 
demand for revenue as a result of slower development which [would mean] 
fewer contracts. "ass 
Conversely, Alex Brummer of The Guardian in Washington argued 
that the "... whole [Mecca] affair could work in favour of the United 
States. " This was because the incident "... would encourage Saudi Arabia 
to strengthen its ties with the United States and the more moderate Arab 
nations and would ensure that oil supplies were protected... It would also 
mean that the Saudi Arabians would remain loyal to the US dollar. "339 
3.1.3 THE IMPACT OF THE MECCA CRISIS ON THE MUSLIM 
WORLD 
The whole Mecca affair highlighted the importance and place of 
Saudi Arabia amongst the Islamic states and communities of the world, in 
addition to its status as an oil power. Clear evidence of this materialised in 
the wave of anti-American violence following the attack on the Grand 
Mosque as the rumour spread that the USA had been involved in the attack. 
The size and the nature of the Muslim reaction reported in the four 
papers affirmed the importance of Saudi Arabia and confirmed that, "The 
eyes of the Moslem world [were] on Saudi Arabia. "360 The Times displayed 
a large picture of the American Embassy in Islamabad ablaze after being 
357 Staff. The Tunes. 29 November 1979. p. 17. 358 Field, Michael. Financial Times. 29 November 1979. p. 3. 359 Brummer, Alex. The Guardian. 22 November 1979. p. 18. 360 Buchan, James and Close, John. Financial Times. 7 December 1979 p. 22. 
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stormed by "... mobs, angered by rumours that Americans and Israelis were 
behind the assault on the Great Mosque in Mecca. "361 
Hugh Davies of the Daily Telegraph reported that, "Islamic fervour 
[had] spread to Pakistan ... as a mob, reported to number tens of thousands, 
stormed the United States Embassy in Islamabad. "362 According to the 
Financial Times, "Screaming crowds of Moslem students stormed the US 
Embassy in the Pakistan capital Islamabad, setting the building, the 
American flag and several vehicles on fire". The paper went on to explain 
that, "The incident, which coincided with the seizure of the Grand Mosque 
of Islam in Mecca, was duplicated in several other Pakistani cities. " Anti- 
American feelings in general were "... inflamed by the Mecca incident. "363 
The Guardian wrote that an "Anti-American demonstration was 
reported to have been taking place throughout Pakistan ... A battle was 
fought between police and 2,000 to 3,000 demonstrators who surrounded the 
American Consulate General in the city. "364 Hugh Davies of the Daily 
Telegraph, reporting from Washington, wrote that the anti-American feeling 
"... appeared to have been co-ordinated violence across Pakistan ... where 
American buildings were raided. "363 In Rawalpindi, Della Denman of The 
Guardian indicated that 500-600 youths had set fire to the USA Cultural 
Centre and "... ransacked the empty British Council Library of furniture and 
books. "366 She also reported that, "... 200 youths had broken through the 
gates of the catholic presentation convent, burnt doors down, ripped out 
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telephone wires and smashed furniture. "367 The Daily Telegraph displayed a 
picture of "... a mob outside the American centre in Rawalpindi ... after 
Pakistani rioters had set fire to the building after learning of the attack by 
gunmen on the Grand Mosque in Mecca. "369 
In India, violence was reported in Hyderabad and other cities when 
Muslims clashed with Hindus after the latter "... refused to close their shops 
in protest against the Mecca siege. "369 The Times printed a picture on the 
first page showing a group of Muslims in Delhi's Grand Mosque burning an 
effigy which represented "... anti-Islamic forces... ". 370 It was also predicted 
that the Mecca affair could have political consequences: "The event at the 
Grand Mosque in Mecca and subsequent incidents of violence in India could 
lead to a Hindu backlash against Mrs Indira Gandhi and her Congress Party 
in the forthcoming elections. "371 
Edward Mortimer of The Times told readers that "... `shock waves' 
from the seizure by a fanatical sect of the shrine of the Kaaba in Mecca 
continued to reverberate through the Muslim world ... [during] the third 
day 
of the year 1400 in the Islamic calendar. "3726 He went on to report the 
`shock waves' in several Islamic countries. In Turkey, " Muslim students 
shouting anti-American and anti-Zionist slogans tried to storm the residence 
of the US Consul General, in the city of Izmir. " In Bangladesh "... 300 
students demonstrated in front of the American Embassy ... accusing the 
CIA of involvement in the Mecca attack. "373 
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3.1.4 SAUDI ARABIA AS AN ISLAMIC STATE 
The result of the totally unexpected and spectacularly public eruption 
within Saudi Arabia, represented by the attack on the Grand Mosque, and 
the wave of deep and even violent concern which it triggered off in other 
parts of the Islamic world, led to major changes in the image of Saudi 
Arabia in the eyes of the British press. It became clear that the position and 
importance of Saudi Arabia did not just stem from its huge oil reserves and 
production capabilities, which allowed it to decisively influence the oil 
market and to largely control oil prices, neither did it just derive from the 
economic and financial power which the revenues from oil gave the Saudi 
Arabian government for playing an increasingly pivotal role in the politics of 
the region with respect to shaping the balance between the conflicting forces 
at work, namely, the balance between communist and anti-communist 
orientations and alignments, between the moderate and the militant 
approaches to the Palestinian conflict and between the fundamentalist and 
modernist approaches to economic and social development. All these were 
vital components of the image of Saudi Arabia, but the realisation also came 
of the full extent of the importance of the unique place which Saudi Arabia 
occupied for the countries of the Islamic and Arab world as the centre of 
Islam and as the homeland of Arab people everywhere. 
An element of awareness of this aspect of Saudi Arabia had already 
formed part of the image before. British newspapers and their readers had 
certainly heard of Mecca and about the annual pilgrimage to it from all parts 
of the world, but they had probably pictured it as part of the distant, 
romantic and historical past of Saudi Arabia and of little practical relevance 
iii 
today. This aspect now formed the focus of the press treatment and indeed 
began to be seen as a central part of the image of Saudi Arabia. In effect, 
the Mecca Crisis began the process of presenting Saudi Arabia as a 
contemporary, Islamic country, rather than as a country with an Islamic past 
and it led to a considerable extension of the British newspapers' 
understanding of what it actually means to be an Islamic country today. A 
spate of articles resulted from the Mecca crisis and they sought to explore 
and explain the above: as such they are particularly revealing and merit 
special examination. They began with a group of articles during the third 
week of November and culminated in two major articles in The Times and 
the Financial Times, which both appeared on 29 November, 1979. 
The build up to this much more three-dimensional image of Saudi 
Arabia began by simply trying to explain, in the wake of the sensational 
events of the Grand Mosque in Mecca, what the `Grand Mosque' was, 
where it was situated and why it and its location were of such manifestly 
huge concern and importance to people far outside the frontiers of Saudi 
Arabia. All the newspapers pointed out that the land which is now called 
Saudi Arabia did not only include the birthplace of Islam's prophet, 
Mohammed, and the place where the Qur'an was believed to have been 
revealed to him, but that it also included, the sites of the most holy places 
for Muslims. One of those sites was "... the Grand Mosque... ", 374 "... the 
sacked mosque... ", "... the religious centre of the holy city of Mecca. "376 
The Grand Mosque was referred to as "... Islam's holiest shrine... "3r, "... 
the Holiest of all... "378, and was said to be situated in Mecca "... the 
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Muslim holy city which houses the Kabba -a black stone towards which all 
Muslims in the world direct their faces during their prayers. "379 With 
reference to the self proclaimed Mahdi, The 77mes explained that, "[The] 
Mahdi is a figure who appears in the Hadith or recorded sayings of 
Mohammed. He is not strictly a messiah but he was prophesised as a 
divinely inspired human being who would cleanse Islam. "380 The two main 
branches of Islam, Sunni and Shi'ites, both inside and outside Saudi Arabia 
are believed to be waiting for his appearance. 
Richard Johns of the Financial T Imes stressed the importance of the 
fact that Islamic law was the system which controlled many aspects of Saudi 
Arabia's social systems. "In practice, the ruling hierarchy [in Saudi Arabia] 
refer all important decisions, apart from those relating to foreign policy, to 
the Ulema, or religious leader. "381 Therefore, when the armed religious 
fanatics conducted their `criminal deviation from Islam'382 by attacking the 
Grand Mosque in Mecca, the Saudi Arabian government did not deal with 
the incident as many other states would have reacted, mainly for Islamic 
reasons. It was these considerations that Prince Nayef Ibn Abdel Aziz, the 
Saudi Arabian Interior Minister, referred to when he said that, "It would be 
easy to storm the places where the militants were holding out but the security 
forces were being held back because ... they did not wish to violate the 
sanctity of the holy shrine. "383 The Financial T iimes interpreted this action 
to mean that, "The Saudi Arabian Troops and the National Guardsmen were 
hampered in their task by the insistence of the Islamic priesthood that the 
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fabric of the holy shrine should not be damaged or its sanctity fouled by 
unnecessary bloodshed. "3" 
Later, however, when the government was able to obtain from the 
Ulema [clergymen] "... a Fatwa, a religious ruling with the force of 
law... "3" which gave it permission for all means to be employed to clear 
the Mosque, the Saudi Arabian troops stormed the Grand Mosque and the 
beginning of the end of the incident started. 
The gunmen were expected to face punishment "... under Sharia law, 
which newspapers and mosques [in Saudi Arabia] emphasised prescribed 
only execution for the violation of Islam's holiest shrine. "386 Further, Saudi 
Arabian officials were also reported to have said that, "The invaders will be 
severely punished because the Koran prescribes dismemberment of the 
persons who desecrated the Grand Mosque. "387 
This led to a highly informative leading article in The Times on 29 
November, 1979, entitled, "The Voice of the Saudi Past", which 
consolidated the idea that Saudi Arabia was founded on Islamic ideas and 
came to be united by forces inspired and motivated by religious aims. It 
stated that in 1803, 
"... `soldiers of Allah', led by Abdul Aziz Ibn 
Muhammed Ibn Saud, 
... entered Mecca and destroyed all the doomed shrines where people had 
offered their prayers to saints rather than to God, 
confiscating and destroying all hookah pipes and 
musical instruments ." 
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I 
114 
The article added that one century later, the founder of today's Saudi 
Arabia, King Abdul Aziz Ibn Saud, reunited Saudi Arabia based on the same 
Islamic principles with an army composed of "... Wahhabi, Ikhwan or 
brethren. "3ß8 Saudi Arabia was said to be one of the few examples of an 
"... Islamic theocracy in the world. Like his predecessor, King Khaled is 
the Imam of the country, nominally its spiritual as well as temporal leader in 
the historic Sunni ways of things". 389 Another dimension was added by The 
Times which wrote that it was "... the religious fervour of the desert tribes 
[which] represent[ed] the very origin of the Saudi state. "3903 
This realisation led to an in-depth consideration, again in a highly 
informative fashion, of the place and role of tribalism in Saudi Arabia and, 
as it emerged, Saudi Arabia's position of importance amongst the other 
states of the region. In fact, Saudi Arabia's position and importance among 
the Islamic, Arabian peninsula states stemmed from its social structure, 
amongst other factors. One could think of Saudi Arabia as being mainly a 
tribal society as, unlike many other states in the region, Saudi Arabia was 
actually founded on tribal forces. Richard Johns of the Financial Times 
pointed out that one of the main tribal confederations of the Kingdom was 
the Otaiba who were "... generally reckoned to be the backbone of the 
regime's support. Otaiba and other selected tribes [were] the sources which 
provide[d] ... men for the National Guard, the paramilitary force which in 
the last resort [was] the arm of security for the house of Saudi. "391 The 
Guardian explained that the far centre of the country was secured and 
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supported by the tribes of Nejid, "... the heartland of the Kingdom and the 
traditional power base of the ruling house of Saudi. "392 
But how could these tribal features of Saudi Arabia enhance the 
country's position and importance in the region? This can only be 
comprehended if we realise that one of the many tribes of Saudi Arabia was 
the tribe of Prophet Mohammed and his lineage. It was also the family of 
the expected Mahdi. Reflecting on the self-proclaimed Mahdi of the group 
which attacked the Grand Mosque, The Times leader argued that the leader 
of the armed men, the Mahdi, 
"... in many respects ... seemed to more than a 
few 
to fulfil the conditions of the prophecies. His name 
and patronymic were the same as the prophet's and 
his tribe's, the Qahgini [the family name of the gunman 
Mahdi] ha[d] a blood connexion with Quaraishi, 
Muhammed's tribe. 393 
On 29 November, 1979, the same day as The Times' long leading 
article appeared, the Financial Times published for the British readers its 
own extended exploration of one complex and unfamiliar aspect of Saudi 
Arabia, its tribal structure. The Financial limes argued that despite the 
tribal based social structure of Saudi Arabia and other Arab peninsula states 
being "... overlaid by a thick layer of modern immigrants ... high rise office 
blocks, industrial states, pocket calculators and limousines... ", 394 the lives 
which people lived, their attitudes to their fellow men, their social priorities, 
and the issues that mattered daily to them remained deeply tribe centred. 
Therefore, "... the political and personal relationships that mattered to 
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Arabia were determined according to several tribal factors; namely the 
following: 
1. what had happened in the past; 
2. who their ancestors had married; 
3. who their grandfathers had fought alongside; and, 
4. what betrayals they had suffered from other families. "395 
Thus, based on such an order, 
"... the most important people in the world to a 
Saudi ... [were] the members of the royal 
family ... 
Beyond them [were] the Nejdi, the desert tribe and 
towns of men of the Saudi family homeland in Central 
Arabia. They need not necessarily be living in Saudi 
Arabia. A person originally from the Nejdi now living 
in Kuwait will be more important in the eyes of a member 
of the Saudi family than a Saudi citizen. "396 
Tribes, relationships and conflicts in the region all interlocked. 
There were many tribes such as the Shammer, the Otaiba, the Harb, and the 
Qattian to name a few which stretched across the borders of Saudi Arabia to 
other countries in the region such as Kuwait, Yemen and Iraq. Saudi Arabia 
had a special position in the region as it was the original homeland of the 
Arabian tribes which gave the Saudi Arabian government certain 
responsibilities in the region. Thus, in the case of a `disintegration' of the 
Gulf state system, those states "... would probably divide along community 
lines. What might follow would be that communities of Central Arabian 
395 Ibid. 
396 Field, Michael. Financial ? Times. 29 November 1979. p. 3. 
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origin in the lower Gulf would express their lack of confidence in the local 
ruler, [and] turn instead to the dominant Saudi family. "397 
The, tribes which made up a substantial part of many Arabian 
peninsula states, the social structures and the power centres all looked to 
Saudi Arabia as the original land from where they sometimes emigrated and 
where parts of their tribes still lived. Therefore, domestic events in the 
Arabian peninsula states could be influenced by, and originate from, Saudi 
Arabia. Further, relationships between the states in the region could, to 
some extent, be influenced by the tribal structure which determined the 
borders between the states and that could strengthen -Saudi Arabia's 
importance in the region as a whole, in addition to its wealth or its position 
as the centre of Islam. 
3.1.5 CONCLUSION 
The British papers' reporting of the attack on the Grand Mosque was 
influenced by their perceptions of the Iranian revolution (particularly in the 
early days), the occupation of the American Embassy in Tehran, the disputes 
between Saudi Arabia and Yemen over border issues and the problem of the 
Shi'ite minority and the Palestinians who were living in Saudi Arabia. All 
of the above factors came to colour the image of Saudi Arabia that was 
presented in the British `quality' press. These new elements brought into 
focus a broader realisation of the interconnections within the area as a whole 
and made Saudi Arabia seem less of a special entity, a world enclosed within 
itself, and put it more into its proper context, as a country affected by those 
around it and by the ferment and issues of the region as a whole. 
397 Ibid. 
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The speculations about the identities and aims of the gunmen who 
attacked the Grand Mosque added other new elements to the picture of Saudi 
Arabia in the British papers. It was believed at one time or another that the 
gunmen were Shi'ites who wanted to replace the Saudi Arabian government 
with a system more like Iran's in the post-Shah era, or that they were Arabs 
who came from countries with border disputes with Saudi Arabia, or that 
they were from other Arab areas and wanted to press Saudi Arabia to take a 
hard line against American policy in the region. Alternatively, it was 
speculated that the gunmen could have been a manifestation of the religious 
and tribal forces within, Saudi Arabia's social structure, people who were 
unhappy with the Western and materialist orientation of Saudi Arabia and 
who were looking for an Islamic government based on what they took to be 
pure Islamic principles. 
What was clear was that the hitherto `taken for granted' stability of 
Saudi Arabia could, after all, be disturbed by a variety of sources. It could 
be disturbed by Iran, which had an ideological relationship with Saudi 
Arabia's Shi'ite minority in the strategic, Eastern governments of Saudi 
Arabia, where the oil fields were located. Or, it could be disturbed by 
forces in Yemen, on its Southern border. Palestinians could also be another 
source of trouble, for more than a quarter of a million Palestinians were 
living in Saudi- Arabia. Finally, it was realised that under the hitherto 
tranquil surface, or at least perceived to be tranquil surface, there were in 
fact internal tensions within Saudi Arabia, and conflicting forces in other 
countries too which, were -going through the processes of development and 
modernisation: between conservatives and liberals within the ruling groups, 
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between tribal or religious groups and the more educated technocrat groups, 
and, between the urban and rural classes. 
In a more general sense, the Mecca crisis marked a watershed in the 
evolution of the image of Saudi Arabia in the British 'quality' press, and by 
inference, in the minds of the critically important group in Britain which 
constituted its readership. The previous image which a typical reader of the 
'quality' press would have had of Saudi Arabia was somewhat like the map 
of the world outside Europe in the 19th century after the seaborne 
explorations had been completed, but before the Europeans had moved 
inland; where the outlines were already drawn in considerable detail and the 
external relationships understood, but the inside was still a large, white area 
with a few unrelated, icon-like images which indicated what had come to 
them from Western markets, and some impression of the inhabitants which 
the merchants and explorers had met, in the shape of the figures in their 
national dresses. In the case of Saudi Arabia, this inner area could be 
coloured yellow rather than white: "the desert" and "the icons" were those 
of oil wells and the somewhat romanticised images of "the Arabs". As a 
result of the Mecca Crisis, this largely blank middle inside the frontiers 
began to be filled in, portraying a country, a culture, a people with their 
own complex and varied social, political and religious structures and a 
country with its own particular interplay of political, ideological, cultural 
and social forces. The measured, un-panicked but effective and relatively 
bloodless way in which the Saudi Arabian government responded to, and 
resolved, the Mecca Crisis also enhanced the previous image of Saudi Arabia 
as the country in the region with the most stable, reliable and moderate 
system of government. 
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THE 'PRINCESS CRISIS' 1. 
4.1 PRELUDE: 13 MARCH 1980-9 APRIL 1980. 
Saudi Arabia's anti-communist position was concentrated within the 
Arab world during the 1970s, but it took on an international dimension in 
the early 1980s. As a result of its oil revenue, the Saudi Arabian 
government was able to engage in an extraordinarily extensive development 
plan based on the assumption of large-scale assistance by Western countries. 
In addition, a huge oil income after the 1973 oil embargo enabled the Saudi 
Arabians to allocate a relatively large percentage of revenue to support Third 
World countries like North Yemen to keep them away from the Soviet 
Union's influence. Perhaps the above factors could all be explained as being 
based on a combination of Saudi Arabia's economic interests, its security 
and its Islamic ideology, which encouraged relations with Christian societies 
and discouraged Muslim relations with those who did not believe in religion 
and God. 
4.2 'ISLAM AND COMMUNISM WERE IRRECONCILABLE' 
The image of Saudi Arabia as an anti-communist country came again 
to the fore in the third period of our study as a result of the Soviet Union's 
invasion of Afghanistan in 1980. The Soviet invasion was believed to be 
strongly related to Saudi Arabia. The Daily Telegraph argued that, because 
the Soviets were, 
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"... likely to run seriously short of oil... [they] ... may be forced to take some extreme form of action to increase 
their oil supplies, a prediction which must not exclude 
the possible seizure of ... Saudi Arabian oil fields, 
for 
they would be driven to robbery by an energy crisis 
born of technical incompetence. *398 
In addition to arranging an eastern gate for Gulf oil, the Soviet Union was 
also preparing the southern gate to reach Saudi Arabia. James Buxton of the 
Financial Times commented that, "... a Soviet - dominated North Yemen 
closely linked to South Yemen, where Russia has a base at Aden, would be a 
disaster for the West, mainly because of the danger it would pose to Saudi 
Arabia. " The above assumption materialised when "... South Yemen 
assisted a National Democratic Front invasion of the North in 1979. "399 
The fines highlighted the role and efforts of Saudi Arabia against the 
continuing spread of "... radicalism in the Arab world and communism 
outside. "'00 Following Saudi Arabia's announcement that it would "... 
boycott the Moscow Olympics... " of 1980, the Saudi Arabians were given 
"... much of the credit for the firmness of the declaration issued by the 
Islamabad Meeting of Muslim Foreign Ministers ... "401 against the Soviet 
invasion of Afghanistan. King Fahd actually "... spoke about the dangers of 
the Soviet incursion into Afghanistan. "402 
398 Berry, Adrian. Daily Telegraph. 19 March 1980. p. 18. 399 Buxton, James. Financial Times. 2 April 1980. p. 4. 
400 Staff. The Times. 21 March 1980. p. 18. 
401 Ibid. 
402 Ibid. 
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King Fahd, (who was then a Crown Prince) was also reported in The 
Times as having declared that "... Islam and communism were 
irreconcilable... " as well as having agreed with Mr Zbigniew Brezinski, 
President Carter's National Security Adviser, who visited Saudi Arabia, "... 
to contribute to an aid package for Pakistan. "403 
James Buxton of the Financial TYmes reported that when 
developments in North Yemen led "... pessimists in Riyadh ... " to 
apparently fear that North Yemen might "... become the next country to fall 
under Soviet influence... ", the Saudi Arabians were seen to have "... 
resumed their aid. "4" This was, according to Mcilroy of the Daily 
Telegraph, after they had "... reached an agreement with neighbouring 
North Yemen under which the Yemenis ... would accept no more Soviet 
Military advisers. "405 North Yemen also agreed to eventually remove the 
100 Russian advisers who were "... believed to be in the country. "'06 
Commenting after the war between the two Yemenis, James Buxton 
of the Financial Times noted that the Saudi Arabians had "... persuaded the 
US to speed up a long standing arms deal, over which Washington had been 
dragging its feet for four years, to provide a large new package of arms, 
including 16 F-16E fighters, 46 M60 tanks, and various anti-tank and anti- 
aircraft weapons to North Yemen. " Saudi Arabia had "... paid for much of 
the equipment and for the teams to train the North - Yemenis. to use it. "407 
The Saudi Arabian policy towards this Arab, Islamic country was reported as 
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being one of moving it "... away from the Soviet Union and their Marxist 
neighbours ... "408 and "... keep[ing] North Yemen non-communist. "40 
4.3 ANTI-COMMUNIST AND PRO-WESTERN 
In a more general framework, British papers echoed The ? Times which 
wrote that, "Saudi Arabia has no relation with any non-Arab or Muslim state 
that could be described as communist. "410 They commented that it had 
provided significant assistance to Arab countries which might otherwise have 
come under the communist influence. The British papers also continued to 
portray Saudi Arabia's anti-communist attitude by highlighting Saudi 
Arabia's economic relations with Western and free world countries as 
opposed to the "communist" states. 
When the "... special relationship... " between Saudi Arabia and the 
USA "... was looking a little tarnished... ", because Saudi Arabia had 
resisted "... heavy-handed attempts to persuade [it] to approve... " the Camp 
David principles between Egypt and Israel, The Times reported that, "... a 
group... " in the Saudi Arabia government, including Prince Saud Al-Feisal, 
the Minister of Foreign Affairs had "... suggest[ed] a little distance... " from 
the USA. The paper explained that the Saudi Arabian position "... was a 
discreet campaign of satisfying needs, not to appear too much on anyone's 
side in the uncertain Middle East, hedging bets with Iran and the radical 
Arab's aid, as if a mistress, fearing her lover's indifference, was seeking 
proof of affection by provoking jealousy. "411 
408 Mcilroy, A. J. Daily Telegraph. 20 March 1980. p. 1. 409 Buxton, James. Financial Times. 2 April 1980. p. 4. 410 Staff. The Times. 21 March 1980. p. 18. 411 Staff, The Times. 21 March 1980. P. 18. 
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But, in spite of the relatively cool relations between Saudi Arabia and 
the USA, at least in public, the British papers continued to emphasise Saudi 
Arabia's. economic relations with the West in general and the USA in 
particular, and so strengthened Saudi Arabia's image as a pro-Western 
country, and thus, by reason of her own Islamic character, as an anti- 
communist country. 
John Close of the Financial Times stressed that Saudi Arabia's "... 
vastly different equipment in its armed forces... " was supplied by Western 
countries. "The Army is supplied by the USA and France, the National 
Guard and [the] Royal Saudi Air Force by the USA and Britain, and the 
Navy by the USA. "412 The Times stressed that "... Saudi Arabian 
authorities would ... continue to invest in US 
dollar assets and to increase 
business with America. "413 The state-run Saudi Arabian Basic Industries 
Corporation "... ha[d] given the go-ahead for a final agreement to be signed 
with the US based Mobil corporation to build a2 billion ... petrochemical 
complex in the Kingdom. "414 
Further, based on reports by Reuters, The Guardian highlighted the 
Saudi Arabia's plan to "... help finance research and development of 
France's new Mirage - 4000 combat planes ... ', to which Saudi Arabia was 
prepared to "... contribute about $685 million needed by Marcel Dassault to 
develop and produce the aircraft. "415 The Financial Terns re-highlighted 
Saudi Arabia's move of one year earlier which was to "... discuss the joint 
production of arms with Austria... "416 when Prince Sultan, Saudi Arabia's 
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Defence Minister, inspected Austrian armaments during his visit in 1979. 
When a group of Japanese companies signed an agreement with Saudi Arabia 
"... to conduct a feasibility study into a 20,000m ($9.300) petrochemical 
complex on the Persian Gulf... ", it was pointed out that "... this was similar 
to the contract which Saudi Arabia had signed with the US earlier on. "417 
Also, according to The TYmes' correspondent, because of Saudi Arabia's 
consistent "... opposition to radicalism... Taiwan, and South Korea [were] 
fulsomely treated as the closest of friendships. *418 The Daily Telegraph also 
reported that millions of Saudi Arabian dollars would be "... poured into 
New Zealand... as part of private Saudi Arabian investment plans. "419 
Therefore, The Times deemed it fit to write that Saudi Arabia's, 
"... moderation in oil pricing and production policies ... [was] ... 
frankly 
admitted to be intended to help the West... ", because "... Saudi Arabia had 
always been willing, to work with the US to contain radicalism in the Arab 
world and communism outside. *420 According to Dr Ghazi Al-Ghosaibi, the 
Minister of Industry and Electricity, who was speaking to American 
businessmen, this could not be achieved, without co-operation between the 
two, namely Saudi Arabia and the West. 
"Your industrial way of life for the coming decades 
will collapse without Arab oil. The independence of 
the Arab countries in the face of expanding 
communities cannot be maintained without your 
strength and resolve. No independence could be 
more complete. "421 
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7 he TFmes, which highlighted Dr Ghazi Al-Ghosabi's view, also 
pointed out that Saudi Arabia's anti-communist attitude stemmed from its 
Islamic culture. Dr Ghazi Al-Ghosaibi who "... remain[ed] of the Saudi 
outlook... ", was reported to have maintained that, 
Communism is wicked, contrary to religion, 
and there are no two ways about it; it is as if 
bred in the most extreme persuasion of an 
uncompromising religion. "422 
4.4 OIL POLICY: A 'CUSHION FOR THE WEST' 
On 26 March, 1980, at the Institute of Director's Annual Convention 
in the Albert Hall in London, 423 Sheikh Yamani, the Saudi Arabian Oil 
Minister, once again alerted his listeners to "... impending energy shortages 
(which) [meant] the world [was] facing a `catastrophe'. "424 He warned that 
"... the balance so far achieved between supply and demand should not blind 
the world to the fact that oil, which is the most preferred source of energy in 
the world, is depleting at an alarming rate. "425 He added that, "Saudi 
Arabia could not forever mitigate a developing energy crisis by maintaining 
a high production level... "426 in order to "... save the world from energy 
shortages"427 It could not use its "... abundant production as a palliative to 
thwart shortages in world supplies ... [because]... this unrequired and 
sacrificial attitude on its part [would] not go on indefinitely. "428 Sheikh 
Yamani blamed the "... world media for not contributing constructively 
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towards informing the public of the true situation [and he] criticised Western 
businessmen and political leaders for hesitation and indecision about finding 
an alternative energy source. "429 
The Saudi Arabian Oil Minister offered "... a six point strategy for 
an international energy programme which could move the world away from 
the edge of an abyss. "430 The plan included "... developing energy sources 
other than oil, ... greater energy conservation, ... [and] technical and 
financial help to develop resources in energy deprived areas. "431 Sheikh 
Yamani advised that, "Unless we put these proposals into practice, the world 
must prepare to face recurrent events similar to those that came about in the 
course of 1979, but with increasingly severe consequences with each 
repetition. "432 
Although the above "warning" by the Saudi Arabian Oil Minister 
was made in London a few weeks before the OPEC Ministerial Meeting in 
Algiers in June, 1980, at which the member states considered unifying 
prices, it was also coupled with a `declaration' that Saudi Arabia would 
maintain higher oil output to ease the oil supply shortage and to keep prices 
stable. 433 
Thus, Saudi Arabia, "... the world's leading exporter... ", announced 
that it would "... maintain its raised production level of 9.5 barrels a day 
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until the oil world market return[ed] to normal... "434, or until Saudi Arabia 
was "... satisfied that the world market [was] back to normal. "433 Saudia 
Arabia's move to continue maintaining oil production above its normal level 
was aimed at stabilising the oil market. John Andrews of The Guardian 
explained that, "The Saudi conception of `stabilisation' [was] to kill off most 
spot market deals and to prepare the ground for reunification of the OPEC 
pricing structure. "436 This was "... designed to restore stability to the oil 
market after last year's supply disruptions and price spirals. "437 Ray Dafter 
of the Financial Times argued that the oil industry saw Saudi Arabia's oil 
policy "... as an attempt to prevent a new supply shortage that might have 
resulted in a further round of price leap-frogging. "438 In the summer of 
1980, Dafter concluded that the Saudi Arabian policy, "... would contribute 
to [the] unification of the OPEC pricing system abandoned last year when 
producers operating in a sellers' market, sought various premium payments 
for their oil. "439 Meanwhile, other producers such as Kuwait, Libya and 
Iran cut their production to avoid a lower oil price. The Daily Telegraph 
argued that Saudi Arabia's extra one million barrels a day, above its `ceiling' 
level, would "... help reduce the impact ... [and would] continue to provide 
an important cushion for the West. "440 
John Andrews of The Guardian held that the continuation of Saudi 
Arabia's higher oil production policy had "... a politically useful side affect 
... to re-assert Saudi Arabia's controlling role with OPEC which disappeared 
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in last year's price spiral allowing `hawks' such as Libya, Iran and Algeria 
to ignore Saudi protest and impose differentials. "441 Thus The Times, in an 
article entitled, `Seven Nations Talks on Oil Price Rise Imput, stated that a 
"... US official... " had revealed that the Saudi Arabian government was "... 
considering substantial investment to strengthen oil output to 12 million 
barrels per day ... [which was] ... necessary to strengthen Saudi's influence 
in OPEC. " Moreover, the paper claimed that "... Saudi spokesmen have 
recently indicated that the aim is to reach the 17 million level by 1984. "442 
4.5 CONCLUSION 
In spite of Saudi Arabia's development plans, which in fact required 
a high revenue, its oil policy was perceived and presented from the time of 
the oil embargo of 1973-74 as being designed to keep oil prices relatively 
low, at least compared to other producers. This was either achieved by 
reducing its oil prices or by 'increasing -its production level. Thus, Saudi 
Arabia provided the West with a vital `oil cushion' in addition to supporting 
it politically through continuing to exert a stabilising and moderating 
influence over the Arab and Islamic world against the spread of communism 
and religious radicalism. 
441 Andrews, John. The Guardian. 18 March 1980. p. 20. 442 Unidentified. The Times. 19 March 1980. p. 17. 
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THE 'PRINCESS CRISIS' AND ITS AFTERMATH: 10 APRIL 1980-8 
MAY 1980. 
It was against this multifaceted but 'untroubled' background image of 
Saudi Arabia, which was well established in the British 'quality' press by 
1980, that for the second time an internal Saudi Arabian event became a 
major focus for the British media and resulted in some modifications to the 
image of Saudi Arabia which was portrayed in the British press. This came 
as a result of the making, and then the subsequent showing by the ITV 
network, of the documentary, 'The Death of a Princess', and the diplomatic 
furore between Britain and Saudi Arabia which followed and which led, at 
one stage, to the expulsion of the British ambassador. 
There were three principal results of this affair and of the massive 
amount of coverage which it received in the British media. One was that for 
the first time, something more like a distant awareness of the existence of a 
country called Saudi Arabia developed amongst the `ordinary' British public, 
in addition to the numerically much smaller numbers of the informed and 
educated sections which formed the readership of the `quality' press. 
Whereas before, one could not realistically talk about a `popular image' of 
Saudi Arabia, owing to the lack of any reasonably consistent and coherent 
coverage of Saudi Arabia by the British `popular' press and television, by 
the time the Princess affair was over,, the `ordinary public' of Britain had 
received some image of Saudi Arabia as a country, with its own political 
system and culture. An exploration of the `popular image' presented by the 
`popular' media, interesting as it would be, does not however form a part of 
this study, though it would be an interesting, future research topic. 
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The second result of `The Death of a Princess' affair was that the 
group forming the readership of the `quality' press in Britain received, 
through their newspapers, an intensive further exploration of the complex 
issues first brought to their attention by the Mecca Crisis, namely, the social 
and religious structure of Saudi Arabia. 
The third, and in many ways the most important and interesting 
result, was that it presented the readers of the 'quality' press with a chance 
to examine their own attitudes towards the role of these features of Saudi 
Arabia in Britain's policy towards, and Britain's relationship with, Saudi 
Arabia. This was all the more timely because Saudi Arabia's Development 
Plan (1976-1980) required a high level of Western expertise and many 
Westerners were working in the country during this period with the British 
participants forming one of the largest sectors. There were more than 
30,000 British people working on various projects in Saudi Arabia during 
that four year period alone. 
There is a sense in which `The Death of a Princess' programme could 
itself be seen as documenting, if not arising from, the `culture shock' which 
these British engineers, craftsmen and businessmen, who were largely from 
outside the `quality' press readership group, had received when they 
encountered Saudi Arabian culture and society during a period of 
development and transition of almost breakneck speed. 
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4.1.1 'THE DEATH OF A PRINCESS' 
Intrigued by the reported public execution of a Saudi Arabian 
princess and her lover in Riyadh in 1977, Anthony Thomas and David 
Fanning wrote and produced an investigative documentary which set out to 
ascertain what might have actually happened. The principal author of the 
film, in terms of research and treatment, was Anthony Thomas and the result 
was described by Jack Shaheen, the author of The TV Arab, one of the books 
which the affair generated, as "... Thomas' version of the execution. "443 
The documentary was completed in the summer of 1980 and was shown on 
the ITV network on 9th April, 1980, after intense Saudi Arabian pressure to 
persuade the ITV to shelve the programme had failed. The film was made 
as a joint production with an American company and was pre-sold to be 
shown in the USA and several continental European countries following its 
premiere on British television. 
On the one hand, the film presented some quality images of the 
country, such as its development into a relatively modern state and how 
Islam was applied and respected in the country. On' the other hand, the film 
provided mainly negative images about Saudi Arabia's culture in general, 
and women in particular, as it argued that women were not only repressed in 
Saudi Arabia but were also confined to leading empty lives, both sexually 
and generally. The sequence in the film to which particular attention was 
paid showed both the Saudi Arabian women's search for, and the picking up 
of, men from Saudi Arabia's streets. The film also argued about the 
ineffectiveness of Islam and suggested that Saudi Arabia still suffered from 
443 Shaheen, 1.1984. p. 72. 
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its old authoritarian, moral and religious codes despite the formal 
introduction of more modern ones. Further, it argued that even though 
Saudi Arabia claimed to be an Islamic country it was not fully so because the 
pre-Islamic tribal laws were still in use. The film implied that Saudi 
Arabian families were not only backward, but heartless, as the film 
conjectured that the Princess was, in fact, still alive and that a Bedouin 
family had been paid to substitute one of its daughters for execution instead 
of the Princess herself. Finally, the film presented one of the prominent 
members of Saudi Arabia's royal families in a very bad light. 
4.1.2 BRITISH PRESS VIEWS OF `THE DEATH OF A PRINCESS' 
The views presented in the British `quality' papers gave different, 
and rather contradictory, interpretations of the film as journalists compared 
what the film had said about Saudi Arabia to what they believed Saudi 
Arabia to be. The latter views led to some support for the Saudi Arabian 
stand against the film. The Daily Telegraph leader of 24 April, 1980, which 
criticised that aspect of the film that focused on the position of women in 
Islam, maintained that, "Some aspects of the film, in particular its 
fictionalised smears against some aspects of the position of women in Islamic 
societies, would have been regarded as an insult against that world as a 
whole. " The paper went on to describe Saudi Arabia as the "... leader of 
Islam and custodian of its holiest places. "444 
The Times, ' which saw the programme as belonging to that "... 
artistically promising, but factually treacherous class of dramatised 
documentaries ... ", argued that the programme was "... a ruminative look at 
444 Staff. Daily Telegraph. 24 April 1980. p. 18. 
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Islam, focusing on a particular scandalous episode containing many 
contradictory statements and expressions of opinion. " The paper explained 
that even though "... it was not a consistently hostile or biased production... 
there was much about it to cause offence in Saudi Arabia. "«5 
Edward Mortimer of The Times wrote that the film was "... only the 
culmination of a series of attacks on Saudi Arabia in the British media... " 
and argued that such attacks "... are seen as having been prompted by those 
opposed to Saudi Arabia's stand on the Camp David agreement between 
Egypt and Israel. "4 In the same vein, John Bulloch of the Daily Telegraph 
argued that the film was "... particularly obnoxious to the Saudis... ", and he 
commented that the programme "... was deeply critical of life among the 
upper strata of Saudi Arabian society ... [as it]... alleged that Saudi Arabia 
merely paid lip service to the tenants of Islam while privately carrying on a 
free wheeling lifestyle . "447 
While some journalists viewed the film as an attack on Saudi Arabia, 
others, such as Robert Schuil of The Times, perceived the film as "... a well- 
balanced journalistic product... " and he saw "... no reason not to go ahead 
with televising the programme... " because the film was not an attack on 
Islam, as the Saudi Arabians "... [had] chosen to see it... ", which showed 
their "... vulnerability to the threat of the film. "44g The film only examined 
how the public execution come to be carried out "... in the context of 
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Koranic precept and Saudi practice. "«9 Further, for Jeremy Bray of The 
Times, the film was 
"... unusually sensitive and sympathetic, ... respectful 
to Islam, to Arab family relationships ... in particular, it allowed Arabs of varying degrees of Islamic 
fundamentalism and liberation to state their views and offer 
other interpretations of events. "450 
Thus, if the Saudi Arabians actually "... saw the programme, they would 
find it sympathetic. "45, The film was not viewed as a bad one by The 
Guardian and if it was, then "... it could have been dismissed by British 
viewers and by offended Saudis as a vulgarity, another of the kind to which 
Arabs have become accustomed through unnumbered lampoons . "452 
In addition to the above views, there was another view which argued 
that the problems around the film arose from cultural or communication 
misunderstandings which existed as a result of the differences between the 
British and Saudi Arabian cultures. The Times leader of 11 April, 1980, 
entitled, `Slight Cause of Mutual Incomprehension', admitted that, 
"A certain mutual incomprehension has to be 
admitted. We have difficulty in understanding 
or approving the rational of [Saudi Arabia's] 
tariff and forms of judicial punishment. "453 
Likewise, the Daily Telegraph leader of 11 April, 1980, entitled, 
`Clash of Culture', stated that Britons "... may not like [Saudi Arabian] 
ways, but that is how they run their country, just as this is how we run 
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ours. "454 Saudi Arabians should understand our position and "... in the 
same way we should attempt to understand theirs. "455 Therefore, the media 
should take "... greater steps ... in future, to portray the 
facts of life in 
Saudi Arabia in a more balanced and less sensational way, and ... there 
[would] be greater understanding on both sides, of our different 
ideologies. "456 
Others took a hard line view and argued that the film only reflected 
the true reality in Saudi Arabia where contradiction and hypocrisy exists: 
The Guardian seemed to emphasise this view more than the other papers. 
John Andrews of The Guardian perceived the film as having "... revealed 
the rottenness at the core of the Kingdom - the picking up of men by veiled 
women in chauffeur driven cars... " and he argued that the film "... 
uncover[ed] the hypocrisy of a regime torn between its commitment to an 
especially ascetic tradition of Islam and the hedonistic encroachments of an 
oil-financed materialism. " Andrews concluded that, "The Princess' fault 
was not to love a man who was not her husband, but to be caught in a 
country [where]... the double standard of public propriety and private 
immorality can remain pervasive only if it remains hidden. "457 
Khan, of The Guardian, saw the film as being "... successful in 
showing . the dilemmas and 
' contradictions which exist today in Saudi 
society... ", but he thought that it only "... showed a little of the truth about 
the hypocrisy that exists in Saudi Arabia. " Further, the director of the film 
"... [had] not shown anything which [was] not common knowledge to the 
454 Staff. Daily Telegraph. 11 April 1980. p. 18. ass Ibid.. 
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people in Saudi Arabia, [but] what he [had] done [was] an honest attempt in 
breaking -the wall of silence that exist[ed] in the media about Saudi 
Arabia. "459 
James Buchan, of the Financial Times, implied that contradictions 
existed in Saudi Arabia between "... the rigours of an Islamic court and 
rough family justice ... " and he argued that the film stressed how "... death, 
on charges of adultery, ... was not exposed to an Islamic court ... "419, the 
Saudi Islamic laws. The execution of the princess was therefore in violation 
of Islamic law as, 
"The Saudis have never provided the rest of the 
Arab world with any explanation of why the princess 
was not given a proper trial, nor why King Kaled as 
leader of Saudi Arabia's royal clan, did not prevail 
upon Prince Muhammed, the Princess' father, to 
punish her indiscretion in some other way. 460 
Anthony Dig of The Guardian, presumed that the film reflected the 
truth about Saudi Arabian barbarities, as he wrote that, 
"If it is right for the media to produce an endless stream 
of dramatisation based on German atrocities committed 
over 30 years ago, then the films exposing barbarities 
being perpetrated in the world today are even more 
relevant. "461 
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4.1.3 THE PRESS AND THE DIPLOMATIC INCIDENT ARISING 
FROM THE PROGRAMME 
The government of Saudi Arabia tried to keep the film off the screens 
by directly approaching the production company, ITV, and they also tried to 
persuade the British government to intervene and get the programme 
dropped. When all of this had failed and the programme had been 
transmitted as made, the Saudi Arabians asked the UK ambassador to leave 
the country. This was only the second time since the creation of Saudi 
Arabia that relations with the UK had been broken off. The first time was in 
1956, as a compound result of the Suez crisis and probably as a result of 
dissatisfaction over the British stand taken over the Burimi Oasis in the south 
of the Arabian peninsula in the mid-1950s. The diplomatic row between 
Saudi Arabia and Britain now became the focus for press coverage and 
comments which related to the nature of the relationship between ' the two 
countries. This significantly added a number of elements to the existing 
image of that relationship. 
The Times reported that the Saudi Arabian government had tried to 
keep the film off the screens and had also "... expressed concern over the 
broadcasting of the film to the British government. "462 The Guardian 
reported that the Saudi Arabians believed the film to be "... very offensive 
to the whole Saudi royal family and [their] country ... We have our own 
laws and our own morals which we keep to ourselves... ", and it was 
therefore "... difficult for anyone in England to understand the moral issues 
on this matter from the Saudi Arabian point of view. "463 In an effort to 
462 Staff. The ? rimes. 10 April 1980. p. 6. 463 Hooper, John and Knewstub, Nikki. The Guardian. 11 April 1980. p. 1. 
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make the British government's position clear, Lord Carrington, the Foreign 
Secretary, sent ".... a placatory message ... " to Saudi Arabian 
leaders and 
stated on behalf of the government that, "We regret any damage that might 
be done to Anglo-Saudi relations... " but he emphasised that "... in any case, 
we have neither the power nor the inclination to interfere in a television 
broadcast. "''64 
David Watts, of The Times, reported that Lord Carrington's 
statement had led to a debate in Parliament, during the course of which, 
some "... Members of Parliament... [had] accused Lord Carrington of 
"crawling" to the Riyadh government and apologising to a `reactionary 
feudal state'. "465 Tom Torney, Labour MP for Bradford South, commenting 
on the British government's message of apology to Saudi Arabia, was 
reported in The Guardian to be "... disgusted and dismayed to see. that we 
are apparently getting on our knees to these sadistic types who obviously do 
not like the truth". 4 The Guardian, which affirmed the attitude of some 
members of the British Parliament, displayed a large cartoon in the middle 
part of the upper section of the front page which depicted Lord Carrington 
on his knees praying towards the Middle East and Saudi Arabia's oil 
fields. ''' Conservative MP for Luton West, Mr John Carlisle, took a similar 
stance to that of David Winnick, Labour MP for Walsall North, who was 
reported by Tony Conyers in the Daily Telegraph as saying that, "It was 
undignified to see a British Foreign Secretary virtually apologising to a 
reactionary feudal state about a television film shown in this country,... 
[thus]..., Lord Carrington's stance is a bit regrettable. "4'8 
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During the following two weeks, the newspapers also reported 
extensively on Saudi Arabia's efforts to persuade ITV to cancel the 
programme, or at least, to omit parts of it. The Saudi Arabians were not 
satisfied with the British government's stand towards the film. They might 
"... accept that items they found offensive were not actually inspired by the 
British government... " however, they found "... it hard to understand how 
[UK] ministers could stand by and let such material be transmitted. "469 In 
addition, it appeared that the views expressed by some of the MPs towards 
Saudi Arabia's stand against the film, might further have angered the Saudi 
Arabians. In order to keep the film, or at least part of it, off the screen and 
minimise its spread and effect, the Saudi Arabians took several steps. I 
propose to divide them into three types: the first one can be seen as a media 
approach, the second one as a political approach and the third one as an 
economic approach. 
Having been unable to persuade the production company, or the ITN 
network, to agree to either the cutting of the programme or the cancellation 
of its transmission, andhaving been angered by MPs comments, and being 
unhappy with the lack of British government intervention concerning the 
film, the Saudi Arabian government was unable to accept the situation and 
on 23 April, 1980, Saudi Arabia took formal diplomatic steps. The Saudi 
Charge de affairs in London issued a statement which said that the film was 
part of a "... fierce and malicious campaign directed against Saudi Arabia on 
television and the other information media in Britain and was aimed at [the] 
King, the Islamic Sheriya and the traditions of the Saudi people. "470 At the 
469 Comfort, Nicholas. Daily Telegraph. 18 April 1980. p. 36. 470 Comfort, Nicholas. Daily Telegraph. 18 April 1980. p. 36. 
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same time, on 24 April, 1980, the British `quality' press also reported that 
Saudi Arabia had asked the British Ambassador to leave their country and 
had refused to send their new Ambassador to London. 471 King Khaled of 
Saudi Arabia was said to be "... offended... " by the film and was reported 
in The Times to have "... cancelled plans for a state visit to Britain. "472 
Likewise, a visit to Saudi Arabia by Francis Pym, the UK Secretary of State 
for Defence, was reported in the Financial Times to have been "... cancelled 
at Riyadh's insistence. "473 In addition, Prince Abdullah, the Crown Prince, 
was "... expected to press Sheikh Zayed [of the United Emirates] for 
concerted Arab action against Britain over the showing of the 
programme. "474 
Unfortunately, from the point of view of the reporting of these 
diplomatic steps in the British `quality' press, the Saudi-Arabian's efforts to 
stop the showing of the film, or at least to omit parts of it, backfired, and 
led to Saudi Arabia being projected as a country which wanted to control the 
media and curtail the freedom of speech in the UK. Thus, The Guardian 
held that the Saudi Arabian's actions must [have been] "... an attempt either 
to alter an English law or to put pressure on British companies, television 
companies in particular, to apply a new form of censorship. " The paper 
concluded that, "The Saudi's must certainly know that neither attempt will 
succeed. "475 Similarly, The 77ores leader of 24 April, 1980, entitled, 
Cause to End a Friendship' explained that "... for as most Saudi officials 
must know, the British government do not, and shall not, have the power to 
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censor television programmes. " The paper pointed out that, "This is one of 
those British customs that foreigners must do their best to understand. "476 
Similarly, Timothy Sullivan of the Daily Telegraph wrote that, "If 
broadcasters are to have to look abroad every time so as not to offend 
potential traders or political allies we will have the pleasant face of true 
freedom of expression removed from our shores once and for all. "4n 
In response to Saudi Arabia's diplomatic moves, the British Foreign 
Secretary sent a second letter to the Saudi Arabian leaders expressing, once 
again, the British government's position. The Times reported that, unlike the 
previous letter, this was not seen as `regrettable' or `undignified' by a 
number of British MPs, but rather the MPs blamed the media for upsetting 
the Saudi-UK relationship. 478 In The Guardian, Mr. Andrew Faulds 
(Warley East), the Labour Arts Spokesman, was reported as having 
criticised the film and argued that "... the irresponsibility and self-interest of 
some of the bright boys of the media - both in TV and in the public prints - 
who make political attacks under the guise of entertainment - frequently 
damage British interests. "479 Nicholas Winterton Conservative MP for 
Macclesfield, was reported by The Guardian to have claimed that some MPs 
expressed to him the view that, "They would like to apologise to the Saudis 
. "48° Some other Conservative MPs were reported in the Financial Times to 
have asked the government to ensure that, "... these left wingers do not have 
the power to undermine the best interests of the UK. "481 
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But why did Saudi Arabia react so strongly long after the programme 
had been shown? David Watts of The Times suggested that Islamic and 
domestic pressure was one explanation for the Saudi Arabian decision as 
they wanted "... to present a more Islamic face to the world both at home 
and abroad. " He felt the Saudi Arabian decision "... was apparently taken 
after consultation with other Islamic governments and the expression of 
widespread anger in the Arab world. " Watts, who expected that "... further 
sanctions were likely against any other country which show[ed] the film, up 
to and including, a demand for the recall of ambassadors... ", suggested that 
further measures would probably be announced after the meeting of the 
Islamic Foreign Ministers. 482 In the same vein, the Financial Times 
suggested that the Saudi Arabian move was "... demonstrating to both 
domestic and Moslem opinion that they [were] prepared for tough actions in 
defence of Saudi Arabia... 483 the Guardian of the holiest places in Islam. "484 
Division within the royal family was also seen to be a reason for the 
Saudi Arabian move. Richard Johns of the Financial Times argued that 
Saudi Arabia's action was "... motivated largely by domestic 
considerations... "485 within what David Watts of The Times described as 
"... the purview of the Saudi royal family who felt directly insulted by the 
programme. "486 
Most papers seemed to agree that the diplomatic move was a warning 
sign to other countries not to show the film. Nicholas Hirst of The Times 
held that "... the relationship between the United States and Saudi Arabia 
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[was] becoming more and more ambivalent ... ", and 
he argued that the 
Saudi Arabian leaders "... may simply wish to wrap Britain on the knuckles 
for failing either to stop or to apologize sufficiently abjectly for the showing 
of the television film ... but, it could also be a way of giving a more general 
warning to America and the West. "487 
Richard Johns of the Financial Times, based on unidentified 'diplomats', 
argued that the Saudi Arabian move was not "... only a protest to Britain, 
but also a warning to other countries not to show the film and to restrain 
their media from casting Saudi Arabia in a bad light. "488 In the same vein 
and on the same day, 24 April, 1980, John Hooper of The Guardian also 
suggested that the Saudi Arabian decision to ask the UK ambassador to leave 
their country was a "... warning to other countries not to show the film. "489 
Thus, the Financial Times leader on 25 April, 1980, entitled the 'Saudi 
Displeasure' was fairly accurate in its conclusion that, "... The Saudi 
government can already take comfort that the publicity given to their gesture 
has conveyed to other Western governments their sense of outrage over the 
showing of the film. "490 
Amid the adverse reporting of Saudi Arabia's action, some aspects of 
Saudi Arabian culture and ideology emerged as well and not all the elements 
within the image were negative. In general, the Saudi Arabian's were seen 
as "... friendly... "491, "... extremely honest, courteous and hospitable,... 
devoted Moslems with strong family ties and ... a proud, nationalistic 
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race. "492 Due to these qualities, they had "... always been among the most 
sensitive of Third World countries to Western comment that offend[ed] 
national or religious pride. "493 
Ideologically, some of the Saudi Arabians were described as 
"... pragmatic or practical... "494 , with a recognisable mixture of 
Islamic and 
Western thinking, but who personally experienced "... considerable 
individual conflict as a result of their education and exposure to Western 
ideology, as they strove to equate the new with the old and establish a 
realistic working relationship between the two in their mother country. "495 
However, "... this group rarely reflect[ed] the true feeling of those at the 
heart of Saudi power or the law makers. "496 
John Hooper of The Guardian considered that an "... element of 
hypocrisy... " could also be noticed in Saudi Arabian society, namely, "... 
between the poor and the rich Saudis who [drank] and gamble[d] abroad... " 
but kept ... severe punishment for those who [did] so at home. "497 The rich 
people in the Gulf states, such as Saudi Arabia, were "... able to lead a free- 
wheeling life style and merely observed the ritual of Islam in public. And, 
when they travelled abroad ... [they] were quick ... in adopting western 
ways of dress, dance, and manners. " Yet, 
"The tiny handful [of Saudis] ... who live[d] it up in the West... [was] not the whole story ... and should not be 
used to represent and judge the five million population 
of Saudi Arabia. "498 
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One Arab diplomat pointed out in the Daily Telegraph that such allegations 
were comparable to, "... assuming that the antics of the people who 
appear[ed] in London gossip [were] typical of everyone in England. "499 In 
addition, it should be remembered that Saudi Arabian society was never 
homogenous as another division existed between `Bedouin' and `urban' 
elites. 
John Andrews of The Guardian, in an article entitled `The Secrets 
that Stay Behind the Veils', compared Saudi Arabia to other similar Gulf 
states and explained that in the latter states: 
"The hypocrisy is less dangerous - miscreants 
and puritans are part of the same homogenous 
societies. But Saudi Arabia - two thirds the size of 
India and with a population of around five million - 
is different... [because] ... the behavioural gap between Bedouin families, fresh from the desert, and a 
decadent urban elite is too glaring to be publicised. 
Instead, the radio and television must pump out a 
sanitised pretence that everyone, from goat herd to 
merchant millionaire, conforms to the same social rule. "S00 
Andrews added that in Saudi Arabia there were "... double standards 
of public propriety and private immorality... [which could] ... can remain 
persuasive only if they remained hidden. "501 
The British papers portrayed two rather different views of Islamic 
laws and the position of women within them in the context of Saudi Arabia. 
In the Daily Telegraph, H. K Sarguroh wrote that: 
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"Islam is totally oriented spiritually, depriving 
instructions concerning every aspect of life 
from cradle to the grave from a Revelation 
called Quran that inspires every action in 
conformity to the Will of the Revealing Deity 
whose supreme name is Allah. 
The Roman background of European 
culture is not so spiritually oriented and is 
open to modifications and revisions. Sover- 
eignty rests with the people in a state of 
affairs where there are things of God and 
things of Caesar. 
In the Islamic perspective, there is nothing 
that does not concern Allah and hence sover- 
eignty rests in Him. Laws of Islam enshrined 
in [the] Quran are compulsive and command 
obedience from its followers. 
Every Moslem true to his salt senses rather 
than merely understands the values implicit in 
the traditional forms of Islam and has a dis- 
taste for the fluctuating temporal laws mas- 
querading as the epitome of refinement, 
attempting to proselytise Islam. "5o2 
The Daily Telegraph also stated that visitors to Muslim countries, 
such as Saudi Arabia, "... soon realise that Islam is part of the life of the 
people far more than Christianity is in Europe ... [and] ... are made 
immediately aware of the unselfconscious pity of the mass of ordinary 
people. " For example, 
"When one of the five daily times of prayer comes 
round, it is common for people to unroll a small mat 
and go through the ritual wherever they may be - in a 
busy airport-lounge, in a shop, or on a traffic island 
surrounded by hurrying cars. "503 
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Yet, Islamic laws in general, and particularly those in Saudi Arabia, 
which follows "... a fundamental and strict version of Islam known in the 
West as Wahhabism... "504, were projected in the British papers in a 
generally negative tone, as involving "... draconian penalties... [and] ... 
being out of date. "505 Stoning to death, the Islamic penalty for adultery, 
was particularly perceived as an example of these "... draconic laws and 
punishments. "506 
David Guildford pointed out in The Times that the `Koran', 'Sunnah' and 
'Ijma' or consensus, were the fundamental principles of Islamic laws but 
exampled certain Islamic countries, such as Saudi Arabia, as ones which 
traditionally imposed them with "... excessive severity of punishments 
especially with regard to penalties for adultery, ... theft ... and 
polygamy. "507 Therefore, the Saudi Arabians "... must have found 
themselves torn by the severity of punishment in violation of the divine norm 
of Islam. "S08 In a letter to the Daily Telegraph entitled, 'Barbaric 
Behaviour', a reader regarded Islam "... with revulsion... " and described 
Islamic Saudi Arabian law as "... abarbarity ... [which could not] ... 
be 
excused because it [was] perpetrated in the name of some particular 
religion. "509 
The British `quality' press also criticised the position of women in the 
Saudi Arabian Islamic system which was projected as repressive. Saudi 
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Arabia, "... a state whose constitution is the Koran... ", 510 was seen to by 
Barbara Tillner of the Daily Telegraph, 
"... [to] present a total patriarchy and indeed has 
incurred adverse votes in the United Nations on 
account of its disregard for women's rights, based 
though it is on the Koran. The Koran asserts the 
superiority of man over woman, advocates punishment 
if she objects, and permits polygamy - up to four wives - 
if the husband can support them. "511 
John Andrews of The Guardian compared Saudi Arabia to other Arab 
countries and wrote that, 
"Even to the Arab of Kuwait and the rest 
of the Gulf, the Saudi brand of sexual 
apartheid smacks of a sinister repression 
... women cannot shop alone, they cannot 
study with boys, they cannot be taught by 
males except via close circuit television, 
they cannot drive, they cannot travel except 
with a close male relative - and least of all 
can they consort unchaperoned with male 
friends. "512 
With regard to the areas of employment available to women, John 
Buchan of the Financial Times wrote that women, who made "... at least 
half the potential Saudi work force, ... [were] severely restricted. "513 Time 
did not seem to bring only progress, as the 1979 upheavals, "... prompted 
the ban on women travelling alone... [and] ... on women working alongside 
men. "514 After the Grand Mosque attack, and to satisfy the conservatives, 
Crown Prince Fahd (now King Fahd) declared that as well as the restrictions 
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that had already been imposed, "Saudi women would no longer be allowed 
to take up a scholarship abroad even with a male companion. "515 Barber 
Tillner of the Daily Telegraph, who referred to Jeddah, one of the most 
developed cities in Saudi Arabia, as "... a highly restricted international 
building site... ", pointed out that a new law had been passed in Saudi Arabia 
which "... triggered off a witch-hunt against Western women by extending 
... [to them]... the already existing ban on Saudi women from taking jobs 
which caused them to work within public view. "s 16 Following the passing 
of the new law, the American corps of engineers and contractors who were 
working for the Saudi Arabian Ministry of Defence were "... told to stop 
employing women. "517 At the same time, three hundred women employees 
of Mobil oil "... retreated shocked, behind (the) company's closed office 
doors, protected from such restriction by the privileged position of the Mobil 
empire in Saudi Arabia. " However, the privileged position of Mobil 
women, 
"... [and] specialist or professional, married women from 
the Western countries ... exempted from the ban ,.. 
... made little difference, since to go unveiled in Saudi Arabia would mark a woman as a prostitute 
or bad influence of some kind... [because] ... unveiled women would be looked at askance in Saudi Arabia. "518 
Yet, as John Andrews of The Guardian wrote, "... outside the Kingdom, all 
is possible. Before the Lebanese civil war, Saudi Arabian girls would flock 
to the American University of Beirut and Beirut College for Women to flirt 
outrageously with macho males from the rest of the Arab world. " When 
eventually, "... Beirut and Lebanese mountain resorts went as a result of the 
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civil wars, London, Paris, New York and Los Angeles became the 
substitute. "519 
women, 
Even inside Saudi Arabia, "... thousands... " of Saudi Arabian 
"... hid their Dior fashions under black Abayya, and the 
`liberated' join[ed] their husbands to watch endless video 
films at private drinking parties until the next trip to freedom 
in Europe. [But] ... the saddest sight of all 
[was] elegant 
Saudi Arabian women travelling back to the Kingdom and 
donning their veils just before touch down. "52° 
When a woman `opposes' any restriction inside Saudi Arabia, she 
becomes "... an outcast. Not only within the family, but the whole of 
society is against her. " Besides, stressed Barbara Tillner in the Daily 
Telegraph, "... other draconic laws and punishments, like stoning can be 
applied against her. 321 Thus, in spite of Saudi Arabia's great development, 
"... from camel to Concorde... ", was the phrase coined by C. J. Syer in The 
Times, "... ancient traditions and customs have not changed. "322 
Besides the negative portrayal in the British `quality' papers of Saudi 
Arabia's Islamic punishment laws and the position of women, there was 
another more positive view which emerged during the film affair, and which 
praised and supported, the application of Islamic codes in Saudi Arabia. It 
also argued that the Saudi Arabians are entitled to do things according to 
their own experience and culture and it focused on the positive position of 
Saudi Arabian women as part of the Islamic system. Caroline Lees, who 
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used to work as an artist in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia, wrote that during her "... 
four years of comparatively public work in the advertising field, at no time 
did anyone try to push me "into the shadows". From the Minister of 
Information down, I received all the politeness, help and courtesy I could 
wish for. "113 As Syer and Others of The 7Imes put it, "There are no stories 
here of little old ladies, living alone, too terrified to answer a knock on their 
front door for fear of being assaulted ." Therefore, the Saudi 
Arabians 
have "... strong grounds for retaining some of the severe forms of 
punishment [and] British courts could learn much from their Saudi 
colleagues. "sea 
David Allen of the Daily Telegraph argued that even though the laws 
of Saudi Arabia may seem "... abhorrent,... the people of that land are 
entitled to do things in their own way. If we expect immigrants to respect 
our laws and customs ... we in our own turn must respect alien ways, even 
if the latter do not fit with our own philosophies. "525 Almost a month later, 
J. P. Blades of the Daily Telegraph wrote that compared with Western 
standards, "The laws of Saudi Arabia may appear to be punitive but 
nevertheless they are effective and the crime rate, which is minimal, must be 
the envy of the Western world. "526 In a letter published in the Daily 
Telegraph under the title, `Respect for Deep Wisdom of Islam', Louis 
Fitzgibbon criticised the attitude of what he called, "... this insular nonsense 
towards Islam... ", and stressed that, "Islam contains deep wisdom and it has 
power. " Fitzgibbon advised those who are "... ignorant of Islam ... to 
leave it alone. "527 
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Sylvia Clayton, of the Daily Telegraph, made a similar point when 
she wrote that, 
"What struck me was the fact that although nearly 
a fifth of the world's population is Moslem and its 
leaders, from the oil - rich Sheikhs to the Ayatollah 
Khomeni are increasingly prominent, understanding 
of Islam has advanced little since the days of the crusades"528 
On balance, these elements added relatively little to the image of 
Saudi Arabia as an Islamic country and changed little of the image which 
had come to be established at the end of the Mecca crisis. What was of 
more significance, were the positive and negative views which members of 
the press and public openly expressed about Saudi Arabia, its Islamic laws 
and the position of women within that social and legal system, and the 
exploration which ensued of Saudi Arabia's relationship with Britain, in 
general, and its importance for Britain, in particular. 
Saudi Arabia's decision to expel the British Ambassador and to refuse 
to appoint a new Saudi Arabian Ambassador to London, was accompanied 
by the "... implied threat of economic action. "329 The Times reported that 
one Saudi Arabian newspaper had called "... for an economic and 
propaganda war against Britain. "530 Nicholas Hirst of The Times, based on 
the Saudi Arabian Official Press Agency, reported that the Saudi Arabian 
cabinet was said, "... to have examined economic relations with Britain, 
especially the work of British firms in the kingdom. "531 This, according to 
529 Clayton, Sylvia. Daily Telegraph. 10 April 1980. p. 15. 529 Hirst, Nicholas. The Times. 24 April 1980. p. 21. 530 Reuters. The Tunes. 14 April 1980. p. 5. 531 Hirst, Nicholas. The Times. 24 April 1980. p. 21. 
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Roman Eisenstein of The T Imes, "... sent some shivers through the foreign 
exchange markets... " and caused the pound to be "... weaker against 
continental currencies because of fears that the Saudis might pull their funds 
out of London. "532 When Lord Carrington, the UK Foreign Secretary, sent 
a second message to Saudi Arabia's leaders, 
"[He] stressed once again that the government attach[ed] 
great importance to [its] ... relations with Saudi 
Arabia 
and ... regret[ted] that they should 
have been damaged in 
this way by. an incident outside our [the government's] 
control. Saudi Arabia and the UK ... have a close 
political and economic relationship from which we both 
benefit. "533 
Sir Ian Gilmour, the British Deputy Foreign Secretary, was quoted in the 
Financial Times ' as agreeing that, "The lowering of relations between 
Britain, and one of the most important countries in the Middle East, was a 
set back. "534 
Eldon Griffiths, MP, sought an emergency debate on the expulsion of 
Britain's Ambassador from Saudi Arabia. The Times stated that Griffiths 
believed, "It was important because relations with Saudi Arabia touched 
upon contracts worth some billions of pounds to Britain, upon the jobs of 
many tens of thousands ." Griffiths called attention to "... the large sums 
of Saudi assets, which if they were to be removed could affect the position 
of sterling. "535 
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Mr Cecil Parkinson, UK Minister of Trade, was reported by Kenneth 
Owen of The Times to "... greatly regret the damage done to British - Saudi 
Arabian political relations as a result of the film. " Parkinson hoped that, 
"... the incident [would] not prejudice trading relationships built up over 
many years ... [as] ... Saudi 
Arabia is a very important trading partner for 
us. "536 
In terms of trade relations, John Hooper of The Guardian was unsure 
"... whether the move was a symbolic gesture ... or the 
first in a series of 
retaliatory measures against the British. "537 Further, Rod Chapman of The 
Guardian maintained that the film affair, "... demonstrated once again 
Britain's vulnerability in international trading relations ... " at a time when 
the UK government intended to "... boost exports to the Middle East and to 
Saudi Arabia in particular. "538 John Lawless of The Times pointed out the 
coming of the third Saudi Arabian development plan and estimated that any 
Saudi Arabian economic boycott against British, firms would be an 
"... unexpected blow to [UK] companies already suffering the consequences 
of developments in Iran and the Soviet Union. "539 The former referred to 
the result of the USA's insistence on a deadline for sanctions against Iran, 
and the latter was the result of the Soviet Union's displeasure over the strong 
Anglo-American stance on Afghanistan which materialised in awarding the 
first in a series of large contracts to the French. 540 Anthony McDermott of 
the Financial Times, who also detailed some aspects of Saudi Arabian-British 
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trade and economic relations, pointed out that Saudi Arabia was "... 
Britain's largest trading partner in the Middle East . "541 
Saudi Arabian - British relations in the defence area, were also 
important. Richard Johns of the Financial Times stated that, "The UK is 
involved in the Kingdom's defence programmes through a government to 
government contract ... worth well over £500m ... under the supervision of 
a team from the Ministry of Defence. " In addition, a British firm was also 
responsible for Saudi Arabia's "... aircraft maintenance, technical back up, 
flying instructions, English tuition, civil engineering consultation and the 
provision of medical services. " Similarly, "... Cable and Wireless, under a 
deal worth £200m, is engaged in design implementations, as well as 
installations, operations and the maintenance of a comprehensive 
communication system for the National Guard. "542 
David Spanier of The Times observed that the Saudi Arabian move 
was "... received in Whitehall with dismay. "543 In his article, he wrote that, 
" It was feared that any move against British trade which might follow 
would have a substantial effect on UK trade... Saudi Arabia has shown every 
indication of becoming the first Middle East market to number among, 
Britain's top 10 overseas customers. " Spanier stressed Saudi Arabia's 
importance to the UK from both a strategic and ideological perspective and 
he explained that, "The substantial increases in trade are not the only 
important factor, for Saudi Arabia has been spending thousands of millions 
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of its petro dollars to promote the cause of Islam and defeat the spread of 
communism in other developing countries. "s" 
The British newspapers also reported the broadly similar responses of 
a number of other Western countries. Robert Schuil of The Times reported 
that, "Considerable pressure ha[d] been brought on the Netherlands not to go 
ahead with ... broadcast [ing] the film. "545 Mr Hans Wiegel, the 
Dutch 
Deputy Prime Minister, was reported in the same article to have said that if 
the decision was his he would not broadcast the film. Further, when Nellie 
Smith Krocs, the Dutch Transport Secretary was in Saudi Arabia as part of a 
tour to the Gulf states, "She gave her pledge that the Dutch government 
would do all in its power to stop broadcasting the film. "546 The Daily 
Telegraph further commented that, "The Saudi government ha[d] ... 'a 
visiting Dutch Minister available for some `arm twisting'. "547 Dutch 
companies with interests in Saudi Arabia were also reported to have "... 
appealed to the network to take those interests into consideration before 
making a decision on whether to show the film. "548 
In Australia, the Independent Television Network, Channel 7, was 
asked by the Australian Government "... not to screen the film, [because] ... 
the network was told that showing it would damage Australia's relation with 
Saudi Arabia as it was `grossly offensive' ... [to Saudi Arabia]. " 549 
Likewise, in West Germany, the television network had "... declined 
contracts to show the programme based solely on grounds of quality. "550 
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Moreover, a Swedish company, which bought the rights to the programme to 
prevent it from being shown on Swedish screens, was described by The 
Guardian newspaper as "... bowing to the pressure and avoiding Saudi 
sanctions. "ssi 
David Cross of The Times stated that, "After Britain and Holland, it 
is now the turn of the US to be approached by the Saudi government. " 
According to Cross, the American's State Department's spokesman in 
Washington had said that, "The administration ha[s] been in contact with the 
Saudis and [is] `listening to their concern' about plans to show the film on 
the US media. "332 According to Mcilroy of the Daily Telegraph, the Saudi 
Arabian government was reported to have prepared a statement demanding 
that the film be banned from American television. In addition he added that, 
"The State Department officials [who] have been keeping an official low 
profile on the subject ... ", admitted that they too were "... apprehensive 
about the damage a showing of the film might cause to relations with Saudi 
Arabia, a principal Middle East ally and oil source. ""3 
4.1.4. CONCLUSION 
In short, if the oil crisis of 1973 sped the emergence of Saudi Arabia 
from a shadowy country into a position of economic world importance and 
regional leadership, and the Mecca Crisis of 1979 highlighted Saudi Arabia's 
place and importance amongst Arab and Islamic countries and communities, 
then the `Death of a Princess' film affair reflected the place and importance 
of Saudi Arabia within Western countries in general, and the UK in 
551 Staff. The Guardian. 24 April 1980. p. 12. 552 Cross, David. The Times. 25 April 1980. p. 8. 553 Mcilroy, A. J. Daily Telegraph. 19 April 1980. p. 5. 
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particular. This was no longer just based on Saudi Arabia's oil power, its 
pro-Western policies, and its place in the Islamic and the Arab world, but 
was now also based on Saudi Arabia's economic power, which resulted from 
its high income and revenue which had accumulated since the oil embargo of 
1973-1974. Although, in the end, Saudi diplomatic pressure and veiled 
threats of economic retaliation did not succeed in preventing the film from 
being shown either in Britain, Europe or the USA, the episode did result in 
an increased perception of Saudi Arabia's importance to Western countries. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
THE GULF CRISIS 
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'THE GULF CRISIS' 1 
5.1 PRELUDE: 5 JULY 1990 -1 AUGUST 1990, 
THE PERIOD PRIOR TO IRAQ'S INVASION OF KUWAIT, 
THE IRAQI THREAT TO SAUDI ARABIA , 
THE OPEC CONFERENCE OF JULY 26 
The four weeks before Iraq's invasion of Kuwait witnessed three 
major events: (1) President Saddam Hussain's verbal attack on the Gulf 
states; (2) Iraq's military threat against Kuwait; and, (3) OPEC's half-yearly 
conference, which was held on 26 July, 1990. 
It is the OPEC conference, however, which is the central event of the 
four weeks period because Iraq's verbal assaults and military threats were 
designed, it seems now, to influence the OPEC conference's decisions about 
prices and oil production. It appears that Iraq's increasingly desperate need 
for extra revenue to pay for the costs of its war with Iran, which it could of 
course only do through a major increase in the price of its oil exports but 
which in turn depended on the support of OPEC, was the mainspring for its 
actions prior to the OPEC conference. This once again put Saudi Arabia in 
the, by now familiar position, of being crucial for the economies of oil-using 
nations and for the world economy in general. But, the fact that a heavily 
armed Iraq, under a leader proven to be willing to resort to war, was 
actually on the borders of Saudi Arabia, as well as on the borders of Kuwait, 
one of the largest oil producers in OPEC and in general a main supporter of 
the moderate oil policy championed by Saudi Arabia, introduced major new 
elements into the British press' attempts to understand and to portray Saudi 
Arabia to their readers. For the first time, Saudi Arabia as a country was 
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under direct military threat, whereas before, one of the central elements of 
the image of Saudi Arabia was that it was remote from such dangers. This 
fact led to both an extensive and a highly analytical coverage which re- 
examined some of the previous themes in new lights and explored aspects 
hitherto hardly touched upon. This resulted in a major, extension and 
revision of the image of Saudi Arabia. 
The whole of the Gulf Crisis was also a testing time for Saudi Arabia 
in every way, as it was forced to make truly fateful choices and 
unambiguous, indeed irreversible, decisions, of the very type which it had 
largely been able to avoid making through its characteristic combination of a 
preference for a cautious and non-confrontational foreign policy and its 
remoteness from immediate threats itself. The Press, therefore, also had a 
special opportunity to observe, seek to understand and then to portray an 
image of Saudi Arabia that was not based in terms of its potential to respond 
to a major crisis, but was based on actual events. The press coverage of this 
period is, therefore, especially significant for consolidating the image of 
Saudi Arabia during the concluding period of this study. 
As we mentioned earlier, the Iranian revolution of 1979 was one of 
the main events which had a significant influence on the Gulf region at least. 
One-of the main aims of the new religious regime in Tehran was to export 
revolutionary ideas to Islamic countries which contained minority or 
majority Shi'ite followers ruled by Sunni regimes in countries like Iraq, 
Bahrain, Kuwait and Saudi Arabia. These countries were all experiencing 
strains among their Shi'ite communities. The emergence of Iran as an 
Islamic country alone posed a challenge to Saudi Arabia, not only due to 
differences between the two Islamic branches of the two countries, Sunni 
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and Shi'ite, but also because, "Until the Ayatollah's rise to undisputed 
power, Saudi Arabia constituted the only Islamic theocracy in the world. "Su 
Further, the Saudi Arabians did not feel comfortable and secure with their 
Shi'ite minority who made up an important part of the labour force in the 
petroleum industry in the Eastern province where Saudi Arabian oil fields 
were said to lie as long as , "... Ayatollah 
Khomeni still dominates Iran. "555 
In fact, Richard Johns of the Financial Times, reported that even 
before Ayatollah Khomeni came to power, "Taped religious discourse, with 
strong political overtones ... of Ayatollah Khomeni ... had been circulating 
in the Eastern province for a year. 0536 Moreover, a few months after the 
arrival of Khomeni to Iran, the Shi'ite staged a march with some members 
of the march carrying portraits of Ayatollah Khomeni. When the march 
ended in a clash with the Saudi Arabian security forces, "... 13 lives were 
lost. "ss7 
Victor Mallet of the Financial limes wrote that the Gulf states in 
general, and Saudi Arabia in particular, because they had supported Iraq 
during the eight-year war which Iraq "... so rashly began - against 
Iran... "558, "... fear[ed] the spread of Iranian revolutionary ideas to their 
own Shia Moslem communities. "559 The war ended with a cease-fire in 
1988. Saudi Arabia and Kuwait's financial support provided Iraq with, "... 
some 35 billion in interest free-loan to pursue the war. "S60 To show the 
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importance of such support, The Times stated that Saudi Arabia and Kuwait's 
financial support had permitted Iraq to `... emerge from the war in 
formidable shape.... "561 
However, the eight year war left Iraq with a severely damaged 
economy. In an attempt to find an economic solution, Baghdad held an 
Arab Summit Conference between 28 to 30 May, 1990. The Iraqis failed to 
gain any further financial support from the Gulf States in particular. Still 
worse, a few months later, there was a rapid decline in the price of oil on 
which Iraq depended almost exclusively for foreign exchange. - This led to a 
dramatic drop in Iraq's projected resources. There were various reasons for 
the drop in price and certainly a lack of production discipline within OPEC 
was a contributing factor. "Most OPEC members were guilty of this, 
including Iraq itself. "562 In fact, even Saudi Arabia, "... which normally 
abide[d] strictly to agreed out-put levels, had turned on its taps in order to 
force wayward members to abide by a new accord. "5635 Finally, Saddam 
Hussain chose a military solution and attacked Kuwait and the U. A. E. who 
were respectively, the "... leading quota breaker... "564, and, "... the main 
quota violator. "565 
In a speech which marked the 22nd anniversary of the coup d'etat 
that brought the Ba'ath party to power, President Hussain launched an 
unprecedented verbal attack on his - neighbours in the Gulf when he 
ironically, "... praised Iran for responding to his call for a peace treaty 
... [and] ... criticised the Arab nations for not recognising Iraq's achievement 
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in the Gulf war. " The Iraqi president was reported by Victor Mallet of The 
Financial Times to have said that, "The policies of some Arab rulers are 
American ... They are inspired by America to undermine Arab 
interests and 
security"566 Hazhir Teimourian of The 77mes reported how Saddam Hussain 
had accused Kuwait, and the U. A. E. in particular, of "... stabbing Iraq in 
the back... [instead of] ... appreciating its sacrifices in the war with Iran... 
Iraq [had]... "sacrifice[d]" its sons to keep their (some Gulf rulers') banks 
full with more money than they [had] ever had. "S67 The speech carrieda 
clear threat in that, "If words failed to protect Iraqis, something with effect 
must be done to return things to their natural course and to return usurped 
rights to their owners. " Saddam Hussein had concluded that, "Iraq [would] 
not forget the maxim that cutting necks [was] better than cutting the means 
of living. Oh God Almighty, be witness that we have warned them. "568 
Saddam Hussain's speech was delivered formally in a report 
submitted to the Arab League by the Iraqi Foreign Minister, Mr Tariq Aziz, 
in which he indicated, among other complaints, that Kuwait and the U. A. E., 
"... had deliberately undermined the Iraqi economy by producing more oil 
than was allowed by their OPEC quotas and then by depressing prices, and 
that Kuwait had violated Iraq's border and had stolen oil worth 2.5 
billion. "569 Finally, the Iraqi threat took a serious course on 24 July, 1990, 
when 30,000 Iraqi troops were ordered to move to the Iraq-Kuwait 
border. 570 The British press offered various interpretations of Iraqi's action 
with clear regard to Saudi Arabia. 
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To Anne Segall and Maurice Weaver of the Daily Telegraph, the 
Iraqi actions were, 
"... brutally straightforward. Hussain ran up a 
$70 billion foreign debt during the bloody eight-year 
war with Iran. His armed forces need rebuilding and 
the country's defence budget ... is some 
$15 billion. In 
1988, debt servicing is believed to have soaked up 
$5-7 billion from the Iraqi exchequers. He is under 
immense pressure from creditors and needs more money 
fast. "571 
Hazhir Teimourian of The Times assumed that Iraq, "... would use the threat 
or the actuality of military intervention against Kuwait and Saudi Arabia to 
avoid the repayment of his estimated war debt of $45 billion to the two 
countries. "572 By Iraq's actions, "... Saddam [had] now told those 
governments [that] the debts [would] never be paid. "573 
On 25 July, 1990, The Times stated that, "Iraq, which covets 
Kuwait's rich oil reserves and wants better access to the Gulf, has tried to 
enforce its claims to large tracts of the border ... Baghdad has demanded a 
lease on Bubian Island in the Gulf, which the Kuwaitis fear would presage 
further territorial claims. "574 
Based on, "... Arab and Western diplomats ... ", Victor Mallet of the 
Financial Times, argued that Saddam Hussain was "... using an adventurist 
foreign policy to distract the attention of the Iraqi people from their 
domestic, economic and political misery. "575 He explained that Iraq was 
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"... seeking a dominant role in OPEC by asserting its prominence in the 
Gulf. "576 
Moreover, Patrick Bishop of the Daily Telegraph reasoned that, "The 
Iraqi aggressive outburst [was] part of a campaign to raise oil prices in order 
to increase Iraqi oil revenue... "577, which was one of the major aims of 
Saddam Hussain's attack against the Gulf states. Anne Segall and Maurice 
Weaver of the Daily Telegraph believed that the Iraqi President's attacks "... 
indicate[d] the ruthless nature of the man who now seem[ed] to be an 
adamant influence in the region". 578 
The British newspapers emphasised that the Iraqi public threat against 
Kuwait and the U. A. E., and the implicit threat against the Gulf states, posed 
a critical dilemma for Saudi Arabia. First of all, Saudi Arabia, as a member 
of the Gulf Co-operation Council, was worried that the Iraqi threat, "... 
might plunge the Gulf Arabs, all of who are treaty-bound ... in the GCC, 
into war. "579 For. the States in the Gulf in general, and Kuwait in 
particular, had "... traditionally [always] been ... protegds of the Saudis. "S80 
Secondly, Saudi Arabia was quoted by the Financial Times as being 
worried that Iraq's threat was more general and indicated an ambition to 
dominate the Gulf States. Indeed, "President Saddam Hussein's bellicose 
rhetoric has revived the fears of his Gulf neighbours that he will turn his 
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politics [and] ambitions, backed by the Arab world's largest army, away 
from Iran and Israel towards softer targets to the South. "591 
Tony Walker of the Financial Times noted that, "Since the end of the 
war with Iran, Iraq [had] emerged as the strongest Arab militant defender of 
Arab interests and the policeman of OPEC. "S82 Iraq's attitude against the 
Gulf states was seen by Patrick Bishop of the Daily Telegraph as "... part of 
a campaign to raise oil prices in order to relieve the chronic post-Gulf war 
debt ... and to suit the economic need of the Iraqi post-war era. "5835 
Obviously, such an Iraqi aim could have had a significant negative effect on 
the oil market which was the main, if not the only, source of income for the 
Gulf States such as Saudi Arabia which had always been an advocate of a 
moderate oil policy in order to maintain oil as a main energy resource in a 
competitive oil market which was described by Gordon Martin et at of the 
Daily Telegraph as, "... finely balanced, because abig increase could push 
western economies into recession and that would destroy demand. "584 
While Iraqi troops were moving along Kuwait's border, OPEC's 
half-yearly conference took place between 25-26 July, 1990, in Geneva and 
Iraq, supported by other countries, led a campaign to increase oil prices. 
This particular OPEC conference was a unique one, as it was the first 
conference which was held while some of its members were directly 
threatened by another member of the organisation. Steve Butler and Victor 
Mallet of the Financial 77mes described. the conference as, "... the first test 
of whether Iraq [could] achieve its aims by threatening. " They stated that 
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the ministers attending would"... have to decide whether to keep, or increase 
the current $18 a barrel reference price fora basket of OPEC crudes. "585 
The Times presumed that the Arab oil ministers, "... must be praying that 
Iraq's beffigerant threat to `break necks' ... [was] no more than heavy-fisted 
economic blackmail. "s86 At that stage, it was still unclear whether it was a 
serious threat or not but as John Hooper of The Guardian wrote, "The 
delegates from OPEC's 13 member states knew that the decision, ... could 
make the difference between peace and war in the Gulf. "Sgt 
Steve Butler and Victor Mallet of the Financial Times suggested that 
Iraq's military threat would "... raise a broader question: [will] the balance 
of power within OPEC shift fundamentally in favour of the price hawks, 
leading to a period of higher oil prices? "588 The following day, Victor 
Mallet wrote in the Financial Times that, "The question is not so much 
whether oil will keep flowing, the Gulf war showed that it will continue to 
do in almost any circumstances. With the ungrateful Mr Saddam enforcing 
OPEC quotas, aiming for oil at $25 and then $30 a barrel, and starting to 
impose his will on the Gulf producer, the question is at what price? "589 
The eventual outcome of the conference was a rise of $3 a barrel in 
the price of oil which was far short of what Iraq had wanted, but was also 
somewhat unexpected by the rest of the world, especially the British 
`quality' Press which had generally seemed torely on Saudi Arabia to block 
any price increases. 
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Before the OPEC conference, the British newspapers, based on their 
perception and image of Saudi Arabia's moderate oil policy, banked on 
Saudi Arabia to restrain the `hawkish' OPEC members like Iraq and Iran. 
For example, the Financial Times reported that Saudi Arabia, the biggest 
exporter, believed that average prices could be restored on an OPEC target 
of $18 a barrel, against Iraq calling for $25.590 Gordon Martin et al, of the 
Daily Telegraph, presumed that Saudi Arabia would, "... swing its support 
behind a moderate increase on oil prices. "591 Likewise, John Hooper of 
The Guardian emphasised that, "In the initial round of position-taking, 
Saudi Arabia and the other Arab Gulf States [had] expressed reluctance to 
agree on a price above $20 a barrel. "592 Similarly, when Ali Akber Hashemi 
Rafsanjani, the Iranian President, called for OPEC to push for higher oil 
prices, Steven Butler of the Financial Times wrote that, "A number of 
moderate OPEC members, including Saudi Arabia, ... are thought unlikely 
to wish to see oil prices rise significantly above ... 
$18-20 a barrel. "593 
Hazhir Teimourian of The Times explained that, unlike Iraq and its 
supporters, who wanted prices "... to rise through immediate action by the 
Cartel", Saudi Arabia, wanted prices "... to rise naturally and more 
Slowly. "594 
Obviously, when the conference ended and the Saudi Arabian oil 
Minister, Hisham Nazer, announced that OPEC had adopted an agreement 
"... to raise its minimum reference price by three dollars, to $21 a barrel 
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... "595, the moderate image of Saudi Arabia's oil policy took a knock, and 
some of British journalists accused Saudi Arabia of following a hard line. 
Others, for example Steven Butler and Victor Mallet of the Financial 77mes, 
took another view and pointed out that the outcome of the conference was a 
defeat for Iraq's "... efforts to lift oil prices to $25 a barrel. " The two 
journalists mentioned that Iraq now "... appeared certain to win a modest 
increase in the Cartel's benchmark price. "s% 
Three days later in the same paper, Steven Butler, commenting on 
the increase in oil prices agreed at OPEC meeting, stated that, 
"... [this] could mark a historic turning point for OPEC. 
For the past four years, OPEC has kept oil prices 
low in a successful effort to regain some market share 
that it lost in the early 1980s. This was the result of a 
coalition of interests between the most powerful Gulf 
countries, Saudi Arabia, Iran and Iraq. Most analysts 
believe this is not a temporary arrangement. "597 
John Hooper and Ben Laurence of The Guardian also implied that Saudi 
Arabia had co-operated with Iraq and added that a new sub-committee to 
monitor output of OPEC production on a monthly basis was ". hammered 
out mainly between Iraq and OPEC's largest producer, Saudi Arabia. "598 
Other journalists, such as Anne Segall and Maurice Weaver of the Daily 
Telegraph, saw Saudi Arabia's support for Iraq as being highly significant. 
"The fact that the Saudis, a traditional moderating influence among OPEC's 
hawks, [had] gone along with the Iraqi price campaign [was] seen as a 
significant development in a grouping which [was] not always so 
595 McGregor, Alan and Fletcher, Martin. The Times. 28 July 1990. p. 1. s% Butler, Steven and Mallet, Victor. Financial Times. 27 July 1990. p. 1. 397 Butler, Steven. Financial Times. 30 July 1990. p. 3. 598 Hooper, John and Laurence, Ben. The Guardian. 28 July 1990. p. 1. 
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cohesive. "S99 The Daily Telegraph warned, and reminded the oil producers 
in an article entitled, `Oil Futures', that, 
"The 1973 and 1979 oil price increase ... resulted 
in a sharp contraction in the market for oil, which in 
turn caused the long-term erosion of prices. At the cost 
of massive disruption in world economy, it's debatable 
whether the oil shock achieved any more for the producers, 
over time, than would a policy of more gradual increases. *600 
Thus, the British newspapers' perception of Saudi Arabia as a 
country which stood for a moderate oil policy was modified as a result of the 
OPEC conference's decision to increase oil prices, and Saudi Arabia's 
decision to change its stand by agreeing to let the price rise to $21. But in 
fact, even before the OPEC conference, Saudi Arabia had been struggling to 
correct, or increase, the oil price. 
Earlier, Saudi Arabia had also put pressure on the Gulf states which 
had broken the OPEC oil quota and was also reported to have been opposed 
to any other countries' attempts to produce oil above their OPEC quota. 
When Venezuala's Senor Colestino Armas offered to place part of his 
country's oil resources at the disposal of the consumer countries, Saudi 
Arabia was reported, "... to have tried to block it. "601 Also, the Financial 
Times wrote that when oil prices jumped by $1 a barrel, after the U. A. E. 
had agreed to cut its oil production, Mr Hisham Nazer, the Saudi Oil 
Minister, said that an agreement had been reached between King Fahd of 
Saudi Arabia and Sheikh Zaid, the U. A. E. president. 602 Roland Gribben of 
the Daily Telegraph reported that, "Sheikh Zayed, the U. A. E. President, 
599 Segall, Anne and Weaver, Maurice. Daily Telegraph. 28 July 1990. p. 13. 600 Staff. Daily Telegraph. 28 July 1990. p. 12. 601 Harvey, Robert. Daily Telegraph. 6 July 1990. p. 10. 602 Unidentified. Financial Times. 13 July 1990. p. 13. 
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[was] said to have telephoned King Fahd of Saudi to give an undertaking that 
the ' U. A. E. would stick to its quota level. "60 Likewise, Kuwait, another 
leading quota breaker, agreed to cut its oil output to its quota of 1.5 million 
barrels per day which was reported to be partly the result of pressure from 
Saudi Arabia, its powerful neighbour. 
Saudi Arabia's role in reducing output as a step towards increasing 
prices was also noted. John Hooper of The Guardian maintained that, 
"[Even] before President Saddam's speech, Gulf Arab producers meeting in 
Jeddah agreed that Kuwait and the U. A. E. should cut their output. "605 
Hazhir Teimourian of The Times wrote that Kuwait and the U. A. E. had "... 
declared that they would cut their oil exports drastically to bring them in line 
with quotas allocated to members by OPEC. "606 Martin Barrow of The 
Times described the meeting as, "A significant breakthrough. "607 Saudi 
Arabia, which had stuck to its OPEC quotas as an example of 
encouragement, was reported by Thomas and Mallet of the Financial Times, 
to be"... ready to see its share of OPEC output temporarily decline. "608 
However, such Saudi Arabian moves at the oil front were also seen 
as a reflection of Saudi Arabia's traditional policy of acting as a mediator, 
seeking to mediate between Iraq and Kuwait and to diffuse tensions in the 
area. According to Deborah Pugh and Simon Tisdall of The Guardian, 
Saudi Arabia was expected, "... to write off the billions of dollars interest- 
free credit made available to Iraq during the Gulf War in return for a down- 
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grading of tensions'. "' The Daily Telegraph affirmed that Saudi Arabia, 
which was willing, "... to be flexible over the large share of Iraq's war debt 
owing to them, [had] set a precedent for other creditors. "61o Further, based 
on "... diplomats in the Middle East... ", John Hooper of The Guardian was 
convinced that, "Saudi Arabia had offered to help finance Iraq's economic 
reconstruction in an effort to `buy' peace in the Gulf. "611 
Even though Saudi Arabia's role during and after the OPEC 
conference shed ý some doubt over the previous image of Saudi Arabia's 
moderate oil policy, nevertheless, Saudi Arabia's actions presented a picture 
of Saudi Arabia as a rational and sensible country which realised its strengths 
as well as its weaknesses and limitations. As Victor Mallet of the Financial 
Times wrote, Saudi Arabia did not want to provoke Iraq and realised that 
even with its five, allies put together they had "... no credible military 
deterrent of their own to deploy against Iraq". Thus, Saudi Arabia and its 
allies were "... left with few options. They [could] appeal to Mr Saddam's 
sense of reason and invoke the feeble spirit of Arab unity, but they would 
have confidence in neither; they [could] appease him and fund his 
suggested "marshall plan" for Iraq, or they [could] call in the 
Americans. "612 But, according to Steven Butler and Victor Mallet of the 
Financial Times, "... to call for US assistance would be to play into Mr 
Saddam's hands. The GCC states [were] thus left with few options other 
than diplomacy and appeasement... "613, such as the financial stand taken by 
Saudi Arabia at the OPEC conference. 
609 
610 
611 
612 
613 
Pugh, Deborah and Tisdall, Simon. The Guardian. 24 July 1990. p. 1. Staff. Daily Telegraph. 28 July 1990. p. 12. 
Hooper, John. The Guardian. 26 July 1990. p. 1. 
Mallet, Victor. Financial Times. 26 July 1990. p. 18. Butler, Steven and Mallet, Victor. Financial Times. 25 July 1990. p. 30. 
176 
f 
Saudi Arabia was therefore portrayed in the British `quality' press as 
a country which wanted to keep its region stable and secure. It felt 
responsible towards the smaller Gulf states, not only for religious and 
political reasons, but also to ensure that they followed a moderate oil policy 
within OPEC. Saudi Arabia was also shown to be a country which wanted 
to keep the status quo in the region because any change could affect the 
whole, including Saudi Arabia. Even though Saudi Arabia could depend on 
American assistance, Saudi Arabia preferred not to do so because it was 
worried that an American presence could bring more pressure from 
nationalist and Islamic sources. The overall picture of Saudi Arabia that 
emerged in the British `quality' press was one with the emphasis on the 
rational and reasonable features of a regional power which sought to play a 
protecting role for countries, particularly those within its sphere of 
influence, against the rise of a new and potentially oppressive power. Saudi 
Arabia was also seen to fill the role of a moderator, a diffuser of tensions, 
and a country willing to pay a high price for peace. 
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THE 'GULF CRISIS' 2 
5.1.1. THE CRISIS AND ITS AFTERMATH: 2 AUGUST 1990 - 30 
AUGUST 1990 
On the 2nd of August, 1990, Iraq invaded Kuwait after a delegation 
from the two countries had failed to reach agreement one day earlier in a 
meeting arranged by King Fahd, of Saudi Arabia and President Hosni 
Mubarrak, of Egypt, which was held in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia. 
A few hours after the invasion, the United Nations' Secretary 
Council passed Resolution 660 which condemned Iraq's invasion. At the 
same time, the United States and the UK enforced sanctions against Iraq and 
Kuwait, blocked their reserve accounts and initiated embargos against Iraq 
and Kuwait's oil exports. Further, President Bush warned Iraq against 
further action and promised to support Saudi Arabia in the case of an Iraqi 
threat. 
When the United Nations passed Resolution 661, which imposed a 
comprehensive economic embargo on Iraq, pressure increased on Saudi 
Arabia to apply the United Nations' Resolution. Saudi Arabia, which gave 
the Emir of Kuwait and most Kuwaiti refugees permission to enter Saudi 
Arabia, did not want to provoke Iraq further by applying United Nations' 
sanctions and by closing the vital Iraqi oil pipelines which crossed Saudi 
Arabia to the Red Sea. 614 Instead, Saudi Arabia called for a summit 
614 Barber, Lionel. Financial Times. 6 August 1990. p. 1. See also 
O'Dwyer-Russell, Simon. Daily Telegraph. 5 August 1990. p. 12. See also 
Almond, Peter. Daily Telegraph. 7 August 1990. p. 15. See also 
178 
meeting between Iraqi and Kuwaiti leaders to diffuse the crisis, but the 
attempt failed because Kuwait refused to accept all Iraq's demands. 615 
However, in an attempt to prevent Saudi Arabia from supporting the United 
Nations and United States' sanctions, or maybe as a plan to threaten or 
invade Saudi Arabia, Iraq deployed troops on Saudi Arabia's border and was 
reported in the press to have sent an aeroplane to Yemen. 616 
Saudi Arabia, which had earlier been under continued pressure from 
the United States, received a visit from the United States Secretary of 
Defence, Mr Dick Cheney, and other key American officials, who took with 
them the most up-to-date satellite photographs which showed the masses of 
Iraqi troops close to Saudi Arabia's border. 
At this stage, Gerald Butt of the Daily Telegraph wrote that Saudi 
Arabia found itself "... caught between fear of an Iraqi attack on them and 
pressure from Washington to back plans for economic and military measures 
against Iraq. "617 After intense hesitation, Saudi Arabia made a historic 
decision, at least within the region, and decided to allow the United States to 
send troops into the country to protect Saudi Arabia and stand against Iraq. 
This decision was probably one of the most difficult and painful decisions in 
the history of Saudi Arabia, and certainly, it was the most significant 
decision up until that point in time in the reign of King Fahd. 
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According to Victor Mallet of the Financial Times, 
"A quiet revolution is under way in Saudi Arabia. 
After years of shedding its puritanical Islamic 
traditions from external influence the oil-rich 
kingdom is having to submit to the harsh and unfamiliar 
gaze of the outside world. Its rulers, accustomed 
to wielding immense influence discreetly, are having 
to adopt to a new order in the region. Saudis and 
foreigners alike are convinced that the Iraqi 
invasion of Kuwait and the arrival of thousands 
of American troops in this most conservative of 
countries mark a significant turning point in 
Saudi history. "618 
Saudi Arabia's role during the Gulf crisis was explained 
comprehensively in the British `quality'press. The problems or dilemmas 
which the crisis was perceived to pose to Saudi Arabia were explained and 
discussed by journalists, for example, why Saudi Arabia should or should 
not support the United Nations, and why Saudi Arabia should or should not 
accept American troops on her soil. These discussions evoked existing 
images and perceptions of Saudi Arabia, for readers of the British 
newspapers and introduced many new, and sometimes rather different 
images, which were not always' consistent with the image of Saudi Arabia 
that had previously existed. Consequently, it appears that Saudi Arabia's 
image underwent a change during the four week period as the British 
newspapers reported the unfolding events and compared Saudi Arabia's role 
in this crisis to what they had expected Saudi Arabia to do, and what it was 
in the past. 
Indeed, several new images of Saudi Arabia, which had not been 
present in the previous periods or crises, emerged. One was that of the 
619 
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vulnerability of Saudi Arabia to external aggression. British newspapers' 
perceptions of Saudi Arabia's ability to defend itself also brought about for 
the first time comments, which in turn led to the formation of an image of 
Saudi Arabia's military power. 
The second dimension to be added to the image of Saudi Arabia 
which emerged, concerned Saudi Arabia's conduct of its foreign policy and 
diplomacy in respect of the involvement of an external power in the context 
of Middle Eastern sensitivities. 
The third dimension of Saudi - Arabia's image which emerged 
concerned the workings and effectiveness of Saudi Arabia's political system 
The newspapers sought to describe and explain what they took to be Saudi 
Arabia's political system and expressed their attitudes to such a system. 
Finally, other issues such as oil, United States - Saudi Arabian relations and 
Islamic issues were touched on again and continued to add to the already 
established image of Saudi Arabia in these respects. 
5.1.2 SAUDI ARABIA AS AN OIL POWER 
From the early days of the crisis, the British newspapers argued that 
the conquest of Kuwait posed a significant danger to Saudi Arabia's security, 
which was vital for the continuity of a moderate oil policy. By controlling 
Kuwait's oil reserves, Iraq would be capable of influencing the oil market in 
the opposite direction to that of Saudi Arabia's policy. Zbigniew Brzezinski 
in The Times believed that, "The display of Iraqi ruthlessness will intensify 
the sense of insecurity felt by the military weak Government in Saudi 
181 
Arabia. "619 Two days earlier, Michael Evans, also of The Times, had 
written that Iraq's war plan "... must include psychological, if not physical, 
domination of Saudi Arabia. "62o Robert Harvey of the Daily Telegraph 
argued, that, "The takeover of Kuwait [was] a body blow to the stability of 
the other Feudal regimes in the Gulf. If a 'pro-Iraq `revolution' can be 
staged in Kuwait, why not also by ambitious cliques eager to dislodge 
bloated monarchies like that of Saudi Arabia. "621 
Moreover, the Kuwait crisis threatened Saudi Arabia's oil market 
which stood for a steady flow of oil at a moderate price. Saudi Arabia's Oil 
Minister, Mr Hisham Nazer, was reported by Stephen Butler of the 
Financial Times as stating that, "Soaring oil prices will damage the world 
economy and the future market for oil. "622 Zbigniew Brzezinki in The 
Times was concerned that, "With Kuwait under Baghdad's thumb, the Iraqi 
government will be in a strong position to coerce the other Arab oil 
producers to follow its lead on pricing decision, with potentially deleterious 
consequences for the, global economy. "623 Certainly, the invasion of 
Kuwait threatened Saudi Arabia's position as the leader of the oil market. 
As Andrew Gowers of the Financial Times put it, Iraq's control of Kuwait's 
oil, put together with Iraq's military power, was "... a combination capable 
of calling the shots on oil policy for the entire Gulf, repository of 65 per 
cent of the world's oil reserve. "624 
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Iraq had already used its military power to influence the Gulf States' 
oil policy during the last months of the OPEC conference and had, as Roland 
Gribben of the Daily Telegraph wrote, "... effectively moved into the OPEC 
driving seat - taking over leadership of the 13-National Cartel from Saudi 
Arabia. "625 Thus, Robert Harvey of the Daily Telegraph warned that as a 
result of Iraq's conquest of Kuwait, " Saudi oil policy would be much more 
subject to Saddam's wishes. "626 
But why was Saudi Arabia threatened by an Iraqi oil policy which 
would increase Saudi Arabia's oil revenue more than Iraq's? The British 
newspapers underlined the fact that Saudi Arabia stood for a steady flow of 
oil at prices that were not exorbitant, and that it would not be any happier 
with an unreasonable increase. Unlike other producer countries, Saudi 
Arabia's interests lie in a long-term policy, owing to its huge proven oil 
reserves which it claimed would still run even when the world's other oil 
reserves ran out. But, higher oil prices could force the consumer countries 
to search for alternative options: they might look for other energy sources 
or they might reduce their oil consumption. Either of these options could 
damage Saudi Arabia's interests in the long-term oil market. Thus, post-war 
Iraq's pressure for higher oil prices or a reduction in oil production could 
threaten Saudi Arabia. Along these lines, Steven Butler of the Financial 
Times predicted that, "Extended high prices, or shortages of supplies, 
[could] harm Saudi long-term interests by destroying the market for its 
oil. "627 A week later, Steven Butler, again writing in the Financial Times, 
wrote that higher prices, "... could affect a generation of investment in 
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industrial plant and energy - heavy consumer durables, where the technology 
already exists, at a price, to use less energy and less oil. "628 
Yet, Vahe Petrossian of The Guardian, based on "some observers" 
argued that "... conservative oil producers in the Gulf had cautiously 
adopted a policy of low prices to prevent both Iraq and Iran from becoming 
too powerful, even if this meant they themselves would suffer 
financially. "629 
5.1.3 MODERATE AND CAUTIOUS IN FOREIGN POLICY 
Why did Saudi Arabia hesitate to accept help from its closest ally, the 
United States, to stand against the clear-cut, brutal aggression of Iraq an 
Islamic, Arab, Gulf state, which in King Fahd's own words, had carried out 
"... the most horrible aggression the Arab nation has known in its modern 
history. "630 Also, why did Saudi Arabia agree in the end to accept the 
United States' offer? 
The British `quality' press perceived and presented several reasons 
behind Saudi Arabia's hesitation to accept the deployment of American 
troops to Saudi Arabia but most of them agreed that Saudi Arabia's foreign 
policy was a policy of cautiousness. Thus, when Saudi Arabia agreed to the 
United States' request, James Craig in The Times wrote that, 
"Decisions taken by the government of Saudi Arabia 
in recent days must have been agonising. They would 
628 Butler, Steven. Financial Times. 17 August 1990. p. 2. 629 Petrossian, Vahe. The Guardian. 3 August 1990. p. 2. 630 Unidentified. Financial Times. 10 August 1990. p. 2. 
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have been difficult enough for any government. But the 
Saudis face special restraints. Their Foreign Policy, in 
line with their temperament, is traditionally cautious 
and conservative. They don't see things in black and 
white, do not change course easily, and prefer evolution 
to confrontation. "631 
Michael Field, of the Financial Times, wrote that the Saudi Arabians had an 
instinctive abhorrence of confrontation. Even though they knew that the rest 
of the Arab world was aware of where their fundamental interests lie, they 
always preferred to disguise what they were doing. 632 He also wrote that, 
"As long as nothing discordant or embarrassing [was] said openly, the Saudi 
government [was] satisfied ... This [was] the essence, not only of 
King 
Fahad's personal style, but of the whole Saudi national ethos. "633 Instead of 
confrontation, Saudi Arabia preferred to mediation. Craig in The Times 
argued that Saudi Arabia "... as the chief, sometimes the only, mediators in 
inter-Arab disputes, [had] always felt that a mediator who [took] sides, 
[could] no longer mediate. "634 Obviously, accepting the United States' 
forces would remove Saudi Arabia from such a role. At the Arab affairs 
level, Tony Walker of the Financial Times interpreted Saudi Arabia's policy 
as traditionally being one of "... seek[ing] consensus wherever possible, and 
avoid[ing] confrontation at all costs. "635 
Therefore, instead of accepting foreign protection and then 
confrontation, it would appear that Saudi Arabia favoured a diplomatic 
solution. Ian Brodie of the Daily Telegraph, wrote that, "The Saudi leaders 
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are cautious and wary by nature. They would have preferred some scheme 
by which the Gulf crisis could have been defused by quiet Middle East 
diplomacy. "636 Con Coughlin, also of the Daily Telegraph, thought that the 
Saudi Arabian leaders were seen to "... use a cheque-book for fashioning 
policy... "637 rather than be involved in confrontation. Consequently, it was 
very hard for the USA to persuade Saudi Arabian leaders to accept American 
military deployment. Even before the Gulf crisis, amid the Cold War and 
the Iranian revolution, Saudi Arabia had resisted an American request to 
establish military bases in Saudi Arabia because, as Andrew McEwen of The 
Times stated, "The West's fear that its oil supplies might be disrupted has 
been matched by the caution of the Saudi Royal Family, an absolute 
monarchy noted for its conservatism. "638 Thus, as Robert Harvey of the 
Daily Telegraph pointed out, one of the biggest problems in the process of 
concluding the international stand against Iraq had been "... to prevent the 
desert kingdom rulers embarking on a characteristic course of fear-induced 
appeasement . "639 Therefore, winning Saudi Arabia's agreement to accept 
American military deployment was seen by the Daily Telegraph as "... a 
signal of achievement ... "640 in its own right. 
0 
Con Coughlin of the Daily Telegraph distinguished between two 
Saudi Arabian policy styles: an old one and a modem one. The former one 
prevailed before the oil era and the latter one prevailed during the oil-wealth 
of Saudi Arabia. On this, Con Coughlin wrote that, 
"The modern Saudi Policy of using a cheque-book 
for fashioning policy is enough to make King Abdul 
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Aziz Ibn Saud, the dynasty's Founder and the great 
Warrior - King, who preferred to settle his arguments 
by personally removing the heads of his opponents, 
turn in his grave. "641 
When Saudi Arabia, against the expectations of many speculators, 
allowed or permitted the deployment of American and other troops on to 
Saudi Arabian territory, Martin Fletcher and Juan Carlos Gumuico of The 
T Imes, wrote that, "The deployment of troops to Saudi Arabia indicate[d] 
that the Kingdom [had] abandoned its previous caut[ious] policy. "6424 In a 
similar vein, Ian Brodie of the Daily Telegraph asserted that, "Welcoming 
American military forces on its territory would be a major shift in policy for 
Saudi Arabia. "643 
Fearing an Iraqi military retaliation, particularly before the arrival of 
enough United States' troops, was also seen as one, if not the main, reason 
behind Saudi Arabia's hesitation to make a clear decision from the start of 
the Gulf Crisis. Saudi Arabia had "... long felt threatened by both Iraq and 
Iran, especially since the Iranian revolution in 1979. It [had] hesitated to 
take any steps which might precipitate an attack. "644 Steven Butler of the 
Financial limes wrote that if Saudi Arabia had participated in moves against 
Iraq, it would have risked provoking Iraqi retaliation. 645 Thus, by agreeing 
to accept United States' troops on its soil, Saudi Arabia would have 
increased the chances of an Iraqi attack on its country. 646 
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Another reason behind Saudi Arabia's reluctance to accept American 
protection stemmed from the belief that accepting foreign troops, "... would 
mark a fundamental shift in Saudi Foreign Policy. Saudi Arabia would be 
throwing its lot in decisively with the United States while turning against an 
Arab neighbour. ""7 Such actions would have threatened Saudi Arabia 
which was "... committed to the ideal of Arab unity, to the notion that even 
if a unified Arab state .... [was] not practicable, Arabs should sort out their 
own problems without outside intervention. ""8 
In addition, as Andrew McEwen of The Times believed, Saudi 
Arabia's action could also have threatened "... [its] wish to be seen as part of 
the Arab world, whichimplied being an opponent of Israel. "6a9 Even 
though Saudi Arabia had "... enjoyed warm relations with Washington, it 
[had] also always been careful to keep its anti-Israel credentials in good 
order. A move against Iraq could well damage them. "65° This sensitivity of 
Saudi Arabia towards its relations with the United States, in the context of 
the Arab-Israel conflict, could explain why, "The Saudis [had] always 
hitherto shrunk from overtly soliciting Western help, for fear of provoking 
their greedy neighbours. "651 Similarly, welcoming American military forces 
onto its territory, against Iraq, "... would [have been] a major shift in policy 
for Saudi Arabia which had traditionally kept Washington at arm's length 
because of the close ties to Israel. "652 Michael Field of the Financial Times 
argued that, 
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"Overt agreement to have American forces on its 
territory runs against all the basic Arab and Islamic 
'instincts of the Saudi Government. The Saudis have 
always been sensitive about their connections with the 
United States, the country which is seen first and fore- 
most in the Arab world as the backer of the National 
enemy, Israel. "653 
Further, if Saudi Arabia had accepted United States' troops, that 
would have exposed it, at the domestic level, to risks of "... subversion, not 
just from an angry Iraq, but from extremist Arab and Islamic groups. "654 
Awareness of the substantial minorities living within the Saudi 
Arabian state, first came to be a part of the way Saudi Arabia was perceived 
during the Mecca crisis, and disinformed the press presentation of the issues. 
Nicholas Beeston of The Times explained that subversion could also have 
come from "... the hundreds of thousands of Arab guest' workers living in 
the country... From Palestinian groups, such as Abul Abbas's Palestine 
Liberation Front which [had] already openly announced their allegiance to 
Baghdad. "655 During the early days of the crisis, The Guardian reported 
that, friction was worsening between, "... the Saudis and national groups 
seen to be supporting Iraq, principally the Yemenis, the Sudanese, the 
Palestinians and the Jordanians who together total[led] over two million of 
the workforce [in Saudi Arabia]. "656 Further threats could also have arisen 
from among the local Saudi Arabian Shi'ites in theoil rich Eastern province 
of Saudi Arabia. Peter Kemp of The Guardian explained that, 
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"The loyalty of the Shia minority, concentrated 
around the oil fields in the Eastern province, [was] 
regarded as highly suspect. Several unexplained 
explosions and fires at petrochemical installations 
in the region [had] been attributed to local saboteurs. "657 
Gerald Butt of the Daily Telegraph wrote that, 
"The Saudis would also be fearful of the backlash 
effect of helping the Americans in this way. It would 
certainly herald a swing in public opinion in the region 
in favour of Iraq in the face of what would inevitably 
be a described as unwarranted US aggression. "63e 
Therefore, when King Fahd agreed to the United States' request, in 
an attempt to rally Arab support, he insisted on having an Arab framework, 
and insisted that "... forcesof his Arab allies must also be involved. "6S9 
Another point that should be mentioned here was raised by Andrew 
McEwen of The Times, who wrote that, "The fear that if foreign forces were 
invited in they might not want to leave... "660 was certainly one of the 
factors behind Saudi' Arabia's hesitation to accept a United States' military 
presence on its territory. 
Why then, did Saudi Arabia agree to allow the United States' forces 
to enter its country and risk threatening its sensitive Arab and Islamic 
credentials as well as provoking Iraq? Peter Stothard of The Times believed 
that two factors seemed to have been decisive in winning Saudi Arabian 
acceptance: "... the seriousness of the Iraqi threat, and international 
657 Kemp, Peter. The Guardian. 10 August 1990. p. 2. 659 Butt, Gerald. Daily Telegraph. 7 August 1990. p. 2. 659 Tisdall, Simon. The Guardian. 9 August 1990. p. 3. 660 McEwen, Andrew. The Times. 8 August 1990. p. 2. 
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solidarity: 661 Others, such as Martin Fletcher of The Times argued that 
reports that Iraq had secretly deployed dozens of Iraqi fighter aircraft in 
Yemen, on the Southern border of Saudi Arabia, combined with Iraq's 
threat, ... apparently shook the Saudi leadership and were said to 
have been 
decisive factors in the Saudi decision ... to ask American troops to 
defend 
the Kingdom. "662 In a similar vein, David Hirst of The Guardian explained 
that, 
"King Fahad has now done something which, in 
deference to Pan-Arabism, he would never have 
dreamt of doing; the threat to his own communities 
was simply so great that, confronted with a truly 
fateful choice, a particular sentiment prevailed. "663 
Another argument was put forward by Lionel Barber and Tony 
Walker of the Financial Times who argued that Saudi Arabia's "... readiness 
to accept an open U. S. presence on ... [its] territory 
is an indication'of ... 
[its] concern about the potential Iraqi threat to the Saudi ruling family . "" 
A similar argument was put forward by Peter Kemp of The Guardian who 
wrote that, 
"The ease with which the Iraqi invasion forces 
swept aside the Al-Sabah family, which had ruled 
Kuwait for 250 years, sent a shiver through the 
emirates, Sheikhdoms and kingdoms of the Arabian 
peninsula. By denouncing the Al-Sabahs on 
unrepresentative, unelected parasites, Saddam 
Hussein was obliquely addressing rulers and ruled 
throughout the Gulf states. "665 
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Another opinion was put forward by James Craig, in The T Imes, 
who believed that a personal or individual touch had influenced Saudi 
Arabia's decision to take the unprecedented move. 
"[King Fahd], having weighed up all these opinions will have 
had the final say. It is significant that he has always been 
attached to the American connections. That attachment has 
been criticised. The Americans, largely because of their 
support for Israel, have not always been popular in the 
Kingdom. But King Fahad seems to have held consistently 
to the view that in the last resort, the United States was 
Saudi Arabia's most reliable and most effective support . ""6 
Craig also pointed out in the same article, that historical and tribal 
relations could have been another supporting factor behind Saudi Arabia's 
decision. 
"Gratitude to the Al-Sabahs of Kuwait will have been 
an important factor, (for) not only are the Al-Sabahs members 
of the same trade union, so to speak, but it was from 
asylum in Kuwait in 1901 that Ibn Saud, the Founder of 
Saudi Arabia, launched the commando raid on Riyadh 
which recovered his father's usurped domain. This 
claim on Saudi support, even though it is 90 years old, 
will not have been forgotten. "667 
Saudi Arabia's decision to accept American military troops and their 
presence on its territory, thus presented, at least within the British `quality' 
papers, the dilemma of Saudi Arabian policy in a way which both 
reaffirmed established images and raised new ones. , The aim of the 
following section, is to examine both of these types of images. 
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5.1.4 SAUDI ARABIA'S ISLAMIC STATUS 
To most Muslims, the division on the crisis between pro-Iraqi groups 
and pro-Kuwaiti groups was determined by the arrival of the American 
troops in Saudi Arabia. As Patrick Bishop of the Daily Telegraph put it, 
their arrival "... decided the issues. The fundamentalists can argue that the 
Saudis have forfeited sympathy by allowing in foreigners hostile to a brother 
Arab state. "668 For example, in the UK, Hizb ut-Tahrir, a British 
fundamentalist Muslim party, organised a protest outside the Saudi Arabian 
Embassy in London against Saudi Arabia's decision. 669 In Jordan, 5,000 
members of the Muslim brotherhood gathered at Amman's University 
Mosque to demand that Jordan declared a Jihad. Their leader was quoted by 
Barry O'Brien in The Times as saying that, "The battle is against the 
crusaders and Zionism, led by the U. S. "670 In Egypt, leaders of the Muslim 
brotherhood in parliament who opposed the presence of Egyptian troops in 
Saudi Arabia, were reported by Pugh of The Guardian to have stated that, 
"Sending Egyptians there with the American force, we reject it. "671 A. 
delegation, including four English Muslims and a representative of the 
Bradford Council for Mosques told the Saudi Charge d'affairs that, "The 
invitation to foreign forces to protect holy places was a grave mistake. "672 
In Tunisia and Algeria, both the En Nahda (Dawn) movement and 
the Islamic Salvation Front respectively, hesitated before taking a position on 
the Gulf Crisis. 
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Francis Ghiles of the Financial Times wrote, that after hearing of the 
decision to accept American troops in Saudi Arabia, the En Nahda party in 
Tunisia, had"... denounced the presence of all U. S. troops in Saudi Arabia, 
while in Algeria, Fundamentalists [had] called for the overthrow of all Arab 
regimes. "673 Thus, Conor Cruise O'Brien, writing in The Times, claimed 
that, 
"In the eyes of Muslim Fanatics - who are politely 
referred to as `Fundamentalists' in the West - the 
offence of ... Fahad and the ten others ... who have now allied themselves with the United States 
which is regarded as Israel's master and protector ... 
[is that] they have allowed their new ally into the 
land of the holy places. King Fahad, who is 
pledged to protect Mecca and Medina, and who has 
now invited infidels into the vicinity, must be 
particularly in danger . "674 
Nevertheless, even though the reactions of some of the Islamic 
communities were against Saudi Arabia, the ineffectiveness of their protests 
proved beyond doubt that Saudi Arabia had shown and reaffirmed its key 
Islamic status among the Islamic communities and countries. 
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5.1.5 SAUDI ARABIA AS AM LITARY POWER 
With the exception of the periods of the October 1973 war, the 
British `quality' Press had not paid any attention to Saudi Arabian military 
power, and therefore, no particular image had been formed of it in that 
respect. However, the Gulf Crisis brought Saudi Arabia's military position 
into the forefront of the news. 
At the outset of the Gulf Crisis, the British `quality' newspapers 
stressed that Saudi Arabia and its oil reserves, which were vital to industrial 
countries in general and America in particular, were vulnerable, and that 
there was not adequate military power in Saudi Arabia to protect it. 
Saudi Arabian oil fields were only 200 miles from occupied Kuwait 
where, according to Paul Wilkinson in The Guardian, Saddam Hussein 
would be able to advance, "... gain control of the whole country and ... 
dominate the Gulf without any necessity to conduct military operations over 
the vast desert areas of the country. "673 Peter Almond of the Daily 
Telegraph was confident that Iraq "... could also have seized the important 
King Khaled Military City base at Hafr Al Batin ..., the Jubail naval base 
and the Dharan air base, home of many of Saudi Arabia's 42 F 15C fighters 
"676 Based on American intelligence reports, Lionel Barber of the Financial 
Times wrote that it was believed that Saudi Arabia "... could be overrun 
within three days by Iraqi forces. "677 Thus, as Paul Wilkinson in The 
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Guardian maintained, Saudi Arabia"... look[ed] particularly vulnerable for 
blitzkrieg tactics that the Iraq dictator had already used so effectively in 
Kuwait. "678 Even though the British `quality' newspapers generally agreed 
that, "Saudi Arabia's Military forces [were] regarded as among the best in 
the area... "679 and had "... a lot of expensive military equipment ... "680, 
some writers, such as Professor Paul Wilkinson of The Guardian, thought 
that, "Saudi Arabia's military power would be inadequate to deter a 
determined Iraqi assault. "681 
Several reasons were given in the British `quality' press for Saudi 
Arabia's military weakness. One of them was the size of its military 
manpower. Paul Wilkinson of The Guardian explained that, 
"Although the Saudi regime have spent billions on 
improving their defences, they know full well that 
their small military force of 72,000 does not have 
much chance of holding out long against Iraq's vast 
battle hardened army. "682 
Further, Andrew Gowers of the Financial Times asserted that 
although Saudi Arabia had a lot of expensive military equipment, it had 
"... fewer than 100,000 men underarms. "693 Therefore, Saudi Arabia had 
previously relied "... heavily upon Jordanian military instructors and their 
presence in the kingdom until the withdrawal, two years ago, of more 
Pakistani military `advisers' who, in reality, did the Saudi's military dirty 
work for them. "684 In addition, when planning its military infrastructure, 
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Saudi Arabia had based such plans more on the support of allies than on its 
own military power. Simon O'Dwyer-Russell of the Daily Telegraph stated 
that, "Indeed, most of Saudi Arabia's military contingency plans have been 
formulated on the assumption that joint US-Saudi action would be the basis 
of any operation. "685 
In addition to the small size of Saudi Arabia's military force, lack of 
training and experience were perceived as other reasons for its military 
weakness. The Daily Telegraph wrote that Saudi Arabia was believed to be 
"... stuffed with advanced weaponary cynically sold to them by the West in 
its drive to recycle petro-dollars. But their strength in terms of hardware is 
belied by lack of manpower and battle experience. "6a6 
John Keegan, also' of the Daily Telegraph, ' affirmed such a view of Saudi 
Arabia's lack of military experience: "The Gulf armed forces are for show 
only. Saudi Arabia, though armed with the most modern American 
equipment, lacks the manpower, training and above all, battle experience 
»687 
A British adviser, just back from service in Saudi Arabia was 
reported by Simon O'Dwyer-Russell of the Daily Telegraph to have said 
that, "The Saudi Military operates on the clear "do not - dent - the 
paintwork" principle. Although the Saudi armed forces possess an 
impressive arsenal of expensive Western weaponary for parades... "688 
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John Hooper of The Guardian, who had pointed out the fighting 
abilities of the people of Saudi Arabia in the past during the unification of 
Saudi Arabia, wrote that until that point in time, 
"... their army's only combat experience ... has 
been a minor role in the six-day war and some 
skirmishing with Yemen. What is clear is that 
Saudi officers and troops live in exceptional comfort. 
At a field mess, the dishes on offer for the officers 
included quail. The carpet on the floor of the guest 
house at King Khaled Military City, South of Hafar 
Al-Batin is well over an inch deep. "689 
From Hooper's writing, it seems there were two perceptions of Saudi 
Arabia's military power. One prevailed before the oil era and the other one 
prevailed during the period of the oil wealth. In the former era, Saudi 
Arabians were described as having "... legendary fighting qualities... ", but 
during the latter era, Saudi Arabia's military power was described- as 
intact over the past three decades of rising wealth and comfort. "690 
K 
Although most of the British newspapers criticised the quality and 
quantity of Saudi Arabia's military forces, they did, at the, same time, 
express a relatively favourable view of Saudi Arabia's air force. The latter 
was seen as being in a good position to at least slow down any military 
advance against the country., For example, Steven Butler of the Financial 
Times felt that if Iraq advanced into Saudi Arabia, the troops "... would 
have trouble advancing far ... because the Saudi Airforce [was] relatively 
sophisticated . "691 Paul Wilkinson of The Guardian affirmed such a view 
when he pointed out that Saudi Arabia had "... some high quality air power 
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including American F-5E5's and Tornadoes [which] could inflict tremendous 
damage on any invader. '692 Simon O'Dwyer-Russell, of the Daily 
Telegraph, interpreted the relatively high strength of Saudi Arabia's airforce 
as a social factor because "... service in the Saudi airforce [was] considered 
an honourable profession . "693 Therefore, when discussing the co-ordination 
of American, European and Arab forces to stand against Iraq, Saudi Arabia 
was reported by Michael Evans of The Times to have had the confidence to, 
"... have made it clear that they wanted to command the air forces that 
operated from their country. "694 
0 
As soon as Saudi Arabia agreed to accept American military support, 
the attention which the British press had paid to Saudi Arabia's military 
aspects, disappeared. Later, when some journalists were able to visit Saudi 
Arabian military bases, they expressed a positive perception of Saudi 
Arabia's military power in addition to the expensive and sophisticated 
machines it possessed. Reporting on such a visit, John Hooper of The 
Guardian wrote that, " Saudi troops have never been exposed to the full 
horrors of war. That is no longer true. Almost 100 journalists were taken to 
see them in what, it can only be presumed, was an attempt to toughen them 
up for battle. "695 Edward Gorman, of The Times, affirmed the new 
impression of Saudi Arabian forces when he highlighted Mr King's (UK 
Defence Minister) comment on Saudi Arabian military officers' co- 
ordination with others. Mr King was reported to have said "... he was 
greatly impressed by the scale of the build-up at Dharan and the smooth co- 
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operation between British, -Saudi and American officers which had eased 
potentially complex logistics. "6% 
Two decades after its appearance during the October war, Saudi 
Arabia's military power did not seem to have created a positive impression 
overall. Neither time nor increasing oil income seemed to have improved 
the overall quality of Saudi Arabia's military forces, with the exception of it 
having new and modern equipment. Even though such a perception was 
rather negative, one positive factor was that it could also be used as evidence 
to support the image of a Saudi Arabia as a country which had focused its 
development plans on other things besides the military forces. 
5.1.6 "UNDEMOCRATIC" IN THE WESTERN SENSE 
Another image of Saudi Arabia which was highlighted in the British 
`quality' press during the Gulf Crisis, was that of the lack of democracy 
which existed in Saudi Arabia. Amir Taheri of The 77mes wrote that the 
Gulf Crisis, "... focus[ed] attention on the fragility of the States' structure. 697 
Kathy Evans of The Guardian wrote that Saudi Arabia was seen as part of 
the Gulf States' "... undemocratic monarchies... "698 Similarly, Robert 
Harvey of the Daily Telegraph explained that Saudi Arabia, as part of the 
Gulf region, "... operate[d] through the venal exertion of princely 
patronage: democracy [was] unknown. "699 Amir Taheri of The Times 
argued that the Gulf States' rulers had, until then, "... felt no real need for 
support fromtheir own people. Income from oil ... [had made]... them rich 
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enough not to need the people for taxation revenue. " Taheri added that, 
"Even the privileged "natives" (who enjoyed the fruits of oil prosperity) 
regard[ed] themselves as unjustly treated by rulers who control[led] the 
national income and refuse[d] all accountability. "700 Thus, according to 
Robert Harvey of the Daily Telegraph, "... corruption, inequality and 
absolution of the ruling system... "701 existed. This, wrote Martin 
Woolacott of The Guardian, made the government "... fearful not only of 
Iraqi arms but of their own discontented people, who warm[ed] to President 
Saddam's attacks on rich feudal rulers of the Gulf, and [took] vicarious 
satisfaction in his ruthless use of force. "702 Amir Taheri of The ? rimes 
suggested that in order to protect Western interests from external threats, 
which could find support from the local people, "Democracy [had to] be 
encouraged, with the people involved in decision-making. Such reforms 
might spell the end of some of the rulers, but no-one need shed tears for 
them. "703 
In, contrast to the above arguments, some journalists held that even 
though Saudi Arabia had no institutional democracy, no parliament, no 
election and no votes, it had its own particular democratic arrangements. 
One of them was the Majlis. James Craig in The Times pointed out with 
regard to the Gulf Crisis, that even though King Fahd would have taken 
decisions himself, he would have held long consultations first, as, 
"King has a large public MAJLIS (Council) 
which any citizen can attend and where anyone can 
give his views, and smaller gatherings for notables in 
all walks of life where the issues of the day are discussed. 
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The senior members of the royal family, ... are always 
consulted. Senior military officers of the army and the 
airforce will, of course, have been called in for 
professional advice. "7a 
King Fahd was seen by the British `quality' press to be responsive to popular 
sentiment and was far from removed from his people. "His eyes and ears 
are the network of family members drawn from among at least 5,000 
princes, the most prominent of whom fill virtually every key position. "705 , 
wrote Peter Kemp of The Guardian. 
In an article entitled, `Dispenl i ng Daily Aid and Justice in the 
Shadow of War', Victor Mallet of the Financial Times underlined the 
practicality of Saudi Arabia's political system for the Saudi Arabian people. 
Mallet quoted comments which a Saudi Arabian man had made when 
praising the direct relationship between the rulers and the people of Saudi. 
Arabia. The man had said that it was easy to get help from Prince 
Mohammed, Governor of the Eastern Province,, as he gave it directly 
without any government procedures. Describing the process in Prince 
Mohammed's Court, Mallet wrote that, "The Arabian political system was 
on show ... Prince Mohammed ... handed written petitions to his aids and 
chatted to bearded and grim-faced tribal leaders. "706 
Thus, as one reader of The Times' asked, "Democracy and human 
rights can be interpreted in many ways: how many leaders in our Western 
world would allow an open hearing to all and everyone with a petition? "707 
Or, as Peter Kemp of The Guardian asked, "Who needs democracy in Saudi 
704 Craig, James. The Times. 9 August 1990. p. 3. 705 Kemp, Peter. The Guardian., 10 August 1990. p. 2. 706, Mallet, Victor, Financial Times. 23 August 1990. p. 3. 707' Reader. The Times. 28 August 1990. p. 9. 
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,i 
Arabia where the ruler has, dispersed largesse shrewdly to spread oil wealth 
throughout the country and provide a high level of welfare services? "708 
Other journalists put forward the notion that Islamic ideas provide an 
alternative to Western style democracy. In response to an earlier letter 
printed in The Times, which accused Saudi Arabia of being one of the most 
abominable and lawless states on earth, Patrick Hanratty wrote that such 
accusations, 
"... cannot go unchallenged. I spent five years resident 
in Jeddah working in a Saudi' bank. Saudi Arabia is 
patently not lawless as it possesses a well-defined legal 
structure. The influence of Sharia law and Islamic 
traditions gives the law a strong cultural expression. 
Some Westerners find accommodating different cultures 
a distinct difficulty. Fortunately, most expatriates 
welcome the experience of living in a country of little 
violence, no vandalism, no graffiti and no public 
drunkenness. Saudi Arabia is a young and very 
vulnerable country. The Saudis themselves are a proud 
and excessively polite people. We should support the 
Saudis at a difficult time and show ourselves true friends 
in a time of desperate need. "709 
5.1.7 CONCLUSION 
The accounts of the Gulf Crisis which were presented in the British 
`quality' press in the summer of 1990, emphasised the overall vulnerability 
and weakness of Saudi Arabia from the point of view of making a stand 
against Iraq. The weaknesses that were emphasised were the following ones: 
708 Kemp, Peter. The Guardian. 10 August 1990. p. 2. 709 Hanratty, Patrick. The Times. 25 August 1990. p. 11. See also The Times. 28 August 1990. p. 9. letters. 
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(1) the weakness of Saudi Arabia's military forces, in terms of size and 
lack of battle experience; 
(2) the weakness of its policy, in terms of being very cautious , 
conservative, and preferring appeasement rather than confrontation; 
and, 
(3) the weakness of its internal situation, in terms of having an 
undemocratic system, at least in the Western sense. 
Nevertheless, the British `quality' press also emphasised that Saudi 
Arabia had been able to manage crises well in the past, and had avoided 
allowing the potential of such weakness to become actual weaknesses. This 
ability of Saudi Arabia, along with other qualities, qualified Saudi Arabia to 
assume a special role in the Gulf Crisis and, as the British newspapers 
emphasised, Saudi Arabia was crucial and significant to the international 
stand against the Iraqi aggressors. 
First of all, Saudi Arabia had the means of applying United 
Nations'oil and economic embargos against Iraq by closing down one of 
Iraq's vital oil pipelines across Saudi Arabia to the Red Sea. Robert Harvey 
of the Daily Telegraph explained that, 
"In the immediate context of Saddam's invasion of 
Kuwait, one of the key pipelines that carries Iraqi oil 
crosses its territory. It is crucial to the success of the 
total economic embargoes imposed by the U. N.... "710 
Lionel Barber of the Financial Times wrote that, "... cutting the pipeline 
would cut ... the Baghdad regimes' financial life-lines. " Barber also pointed 
out that, "Saudi co-operation becomes even more important if the U. S. and 
710 Harvey, Robert. Daily Telegraph. 9 August 1990. p. 16. 
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its Western allies are to apply genuine economic pressure on Iraq. "711 The 
following day, Barber wrote that Saudi Arabian help "... would strengthen 
the U. S. - led international oil boycott. "712 Likewise, Kathy 
Evans of The 
Guardian, who saw Saudi Arabia as setting an example for other countries in 
the region to back a Western stand, wrote that, "A key indicator [would] be 
whether the Saudis continue[d] to allow Iraqi oil to flow through the 
pipeline. "713 Tony Walker of the Financial Times saw the Saudi Arabians 
as "... the key players in the Gulf crisis . "714 The 
Times wrote that, 
"International solidarity against Iraq depends on states such as Saudi Arabia 
being able to say that they have taken part in graduated pressure against Iraq 
aggression. "715 
Secondly, Saudi Arabia was also seen as strategically important, 
especially during the early period of the Gulf Crisis. Robert Harvey of the 
Daily Telegraph regarded Saudi Arabia as, 
"... the right place to make a stand ... because it 
[was] the only country in the Gulf outside Iraq 
and Iran with anything approaching a sizeable 
population. "716 
Before Saudi Arabia allowed the deployment of American troops, 
Martin Fletcher and Michael Evans of The Times indicated how important 
Saudi Arabia was strategically. Saudi Arabia first had to be prevailed upon 
to make its military facilities' available, otherwise, as one senior USA Army 
official put it, `It would [have been] a logistical nightmare. We [had] no 
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infrastructure in the region. "717 Similarly, Simon Tisdall of The Guardian 
based on unnamed analysts, argued that without any Saudi Arabian help, "... 
the strategists' plans would remain merely plans. It was also noted that any 
really effective defence of Saudi Arabia, or attack on Iraq would necessitate 
the opening of Saudi Arabian bases to the U. S. "718 Consequently, from the 
early days, the USA was reported to have sought "... an expansion and 
formalisation of facilities for their troops in the Kingdom . *719 
Thirdly, "... [as] the only producer with the capacity to rise output 
sufficiently to prevent [oil] pricing going through the ceiling ... "720 , Saudi 
Arabia was seen by David Hirst, of The Guardian, as crucial to the 
international stand against Iraq and against the world's economic instability. 
Because, as Robert Harvey of the Daily Telegraph wrote, 
"If the oil embargo against Iraq and Kuwait [could] 
be made to stick, there [would] be a shortfall of 
around 4.3 million barrels a day in world oil production 
of about 6.7 million barrels a day ... This [could] be restored almost overnight if ... Saudi Arabia, agree[d] 
to pump oil up to full capacity. "721 
Similarly, Tony Walker of the Financial Times asserted that, "The 
Saudis, the world's largest oil producers, ... have the capacity to increase 
production to stabilise the market in the event of an oil embargo against Iraq 
and its puppet government in Kuwait. "722 The Daily Telegraph thought that 
Saudi Arabia was capable of "... offset[ting] the pressure on prices. "W 
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According to Sivell and Robinson of The Times, "[The] oil 
production capacity of about 3.5 million barrels a day, notably from Saudi 
Arabia, [was] available to make good the shortfall in the event of a 
prolonged embargo . "7u Ben Laurence of The 
Guardian saw the role of 
Saudi Arabia as "... absolutely pivotal. If the Saudis wanted to, they could 
increase their current production by maybe two million b/d. "723 Thus, when 
Saudi Arabia agreed to ' allow American troops to enter the country and 
closed the Iraqi pipeline, Saudi Arabia was seen to play a prominent role in 
stabilising the oil market, and prices in particular, by increasing its 
production level above the OPEC quota, much to the anger of many of the 
organisation's members 7m. 
Fourthly and finally, Saudi Arabia's financial role was important as 
Saudi Arabia had been willing to, and almost certainly did, contribute to the 
cost of the military operation. Simon Tisdall of The Guardian underlined 
the fact that Saudi Arabia, "... had indicated to the Pentagon that it would 
help to defray the bill for the American deployment. "n7 At a press 
conference in Washington, Prince Bander Bin Sultan, Saudi Arabia's 
ambassador to the USA, did not deny Saudi Arabia's contribution. When 
asked about the issue, he replied, "We'll cross that bridge when we get to 
it. "ns 
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Laurence, Ben. The Guardian. 7 August 1990. p. 12. 
Beavis, Simon. The Guardian. 20 August 1990. p. 2. See also 
Butler, Steven. Financial Times. 20 August 1990. p. 1. See also 
Barrow, Martin. The Times. 21 August 1990. p. 17. See also 
Hoffer, Peter. Daily Telegraph. 27 August 1990. p. 6. 
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If we look towards the future, Saudi Arabia's crucial role in the 
international community will continue as long as oil continues to be the 
world's main energy source. Saudi Arabia also plays its cards so as to 
encourage that to continue. The first element in that policy is the `moderate' 
oil policy which it advocates in general. Reasonable prices and an adequate 
oil supply will discourage oil users from turning to more expensive or less 
safe, alternative energy supplies such as wind power or nuclear power. 
Saudi Arabia also has the extra-production capabilities which enable it to 
ease sudden supply shortages and to restrict the size of prices triggered by 
other producers from time to time. But perhaps most importantly, Saudi 
Arabia has the largest oil reserve in the world, enough to meet world 
demand well into the next century. As Robert Harvey wrote in a major 
article in the Daily Telegraph, 
"Saudi Arabia not only contains a quarter of the 
world's proven oil reserves, it almost certainly 
has very much more: indeed enough to power 
the world's industries cheaply until at least the 
end of the next century. Sheikh Ahmad Yamani ... 
once remarked of Saudi Arabia's potential reserves: 
"Fasten your seat-belts. You would be amazed. 
Aramco, the state-owned Saudi oil monolith, 
has developed only two of its six concessionaries. 
The country has 47 proven oil fields, but until 
recently only 15 were in production. And the 
country's geology suggests that oil may be 
present in many unexplored parts. "729 
In a later article, Robert Harvey confirmed that statement by personal 
observation, after visiting Saudi Arabia. He wrote that, 
"I was struck on a visit to Saudi Arabia, at the time, 
by how the ratio of production to reserves seemed 
729 Harvey, Robert. Daily Telegraph. 9 August 1990. p. 16. 
208 
to stay utterly constant over a long period. . Saudi reserves grew by exactly as much as was 
required to justify a free time level of output. 
On closer inspection, it turned out that the 
Saudis were exploiting only one fifth of the 
area that they had identified geologically as 
potentially oil bearing "730 
Thus, the Gulf Crisis showed that Saudi Arabia could reasonably 
claim to have a confirmed place in the international community, based on its 
significant oil reserves, its `moderate' and `cautious' oil policy, and its 
ability to respond decisively in moments of major crises. 
730 Harvey, Robert. Daily Telegraph. 16 August 1990. p. 16. 
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CONCLUSION 
When interacting through the various channels of communication, we 
build up an image of others and they build up an image of us. If our 
relationship with others is influenced by our perception and image of them, 
then the mass media's perception of others is crucial. 
In a democratic society, such as the UK, where public opinion can 
influence the decision-making process, then the image which the UK media 
presents about a country, such as Saudi Arabia, is extremely important. 
This is because the economic and political relations between the two 
countries can be influenced by what the British perceive that country, to be, 
as well as how the country, in this case Saudi Arabia, perceives how the 
British perceive it. 
The research findings, which covered a period of almost twenty 
years, indicate that the typical image of Saudi Arabia in the British press is 
favourable. In general, categorical terms, Saudi Arabia has been placed 
under the headings of a `conservative', (rather than `backward') `moderate' 
and `developing' country which is developing in reality rather than the term 
`developing' being a euphemism for being `backward' but with special oil, 
social, ideological and economic powers. 
Saudi Arabia has been seen as being founded on Islamic principles 
and is led and united by tribal forces. Even though development has seemed 
to overshadow such features, nevertheless, Saudi Arabia's social structure is 
still perceived as being mainly Islamic and based on a tribal system as these 
factors still influence the life process inside Saudi Arabia, but not necessarily 
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in a hierarchical way for development. Until the Mecca -crisis, the 
Government of Saudi Arabia was perceived to be in total control of its tribes 
and religious forces, however, the attack on the Grand Mosque suggested 
that such a perception was questionable. Nevertheless, the way the Saudi 
Arabian Government reacted and resolved the crisis, and the level of concern 
shown by the international Islamic community in several Islamic cities, 
highlighted Saudi Arabia's position in the Muslim conscious and sentiment. 
Moreover, the perception of the character of Saudi Arabia as an Islamic 
country was reinforced by the way the Saudi Arabian government reacted to 
the attack. Saudi Arabia's government was presented as functioning within 
the Islamic framework when dealing with the group, as the government 
waited for religious permission to end the Mosque situation before taking 
any action which might have violated Islamic law. Even though Saudi 
Arabia was occasionally perceived by the British Press as a monarchy where 
democracy did not exist, at least in the Western sense, some understanding 
was shown by the Press of the fact that Saudi Arabia has its own consensual 
procedures, based on Islamic and tribal systems, through which the people 
have direct access to the leadership elite. 
Even though the British press generally presented an understanding of 
Islamic culture and practice, Islamic law and the position of women, in 
particular, were generally negatively presented. The attitude, revealed 
through the papers which were examined, tended to be that Islamic laws 
were `ancient traditions', `old', `fundamental', and they were described by a 
variety of words and phrases such as `strict version', `draconian penalties' or 
`severity of punishment', `barbaric behaviour', `total patriarch incurred 
adverse attitude towards women's rigid segregation', `severe terms of 
punishments' and `abhorrently punitive'. Only a few positive projections of 
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Islamic and women's laws which exist in Saudi Arabia, were presented in 
the British press. 
Similarly, although Saudi Arabian people were presented as being 
`polite' and `conservative' people, some of the British `quality' press argued 
that Saudi Arabian society was seen to suffer from `contradiction' and 
`hypocrisy' as a result of the gap between what -Saudi Arabians should 
practice as Muslim followers and the reality of their practical daily lives. In 
addition, contradictions were seen to exist between the Bedouin families and 
the descendant urban elites, and between the rich, who can travel and enjoy 
Western traditions, and the poor, who cannot afford to go abroad. 
Saudi Arabia's foreign policy has come to be almost universally 
perceived as cautious. Saudi Arabia disfavours confrontation and conflict 
and prefers consensus and appeasement by almost any means. Before the 
1990 Gulf Crisis, this was given as the explanation for Saudi Arabia's 
resistance to allowing the USA to build military bases on its soil, and also, 
of Saudi Arabia's hesitation to permit American troops to come out to 
defend Saudi Arabia once the Gulf Crisis broke out, despite the inadequacy 
of Saudi Arabian forces who were faced with Iraq's army. Saudi Arabian 
forces were presented by the British `quality' press as having sophisticated 
and expensive military equipment but they were seen as lacking in battle 
experience and above all they had an inadequately sized army against Iraq. 
Caution about its Islamic and Arab credentials were projected as the main 
reasons behind Saudi Arabia's initial reluctance and hesitation to allow 
American troops to enter the country rather than a lack of will or hostility 
towards the USA. 
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At the international level, and during the Cold War tension, Saudi 
Arabia was seen as an anti-communist and pro-Western state. The Saudi 
Arabian stance against, communism was consistently portrayed as an 
important factor amongst the Arab countries during the 1970s. Saudi Arabia 
was given much credit for the withdrawal of the Soviet influence from 
Egypt. This image was affirmed during the 1980s and Saudi Arabia was 
seen to take an active role in fighting the spread of communism at the inter- 
Arab level. For example, when Saudi Arabia felt that North Yemen could 
become the next country to fall under the Soviet influence by its South 
Yemen proxy, and when conflict between the two Yemenis erupted in 1979, 
Saudi Arabia urgently provided military and financial assistance to North 
Yemen, mainly to keep it away from the Soviet influence. As a result of its 
oil-increased income, Saudi Arabia's anti-communist and pro-Western stand 
extended to a wider international level and was seen as leading to a 
strengthening of its trade and economic relations with Western or pro- 
Western states to the disadvantage of the socialist or communist states. The 
importance of Saudi Arabia's anti-communist stance was heightened by 
Saudi Arabia's pro-Western attitude in general: Saudi Arabia supported a 
moderate oil policy, which was designed to keep world oil prices at an 
affordable level, and was engaged on a large scale in economic and trade 
relations with Western or pro-Western countries. Saudi Arabia's huge 1970- 
1980 development' plan was based on Western and pro-Western assistance. 
Further, Saudi Arabia was seen as playing a crucial role in consolidating an 
Islamic front , against the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, through the 
Islamic Conference Organisation. 
In general, it was held that Saudi Arabia believed that `oil should not 
mix with politics' and that it advocated a moderate approach to both oil price 
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and supply. If at times Saudi Arabia departed from such a policy, then 
pressure from external sources was mainly seen as the cause of such a 
change. For example, during the October war, Saudi Arabia was believed to 
have been forced to take a hard-line oil policy against the USA, mainly 
because Saudi Arabia realised that any further Egyptian and Syrian defeat 
would bring about an unwanted disturbance in the region. Nevertheless, 
even when Saudi Arabia agreed to use its oil as a weapon, Saudi Arabia's 
interpretation of the application of such a weapon was still far more 
moderate than other Arab countries such as Iraq. Meanwhile, while the 
latter country struggled to put a total embargo on oil output, Saudi Arabia 
advocated a reduction on the future or present flow as token measures. 
During the latter part of the 1970s, Saudi Arabia's oil production policy was 
believed to have been influenced by a lack of technological resources, a 
policy division within the royal family over oil conservation aims and Arab 
and Iranian pressure. 'However, seeking to protect the stability of the 
world's economy, trying to rationalise the oil price structure and restoring 
the solidarity, of OPEC were believed to have been the three main factors 
that influenced Saudi Arabia's oil price increase at that time. Once again, 
Saudi Arabia's moderate oil policy was presented in the press as being 
vulnerable to external pressure caused by Iraq's pressure to increase oil 
prices before Iraq invaded Kuwait. Saudi Arabia's response to Iraqi 
demands on the oil issues, and on the financial issues, reflected an image of 
Saudi Arabia as a country which was seeking stabilisation and security: a 
country that was willing to `buy' peace at almost any price. Thus, Saudi 
Arabia was typically presented in the British `quality' press as a country 
which was committed to supporting a moderate oil price policy, but one 
which was seeking compromise rather than confrontation. In addition, it 
was seen as a country which was willing to increase its prices some way 
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towards the desires of the `hawk' members in the contexts of the 1973,1979 
and 1990 oil shocks. 
In sum, Saudi Arabia's oil policy was generally presented in the 
British Press as reflecting a responsible policy towards its own economy, as 
well as towards the international economy, on whose welfare Saudi Arabia's 
security and stability depended. 
During the 1970s, one major feature of Saudi Arabia's image which 
emerged in the British 'quality' press was that of Saudi Arabia on the world 
stage, from almost obscurity as far as the British were concerned. This 
happened amid a prediction of an increased dependency on oil as an energy 
source and was based on Saudi Arabia's oil reserves. However, the decision 
to use oil as a political lever, mainly against the USA during the October 
war in 1973, not only reflected the strength of King Feisal's leadership and 
his personal character in taking such a crucial decision, but it demonstrated 
Saudi Arabia's oil power, projected Saudi Arabia and its King into a 
prominent leadership position, at least in the Arab region, and also showed 
Saudi Arabia's vitality to those who depended on oil as an energy source at 
the world level. 
The increase in oil prices, which resulted from the 1973-1974 
embargo, enabled Saudi Arabia to engage financially in a -huge and fast 
development plan. This brought strains and dislocation in the social 
structure of the country which manifested itself in two events, both of which 
had particular significance for the image of Saudi Arabia as an Islamic 
country with an Islamic mission. One of them was the attack on the Grand 
Mosque by those who were opposed to foreign culture and wanted to 
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conserve, in their old forms, the Islamic and tribal ways of life. The other, 
was the `Death of a Princess' affair which arose from the presence of a large 
number of Westerners in Saudi Arabia as part of the modernisation 
programme, and of the impact of these people coming into day-to-day 
contact with Saudi Arabian society and its Islamic culture. During the course 
of the reporting on both of these episodes, journalists came to question much 
of the simplified image which they had always held about Saudi Arabia as an 
Islamic country, and a great deal of that was extremely critical. 
Nevertheless, in the end, both helped to reaffirm in British eyes the crucial 
role of Islamic principles and Islamic Sharia law in Saudi Arabia, as well as 
the place and importance of Saudi Arabia in, and for, the Arab and Islamic 
community in the world as a whole. 
The fears which the attack on the Grand Mosque had initially raised 
in the British `quality'press about Saudi Arabia succumbing to internal 
disintegration, eventually refocused British perceptions onto the importance 
of Saudi Arabia to Britain and the Western world in general. This helped to 
further the image of Saudi Arabia as being a country which occupied an 
important place on the `world stage' which was covered by the world's 
media. More importantly, the Grand Mosque crisis highlighted the place 
and importance of Saudi Arabia in the heart of the Arab and Islamic 
communities of the world. 
Saudi Arabia's status among the above communities came to be seen 
as not just based on its oil power but on two other factors as well. The first 
was the location of Islam's most holy places within, and under, `the 
Guardianship' of Saudi Arabia, and the second, was that it was from the 
territory which now constituted Saudi Arabia that the Arabs, who had 
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carried Islam far beyond it, had originated, descendants of the tribes ' which 
still occupied a central position within the structure of the modern Saudi 
Arabian state. Notwithstanding the political boundaries within the Peninsula 
itself, and beyond it in the many Islamic countries, it came to be perceived 
that in a sense Saudi Arabia was the home country for Islam and for people 
of Arab descent the whole world over. Therefore, what happened to and 
within Saudi Arabia was of concern far beyond Saudi Arabia itself and this 
added to Saudi Arabia's importance. The Mecca crisis helped the British 
`quality' press to understand and present to its readers why Saudi Arabia was 
not just important as a major oil producer but that it also had an influence 
and, to some degree at least, a leadership position within the large Arab- 
Islamic world itself. 
More generally, the image of Saudi Arabia's government which 
emerged over the period as a whole was that of the `Guardian of Islam', and 
this was not just an empty phrase to British readers but was real in a 
practical sense. The Saudi Arabian government was presented in the British 
`quality' press as being ready to use its political and economic resources as a 
means of returning Islamic lands and rights in East Jerusalem, an objective 
which was not only a matter of narrow and specific national interest, as 
manifested in the 1973 Arab-Israeli conflict, but it was also ready to protect 
Islam from attack and criticism in general, as shown in the `Death of a 
Princess affair'. Saudi Arabia's readiness to use its political and economic 
resources against those who attacked Islam was also seen at times to have 
played a vital role in acting as a deterrent to those who might attack Islam in 
the future, from whatever quarters. Saudi Arabia was seen to have used its 
economic and financial resources to fight the spread of communist ideology 
in the Arab and Islamic countries, in part at least, because its attitude 
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towards communism was based on an Islamic interpretation of socialist and 
communist ideologies, which Islam regards as atheist. 
Islam and oil were, therefore, the main features of the image of Saudi 
Arabia to emerge in the British `quality' press. Even though these two 
factors were seen as being used by Saudi Arabia to support one another, 
nevertheless, the British newspapers came to emphasise how Saudi Arabia 
used its oil resources, both politically and financially, for promoting and 
supporting the Islamic cause, as well as for its own national interests. It was 
in this sense, that a much fuller understanding emerged of the meaning of 
the government of Saudi Arabia as being the `Guardian of Islam'. 
One implication for the future which emerged from this study was 
that the time may be ripe for seeking to project and explain the meaning and 
concept of the `Islamic mission'. We believe that during the period under 
investigation, a sufficient degree of understanding was reached in the British 
`quality' press of the importance of the practice and observation of Islamic 
and Sharia laws and of Saudi Arabia's ability to combine the keeping to its 
own Islamic principles with a high level of economic modernisation and, of 
Saudi Arabia being able to manage the potential conflict which these could 
generate. Saudi Arabia was thus perceived in the British `quality' press as 
having set an example for the continuation of the application of the Islamic 
system within a framework of economic development. 
In conclusion, it must be stated that the image of Saudi Arabia, as 
shown in the literature examined, could not readily be distinguished from the 
image of `Arabs' or `Islam' in general. This study represented a modest step 
towards identifying and clarifying the image of Saudi Arabia and it showed 
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that such an image was generally more favourable and positive than the 
images of `Arabs' and `Islam' which were presented in previous literature. 
At this point in time, it seems clear that further serious and specific studies 
are needed to elucidate the image of particular Arab and Islamic countries. 
Such studies should take into consideration the variations in the perception of 
each country as an entity in itself and should also consider the variations 
arising from the geographical and cultural contexts in which those countries 
exist. 
With regard to Saudi Arabia itself, more studies need to be 
undertaken to address the image of Saudi Arabia in other countries apart 
from Britain. In addition, further studies need to examine the image of 
Saudi Arabia as portrayed by the Sunday newspapers, magazines and other 
media such as film, radio, television and popular literature. 
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